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A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR 1965-1972

Editor: Thomas C. Thayer

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A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR: 1965-1972

Volume 7.

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VOLUME 7

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A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR: 1965-1972

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- Volume 2 - Forces and Manpower
- Volume 3 - Viet Cong--North Vietnamese Operations
- Volume 4 - Allied Ground and Naval Operations
- Volume 5 - The Air War
- Volume 6 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)
- Volume 7 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)
- Volume 8 - Casualties and Losses
- Volume 9 - Population Security
- Volume 10 - Pacification and Civil Affairs
- Volume 11 - Economics: War Costs and Inflation
- Volume 12 - Construction and Port Operations in South Vietnam

A Systems Analysis View of The Vietnam War: 1965-1972

Volume 7

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INTRODUCTION

This volume, plus the other eleven volumes in the series, contains every article ever printed in the Southeast Asia Analysis Report (a few additional papers not printed in the report are occasionally included, too.).

Fifty issues of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report were published from January 1967 through January 1972 by the Southeast Asia office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). The Report had two purposes. First, it served as a vehicle to distribute the analyses produced by Systems Analysis on Southeast Asia. It thus provided other agencies an opportunity to tell us if we were wrong and to help prevent research duplications. We solicited and received frequent rebuttals or comments on our analyses which sharpened our studies and stimulated better analysis by other agencies. Second, it was a useful management tool for getting more good work from our staff -- they knew they must regularly produce studies which would be read critically throughout the Executive Branch.

The first page of the Report stated that it "is not an official publication of the Department of Defense, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), or comparable officials." The intent was solely to improve the quality of analysis on Southeast Asia problems -- and to stimulate further thought and discussion. The report was successful in doing precisely this.

We distributed about 350 copies of the Report each month to OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), the Military Departments, CINCPAC, and Saigon, and to other interested agencies such as the Paris Delegation, AID, State Department, CIA and the White House Staff. Most copies circulated outside OSD were in response to specific requests from the individual person or agency. Our readership included many of the key commanders, staff officers, and analysts in Washington and in the field. Their comments were almost always generous and complimentary, even when they disagreed with our conclusions. Some excerpts appear below:

"I believe the 'SEA Analysis Report' serves a useful purpose, and I would like to see its present distribution continued." (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 31 May 1968)

"We used a highly interesting item in your May Analysis Report as the basis for a note to the Secretary, which I've attached." (State Department, 28 June 1967)

"We were all most impressed with your first monthly Southeast Asia Analysis Report. Not only do we wish to continue to receive it, but we would appreciate it if we could receive 4 (four) copies from now on." (White House, 9 February 1967)

"Ambassador _____ has asked me to tell you that he has much appreciated and benefited from the studies and analyses of this publication."
(State Department/White House, 24 January 1969)

"Congratulations on your January issue. The 'Situation in South Vietnam' article was especially interesting and provoking." (State Department, 24 January 1969)

"I let Ambassador _____ take a swing at the paper. He made several comments which may be of interest to you. Many thanks for putting us back on distribution for your report. Also, despite the return volley, I hope you will continue sending your products." (MACV-CORDS, 17 June 1968)

"As an avid reader (and user) of the SEA Analysis Report, I see a need for more rounded analyses in the pacification field and fewer simplistic constructs." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 17 April 1968)

"The SEA Programs Division is to be commended for its perceptive analysis of topics that hold the continuing concern of this headquarters... The approach was thoughtfully objective throughout and it was particularly pleasing to note a more incisive recognition of factors that defy quantified expression." (Commander, US Army Vietnam-USARV, 29 November 1967)

"In general, I think it is becoming the best analytical periodical I've seen yet on Vietnam (though there's not much competition)." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 21 April 1967)

"Statistical extrapolations of this type serve an extremely useful purpose in many facets of our daily work." (CIA, 6 February 1967)

"One of the most useful Systems Analysis products we have seen is the monthly Southeast Asia Progress Report.... Indeed it strikes many of us as perhaps the most searching and stimulating periodic analysis put out on Vietnam." (President of The Rand Corporation, 22 October 1969)

In November 1968, 55 addressees answered a questionnaire about the Report: 52 said the report was useful, 2 said it was not, and 1 said, "The report does not meet an essential need of this headquarters;" nonetheless, it desired "to remain on distribution" for 7 copies. From 48 questionnaires with complete responses, we found that an average 4.8 people read each copy -- a projected readership of 500-950, depending on whether we assumed 1 or 2.4 readers of copies for which no questionnaire was returned.

Readers responding to the questionnaire reported using the Report for the following purposes:

Information	42%
Analysis	31%
Policy Making	11%
Briefings	7%
Other	9%
	100%

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In addition, readers reported about equal interest in each of the seven subject areas normally covered in the Report.

VC/NVA	18%
Air Operations	20%
RVNAF	17%
Pacification	13%
Friendly Forces	12%
Deployments	12%
Logistics/Construction	8%
	100%

There was some negative reaction to the Report. Concern was expressed about "the distorted impressions" the Report left with the reader and its wide dissemination which "implies its acceptance by the Secretary of Defense, giving the document increased credibility."

Given the way in which the Southeast Asia Analysis Report was used, the important responsibilities of many of its readers, and the controversial aspects of the report, I decided to include in these twelve volumes every article ever published in a Southeast Asia Analysis Report. This will allow the users of these volumes to arrive at their own conclusions.

Thomas C. Thayer
February 18, 1975

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RVNAF GROUND FORCES TRAINING

Summary. Our analysis of RVNAF Ground Forces Training indicates several deficiencies upon which present programs have had little impact. US advisor ratings of the effectiveness of "on-site" training and the training of company grade officers and noncommissioned officers indicate a clear requirement for more effective training programs. In the first half of 1969, training missions accounted for 3% of the total battalion days available; 66% of the maneuver battalions conducted no training and less units were scheduled for training in CY 1969 than in CY 1968.

The RVNAF training system is being overtaxed by an influx of new recruits to keep pace with the expanding RVNAF. On the other hand, serious shortfalls are being experienced in training specialists.

A critical problem is the requirement to train Vietnamese in the English language. Although much is known of the problems associated with teaching Vietnamese English, little is known of why it is necessary to teach Vietnamese English in the first place, especially in view of our Vietnamization objectives.

Our approach to training Vietnamese is in contrast to our experience in the Korean War. Although many differences exist between the two wars, there are many successful Korean training programs that may have applicability in South Vietnam.

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RVNAF GROUND FORCES TRAINING^{1/}

Our analysis of RVNAF ground training covers four separate problem areas: maneuver battalion training, the RVNAF training system, English language training and US training assistance. We recognize that each of these areas are interrelated but we have separated them for analysis.

MANEUVER BATTALION TRAINING

Amount. One valid assessment of the overall effectiveness of the entire training effort probably is the US advisor ratings of the training level of personnel in maneuver battalions. These assessments are included in the analysis of maneuver battalion effectiveness but reflect on the entire system.

Table 1 is based on the MACV System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER) and shows the number of battalion days each ARVN unit was assigned a particular mission. In the period Jan-June 1969, training missions accounted for 3% of the total battalion days available. About 92% of the ARVN battalion days were assigned to combat (47%), security (21%) and pacification (24%) missions. The remaining 5% involved reserve (4%) and rehabilitation (1%).

TABLE 1^{2/}

ARVN INFANTRY BATTALION - UNIT DAYS BY MISSION ASSIGNED

(1969)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Total	%
Combat	1879	1778	2088	2025	1895	1618	11283	47
Security	890	904	956	973	669	623	5015	21
Pacification	955	778	739	759	1174	1373	5778	24
Reserve	172	127	155	171	206	180	1011	4
Training	128	70	118	101	127	190	734	3
Rehabilitation	34	41	33	32	61	65	266	1
Total Unit Days	4058	3698	4089	4061	4132	4049	24087	100

2/ Source: SEER-AMFES Operational Statistics Report, Section IV-Missions Assigned.

1/ Our analysis concentrated on RVNAF ground forces only, since the success of Vietnamization largely depends on their performance. It is based on data derived from MACV training programs; the MACV System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF; DIA reports on RVNAF schools and training centers; Dept. of the Army reports of US training support for Vietnamese; comments made by the Secretaries of the Military Services and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff in their review of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program; and observations contained in US Army Senior Officer debriefing reports. In addition, General Matthew B. Ridgway (USA, Ret.), General James A. Van Fleet (USA, Ret), Major General Cornelius B. Ryan (USA, Ret.), and Brigadier General Arthur S. Champany (USA, Ret.) were contacted to obtain background information on Korean War training programs.

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Although mission assignment is an indication of command emphasis, it does not show the total amount of training RVNAF maneuver battalions are receiving or its effectiveness. Table 2 shows that in the same period (Jan-June 1969), 66% of the maneuver battalions had no training at all; 15% conducted 10 days or less of training; only 4% (or 7 maneuver battalions out of a total of 182) received more than 30 days of training.

TABLE 2^{a/}**MANEUVER BATTALION TRAINING ASSIGNMENTS**
(Jan-Jun 1969)

No. Maneuver Battalions	% of Total	No. Days Training Per Battalion	No. Bn Days Training	No. Bn Days Available
121	66	0	0	21780
28	15	1-10	139	5040
16	8	11-20	254	2880
10	5	21-30	269	1800
3	2	31-40	100	540
1	.5	41-50	42	180
2	1	51-60	111	360
1	.5	61-90	90	180
182	100		1005	32,760

a/ Source: SEER-AMFES Operational Statistics Report, Section IV - Missions Assigned.

To validate these findings, we reviewed the CY 1968 and CY 1969 unit training programs. We found that fewer Vietnamese units were programmed for training in 1969 than in 1968. Table 3 shows a decrease in 1969 in units and personnel programmed for every type of training except for new RF companies and PF platoon refresher training. In the latter case, part of the previously scheduled training has been cancelled to train 450 new PF platoons in accordance with the Midway Proposal. In total numbers, 181 less units and 13,119 less personnel were programmed for training in 1969 than in the previous year. We do not know how much of the programmed training has actually been accomplished. However, the Secretary of the Army reported that RVNAF utilization of training centers in first half 1969 was 29,000 men below that programmed; most of the shortfall occurred during the first quarter.

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TABLE 38/

UNIT TRAINING PROGRAMS
(Programmed - not actual)

	1968		1969		Change
	No. of Units	No. of Personnel	No. of Units	No. of Personnel	
UNIT TRAINING					
New Inf. Bn.	2	1270	1	635	- 1 - 635
Inf. Bn. Refresher	43	27305	28	17780	- 15 9525
New RF Company	112	13776	278	34194	166 20418
RF Co. Refresher	240	29520	106	13038	-134 -16482
New PF Platoon	446	15610	75	2625	-371 -12985
PF Platoon Refresher	554	19390	728	25480	174 6090
Total	1397	106871	1216	93752	-181 -13119

a/ DIA Intelligence Training Reports on RVNAF Military Training and Schools.

There is little hard data on how much unit/refresher training is optimum, but many observers have cited it as essential to improving the leadership, morale, esprit and overall effectiveness of any Army. For example, in the Korean War, Korean units were taken out of operations and sent to a training center where they received systematic training up to division level exercises with live fire. No data is presently available on how often this was accomplished. Observers normally indicate one refresher period per year would be ideal - with the follow-up training regularly conducted at the unit. The Vietnamese Marine Corps is now planning on one refresher period every two years.

Operational commitments often cause cancellation of scheduled RVNAF training, such as during Tet 1968. However, no comparable emergency existed in the first half of 1969 and overall enemy incidents were lower in level and intensity than in the same 1968 period. Further training cancellations may occur if ARVN operational commitments are increased as US troop withdraw.

Effectiveness

There is no direct measure of the quality of the RVNAF unit training program. Since most of the maneuver battalion training is conducted "on-site" we relied on US advisors' ratings to measure the effectiveness of the limited amount of that type training which is accomplished.

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Table 4 is based on US advisors' quarterly ratings of on-site training. It shows that in 1968, 45% of the training conducted to improve combat skills was rated as effective, while 55% was rated as ineffective or marginal. In the first half of 1969, effective ratings dropped to 40% while the ineffective and marginal ratings increased to 60%. Put another way, 66% of the maneuver battalions reportedly received no training. About half of the training of the other battalions was considered ineffective or marginal.

TABLE 4

US ADVISORS' RATINGS
On-Site and other Training to Improve Combat Skills

	1968				1969 (Thru June)				1968				1969			
	Qtr	Avg	%	Qtr	Avg	%	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr
Effective	49	45		46	40		38	55	51	52	43	49				
Marginal	49	45		58	51		51	50	50	45	60	55				
Ineffective	10	10		10	9		11	6	6	15	7	14				
Total	108	100		114	100		100	112	107	112	110	118				

US advisors report monthly on the training level of company grade officers and noncommissioned officers in their units. While these ratings are not a direct measure of the effectiveness of maneuver battalion training *per se*, they also point to the need for training and reflect shortcomings both in maneuver battalion training and the entire training system.

Table 5 shows the US advisors' ratings of how well company grade officers are trained. It shows that, in 1968, 32% of the company grade (Captain-Lieutenant) training was rated as below average, while 56% was rated as average and 6% was rated above average. In the first half of 1969, 35% was rated below average while 56% was rated as average and 4% was rated as above average.

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TABLE 5

US ADVISOR RATINGS
Training of Unit's Company Grade Officers

	1968		1969		1968				1969			
	Qtr	Avg	%	Qtr	Avg	%	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr
Above average	8	6		5	4		6	7	9	8	5	5
Average	71	56		73	56		60	75	66	81	71	75
Below average	41	32		46	35		48	34	46	35	49	43
Cannot judge	8	6		7	5		8	7	8	7	7	6
Total	128	100		131	100		122	123	129	131	132	129

Noncommissioned officers had more below average ratings than did company grade officers. Table 6 shows that in 1968 the below average ratings were 48%; average were 37% and above average were 3%. In 1969 the figures were 50%; 38% and 1%.

TABLE 6

US ADVISOR RATINGS
Training of Units Non-Commissioned Officers

	1968		1969		1968				1969			
	Qtr	Avg	%	Qtr	Avg	%	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr
Above average	4	3		1	1		2	.6	4	3	0	2
Average	47	37		48	38		38	47	47	56	45	50
Below average	60	48		64	50		67	55	61	58	72	55
Cannot judge	15	12		14	11		15	15	15	14	15	13
Total	126	100		127	100		122	123	127	131	132	120

Although the limited amount of training and its effectiveness is a matter of concern, the trend is particularly alarming. Both quantity and quality of training have deteriorated or remained constant since 1968. The need for better training is evident. Moreover, RVN funds for training also decreased in 1969, as noted below.

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RVNAF TRAINING SYSTEM

Where Training is Done. There are three alternative locations for training RVNAF forces: in Vietnam, in CONUS, and in other countries in Asia. Limited data are available on the relative merits of these three approaches and there are conflicting views on the values inherent in each. Costs favor sending Vietnamese to Malaysia, Australia, or Hawaii rather than to the east coast of the US. However, there are arguments supporting the higher cost of CONUS training because of the "people to people" benefits of attending schools alongside of Americans and other foreigners. Running counter to this is the view that Vietnamese (especially technical personnel) trained away from home learn behaviors inappropriate to their own environment. Systematic study of site alternatives, evaluating pros and cons, needs to be done to formulate a policy. At present Vietnamese are trained in CONUS and in Vietnam and a small number are being trained on Okinawa. No "Third Country" is significantly involved in training Vietnamese military personnel. The Australians and Koreans have excellent training facilities which could probably help relieve the overcrowding in the Vietnamese training system. As far as we know, they have not been asked to assist in this regard.

All training in Vietnam operates under the constraints of a nation at war. This is both good, in that the war is a constant motivating force (very few other areas can compete with Vietnam for realism) and bad because operational demands interfere with training.

On paper, the RVNAF have an impressive military school and training system. It is generally patterned after the US Army system and consists of formal schools, individual training and unit training programs.

Under the Central Training Command of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, there are about 30 Army schools ranging from Adjutant General to Quartermaster. There are also a number of training centers where recruit, specialist, and unit training is conducted.

The Vietnamese training system suffers from a lack of qualified instructors. Most observers admit that the best caliber personnel are not assigned to the training commands. For example, President Thieu recently relieved the Commanders of the two least effective Vietnamese Army divisions (18th and 5th) but then assigned both to training commands. The US advisors assigned to the training command are often not of the best caliber, because the best US Army officers in Vietnam normally seek duty in the US divisions.

The Secretary of the Army reports that the majority of the training centers are now at or over their rated capacity due to the expansion of RVNAF. However, numerous shortfalls are being experienced in the area of critical specialist training to operate and maintain the equipment we are providing RVNAF. These shortfalls are in the areas of engineer, medical, ordnance, signal, and wheeled vehicle maintenance. The problem is that training facilities have been diverted to train new recruits and specialists to the detriment of unit training. Yet, in the face of a need for expanded training RVN training funds decreased in 1969. The RVN defense budget has 1.3 million

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dollars earmarked for training in 1969; In 1968 the total was 1.4 million dollars.

Table 7 shows the number of students programmed for training in ARVN schools in 1968. Data on the numbers who actually completed training is not available. The total number of students increased 22,026 in 1968. However, one third (7,000) of the increase was in the Armed Forces language school (English Language Training). Engineer and infantry training both showed significant declines.

TABLE 7

ARVN SCHOOLS a/

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
Administration	798	1,332
Adjutant General	1,450	1,720
Armed Forces Language School	3,770	10,110
Armor	1,961	4,376
Artillery	1,047	1,164
Command and Staff College	450	850
Engineer	3,958	3,196
Infantry	12,440	10,718
Intelligence	940	1,615
Junior Military Academy	419	0
Logistic Management	415	868
Military Dog Training Center	270	698
Medical	1,971	3,430
Music	220	265
Military Police	3,846	3,724
NCO Academy	16,741	21,959
National Defense College	20	40
Ordnance	2,637	3,957
Political War	350	550
OM	919	1,053
Signal	3,612	4,827
Social Welfare	479	540
Transportation	6,150	7,731
Vietnamese Military Academy	260	1,000
Womens Armed Forces Corps	1,592	3,038
	66,715	88,761

a/ Source: DIA Intell. Training Reports on RVNAF Military Training and Schools.

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In addition to developing basic combat skills, the Vietnamese Improvement and Modernization Program has created the need for developing technical skills in the RVNAF. Some idea of the magnitude of the training aspects of the program can be inferred from the type of equipment we are turning over to the Vietnamese, including Turbopowered UH-1E helicopters and A37 jet attack bombers, and large increases in all types of communication equipment. Data is not available on specific quantitative training requirements, but it is obvious that RVNAF modernization effort will have to deal with hundreds of technical MOS's and tens of thousands of individual trainees. These requirements will further exacerbate the Vietnamese training and manpower situations.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING

Current plans require very large numbers of Vietnamese to receive English language training (ELT). Partly, this is because ELT currently is critical in the preparation of Vietnamese candidates for training in US schools and partly because of the continued need to operate jointly with American units in the field. Since the capacity of Defense Language Institute facilities is saturated, it has become necessary to provide almost all ELT in Vietnam. The burden for this has fallen on the Vietnamese Armed Forces Language School, which suffered heavily in the 1968 Tet offensive. The expansion of the VNAF Language School reached a peak of 5,300 students in July 1969. Severe shortages of instructors has made it necessary to use US NCO's as instructors, few of whom have any previous experience in teaching English.

The English language requirement for the ground forces is only one part of the total problem. The Air Force is experiencing great difficulty in English Language Training, which is a pre-requisite for mechanics, technical personnel and pilots. All of the Services listed English language as a major problem obstructing RVNAF training.

Although a great deal is known of the problems in teaching Vietnamese English, little is known about why it is necessary to teach such large numbers of Vietnamese English in the first place. Informal contact with persons in Government and Industry with experience in training foreign nationals indicates that the numbers of Vietnamese requiring English could be substantially reduced. The cadre-training program used by the Agency for International Development and other industry initiated programs may offer techniques which could be used to avoid the need for ELT.

Since the ELT requirements based on joint operations with US forces will decrease during Vietnamization, now is the time to review our requirements in the area and place greater emphasis on training in the Vietnamese language.

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US TRAINING ASSISTANCE

In Vietnam. There are about 15,000 US Army advisors in Vietnam. There are persistant reports that the caliber of US officers assigned to advisory billets, especially the Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs), are poor. In contrast, a major emphasis on instructor training in Korea seems to have paid off. Deliberate efforts were made to assign top quality US personnel to advisor billets in the Korean training commands and a special effort was made to recognize their exceptional service.

The Mobile Advisory Teams began in 1967 and now number 353. These teams operate in II, III and IV Corps and train both RF and PF; eventually MATs will replace the Combined Action Program in I Corps. The teams are led by first tour lieutenants and some captains. The Secretary of the Army considers it desirable to assign combat tested officers to lead these teams and to advisor billets instead of newly commissioned officers. The problem is that many ARVN commanders become "advisor proof." Some have been commanding troops in combat for more years than their advisors and instructors have been in the Army. Many feel (and some rightly so) that with their experience they no longer need advice on how to fight. The Secretary of the Army is aware of these problems and believes a review of the advisory program should be undertaken to revise our selection procedures.

In 1967 a special program was instituted for recruiting and training province senior advisors. They are selected for the program after careful screening and are invited personally to serve by the Chief of Staff. The qualifications are the same as those for a combat command. If they accept (a considerable number do not) they attend a 33 week training program at the Foreign Service Institute, where they receive considerable language training and study the pacification program intensively. After completion of training, the selected are assigned an 18 month tour (normal US Army tour is 12 months). The results of this program are excellent. The critical features are the 18 month tour and the limited orientation required when an officer enters Vietnam.

The problem is that Army promotion boards favor officers with "command" experience in a US unit. Although the Army is experiencing difficulty in finding qualified personnel to fill the province advisor program, its features may have particular merit as US units redeploy and available "combat commands" diminish.

In addition to the advisory effort, there are approximately 13 separate RVNAF assistance programs sponsored by US commands and a number of others conducted on an informal basis. Most involve a mobile team of US instructors with interpreters who visit RVNAF units on a random or periodic basis. The Combined Action Program to train PF in I Corps differs from the others in that the Marines remain with the unit they are advising for an extended period of time. According to the Marines, this program has been highly successful but it has not been introduced into other corps areas.

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MACV has stressed combined operations as a major way to increase RVNAF performance. During FY 1969, US battalions in SWI reportedly conducted over 62% of their operations in conjunction with RVNAF units. Operations generally fall into two categories. The first involves operations in which planning is done jointly with RVNAF, but units are not physically integrated and the subsequent operations may be conducted in separate areas with only the sharing of US combat support assets. The second category involves the physical integration of RVNAF and US units of all sizes in which command posts are collocated, and a single commander, either US or Vietnamese, controls the operation. Personal interviews and formal written debriefs of over 50 recent US officer returnees representing all Corps Tactical Zones in SWI indicate that less than half (estimate) of the large number of combined operations are actually integrated operations. The returnees unanimously agree that these integrated operations provide an extremely effective method of training RVNAF NCOs, commanders, and staff. Specific areas in which integrated operations have proven effective in improving RVNAF are:

1. Planning fire control coordination at the regimental staff level.
2. Planning for efficient use of helicopter transport and gunship assets at regimental and battalion level.
3. The conduct of airmobile assaults.
4. The conduct of small unit operations.
5. Artillery gunnery, fire direction and forward observer techniques.

Training In the US: The CONUS training program originates at MACV where student processing, testing and follow-up is accomplished. Requirements for training are supposed to be generated in the field by Vietnamese units. Actually, the US advisors are given quotas to fill. The Vietnamese Army branches (Infantry, Armor, etc.) consolidate the requirements and submit them to the central training agency and then to the MACV training directorate.

The system for selecting, processing and followup after a student returns to Vietnam is complex, and follow-up has not been done. Orderly student selection and processing is constrained by a lack of continuity in the program and the English language requirement. According to MACV, continuity from year to year is provided by the advisors. However, with the rapid turnover of US advisors this is not the case. The lack of qualified English speaking candidates causes cancellation of about 15% of the allocations for US training.

There is no personnel record system in the Vietnamese military training establishment. No central records are kept on courses men have taken, on their performance in training or on assignments after the training. Therefore, there is no way to determine what "type" Vietnamese are being trained in the US and how they are utilized on their return to Vietnam. Obviously, the English language requirement is prejudicial to Vietnamese in combat units who do not have time to prepare and permits other Vietnamese to attend several types of US schools whether they need the training or not.

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A spot check of Vietnamese records at one US school revealed that the Vietnamese officers are always at the bottom of their class even when compared to other foreign students. The program of instruction did not appear to be very intense, since about 20% of their classes were missed in order to visit American cultural points of interest.

The total numbers of Vietnamese programmed for training in the US increased in FY 1969 and 1970 as shown in Table 8, but numbers programmed for ground forces training decreased. The increases are primarily a result of the need to train personnel to operate and maintain equipment we are turning over to the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force.

TABLE 8

TRAINING OF RVNAF PERSONNEL IN US a/

	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>
ARVN	707	688	634
VNN	296	477	658
VNMC	12	16	25
VNAF	494	1210	5889
Total	1509	2391	7206

a/ JCSM 636-69

Funds for training RVNAF personnel in the US increased slightly in 1969 and 1970 but will decrease in 1971. Funds for training of RVNAF are as follows:

TABLE 9

	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>
Budget (millions of dollars)	2.5	2.6a/	2.9a/	2.0

a/ Cost determined by type training; not student load.

Table 10 shows that 13% less Vietnamese are scheduled in US Army schools in FY 1970 than in 1968 and plans call for training 31% less in 1971. In FY 70, a total of 775 Vietnamese are scheduled to attend 23 separate US Army schools ranging from Adjutant General to Chemical school. Of the total, ten are enrolled in Intelligence and the Adjutant General School has four times (41) the number of Vietnamese slots as does the Special Warfare (Counterinsurgency) School (11). The Civic Action school has 12 Vietnamese students programmed in FY 1970. In 1969, the Engineer school accounted for more students (253) than any other school. In 1970, it was reduced to 57 students and the Infantry School accounted for the most students (152).

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Our training of Koreans in the US during the Korean War was different from our current programs for Vietnamese. Specially tailored classes were established on a "crash" basis in US Army schools. The training was intense, and included only what was needed in basic combat skills (Infantry, Armor, Artillery). Student selection was based on combat performance. They were taught (in a separate group of 100-150 students) by specially selected US Army officers who were fluent in Korean. On return to Korea the students became instructors in the Korean school system, where manuals were translated into the Korean language.

TABLE 10 a/VIETNAMESE TRAINING IN CONUS

<u>School</u>	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>	<u>FY70</u>	<u>FY71</u>
Adjutant General	42	56	41	45
Armor	46	38	26	26
Artillery	35	44	64	28
USACGSC	6	6	8	9
Chaplain	3	6	9	6
Civic Action	16	14	10	10
Engineer	108	253	57	58
Finance	17	9	28	29
Infantry	128	162	152	142
Intelligence	6	12	10	10
Judge Advocate General	1	4	4	4
Logistics Management	41	19	20	30
Medical	6	28	12	22
Military Police	52	42	34	24
Ordnance	19	31	32	26
Quartermaster	36	47	30	34
Signal	47	127	124	60
Special Warfare	39	17	11	16
Transportation	59	45	64	10
WAC	4	7	8	3
Information	12	8	9	5
English Language	152	-	20	18
Chemical	12	-	2	1
 Total b/	887	975	775	616
 % Change from 1968	-	10	-13	-31

a/ DIA-Foreign Military Training Division.

b/ Total includes ARVN and Other Vietnamese personnel in U. S. Army Schools. Does not include Helicopter/Mechanic Training for VNAF.

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Summary. It is clear that severe problems exist in training the RVNAF ground forces. We recognize that much has been accomplished to improve RVNAF ground forces training. However, we believe more emphasis has been placed on equipping the RVNAF than on training them.

Training also affects other RVNAF problem areas such as leadership and morale. Many observers rate an effective unit training program as the key to improving deficiencies in RVNAF morale, esprit and leadership (and leadership is considered to be the key to desertion control). The problem at the present time appears to be that training is not being addressed on the same accelerated basis as the equipment program. We believe that a shift in emphasis from force expansion and equipment modernization to training can go a long way in overcoming RVNAF deficiencies.

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RVNAF TRAINING

Summary. About 36% of all Regular Force Battalions received no training in 1969; another 18% conducted 10 days or less of training. Only 3% of the estimated US Service funds is allocated to RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (I&M), and about 90% of this is devoted to Air Force training; by FY 1973 only .4% of total I&M costs are tentatively allocated to RVNAF Training.

Table 1 shows the number of battalion days that ARVN battalions spend on training (Divisions and Separate Regiments only). Although improvement has been made in the last five months, training still accounts for only 7% of the total battalion days available to those particular units.

TABLE 1 a/

ARVN INFANTRY BATTALION - UNIT DAYS ON TRAINING b/
(Monthly Average)

	1969				Jan-Nov (Monthly) Total
	1st Qtr Avg.	2nd Qtr Avg.	3rd Qtr Avg.	Oct-Nov	
Total Unit Days	3948	4081	4090	4062	44480
Training	105	139	273	296	2144
% of Unit Days on Training	3	3	7	7	5

a/ Source: SEER-AMFES Operational Statistics Report, Section IV-Missions Assigned.

b/ Includes ARVN battalions in Divisions and Separate Regiments. Does not include the Vietnamese Rangers, Airborne, Marines or Cavalry.

Table 2 shows that 35% of the all Regular RVNAF battalions had no training in 1969; 18% conducted 10 or less days of training; and 27% received more than 30 days of training.

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TABLE 2

ARVN/VNMC TRAINING ASSIGNMENTS a/
(Jan-Dec 1969)

No. Maneuver Battalions	% of Total	No. Days Training Per Battalion	No. Bn Days Training	No. Bn Days Available
65	35	0	0	23,725
34	18	1-10	180	12,410
15	8	11-20	232	5,475
21	12	21-30	562	7,665
32	17	31-40	1576	11,670
<u>18</u>	<u>10</u>	over 40	<u>1089</u>	<u>6,570</u>
<u>185</u>	<u>100</u>		<u>3139</u>	<u>67,515</u>

a/ Includes all ARVN, Ranger, Airborne and Marine battalions, plus the... cavalry squadrons.

Major deficiencies in RVNAF training listed in the recent JCS Training Plan (JCSM 42-70) have been mentioned in service reports:

- The Central Training Command is not staffed to control the training effort effectively.
- The system for rotating cadre into and out of training centers is ineffective. Marginally effective instructors have remained in training centers for as long as seven years.
- Key personnel at training centers and Service schools have no combat experience. There is no effective program to relate combat experience or lessons learned in combat to the training situation.
- Training facilities are inadequate.

In spite of these shortcomings, the JCS plan proposes to train the following numbers of personnel:

<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
608,000	632,000	617,000	606,000

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Even if this number could be trained, its effectiveness is doubtful. US Advisors rate over 50% of the training to improve combat skills, and the training of company grade officers and noncommissioned officers as ineffective. Extrapolating from this data, the total numbers of RVNAF receiving effective training is substantially lower than the totals in JCSM 42-70. However, we do not have sufficient data to project precisely how many RVNAF personnel are receiving effective training.

Capability of Training Base to Meet Training Requirements

MACV is currently staffing a proposal to upgrade RVNAF training facilities expected to cost about \$27.5 million and is pursuing a plan to eliminate small inefficient training centers and improve and expand training centers capable of long range development. According to JCSM 42-70, these improvements will permit the RVNAF training facilities to operate at the following capacities during the RVNAF consolidation period.

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Percent of Normal Capacity Required</u>		
	<u>ARVN/RF/PF</u>	<u>VNAF</u>	<u>VNN/VNMC</u>
1970	111.3	100	100.0
1971	95.6	100	94.9
1972	93.7	100	43.9
1973	89.0	90	47.7

JCSM 42-70 also indicates that although RVNAF training is below US standards, the following classification provides a measure of the relative quality of instruction and curriculum.

<u>Classification</u>	<u>ARVN/RF/PF</u>	<u>VNAF</u>	<u>VNN</u>	<u>VNMC</u>
Excellent	50%	60%	---	100%
Above Satisfactory	45%	5%	75%	---
Satisfactory	5%	35%	25%	---

We do not know how these ratings were determined. However, MACV's proposal to upgrade training facilities (cited above) appears to be a long range proposal that may have little effect in alleviating the overcrowded conditions now being experienced in the training centers. The problem is that the training centers have not been able to keep abreast of the linear expansion of RVNAF. It is compounded because recruiting is accomplished at a maximum rate apparently without regard to the capacity of the training base in a particular area. The result is some training centers are forced to operate above 111% whereas others operate under 100% capacity. General mobilization and previous RVNAF improvement and modernization programs have emphasized recruiting and training a maximum number of new personnel to fill the expanding RVNAF. To accommodate them, refresher training had to be cancelled.

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Table 3 shows that of the estimated US Service funds allocated for RVNAF Improvement and Modernization, only 3% in 1970 and 1/2 of 1% in 1973 are allocated to training. The highest expenditure for training is \$44.0 million in 1970, of which \$39.2 million is allocated to the Air Force. The Navy expends almost as much on training (\$2.2 million in 1970) as the combined total of ARVN, Regional and Popular Forces (\$2.8 million); while the Air Force (\$39.2 million) spends over ten times the combined total.

TABLE 3

ESTIMATED COST FOR RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION/TRAINING BY SERVICE ^{a/}

	FY 70			FY 71			FY 72			FY 73		
	Total	Train- ing	Per- cent									
Army ^{b/}	1356.2	2.8	.2	1425.1	2.8	.2	1195.5	2.5	.2	1189.7	2.1	.2
Navy	54.6	2.2	.4	121.0	2.3	.2	76.2	.5	.1	60.8	.5	.1
Air Force	263.7	39.2	15	386.2	27.9	.7	552.1	8.5	.2	512.4	4.4	.1
Total	1674.5	44.2	3	1932.3	33.0	2	1823.8	11.5	.1	1762.9	7.0	.04
GVN Expenditures for Training	3.2			4.2			4.5			4.7		
Total	47.4			37.2			16.0			11.7		

^{a/} Costs estimated in JCSM 42-70. Total GVN costs supporting training cannot be identified because GVN budget and financial management system is not oriented toward cost identification.

^{b/} Includes Marine Corps.

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GVN FORCES - DESERTIONS AND PERSONNEL INPUT





TABLE 1

GVN DESERTIONS - MONTHLY AVERAGE

	CY 1965		CY 1966			
	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th ^{a/} Qtr
<u>Deserters (000s)</u>						
Regular Forces ^{b/}	3.7	5.1	6.2	5.6	5.3 ^{c/}	4.4
RF and PF ^{d/}	6.0	4.4	4.8	6.1	3.7	2.9
Total ^{d/}	9.7	9.5	11.0	11.7	9.0	7.3
<u>Deserters Per 1000 Strength ^{e/}</u>						
Regular Forces	12.5	16.9	19.7	17.9	16.5	13.8
RF and PF	23.3	16.4	17.6	21.9	12.9	9.8

^{a/} Based on October and November preliminary data.

^{b/} Regular forces include ARVN, VPA, VNNC, and VNAF.

^{c/} The definition of deserters was changed and the severity of penalties increased.

^{d/} Excludes desertions from CIDG, Armed Combat and National Police.

^{e/} Using SEA Statistical Summary Table 1 Force Strengths.

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TABLE 2

REGULAR PERSONNEL INPUT - MONTHLY AVERAGE

	CY 1965		CY 1966			
	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr
Volunteers (000)	8.5 (63)	5.4 (61)	4.5 (51)	4.8 (54)	4.1 (44)	4.4 (48)
Conscripts (000)	4.4 (37)	3.2 (39)	4.0 (49)	3.5 (46)	4.6 (56)	4.0 (52)
Total	12.9 (100)	8.6 (100)	8.5 (100)	8.3 (100)	8.7 (100)	8.4 (100)

Prior to August, 1966 a deserter was an individual who was absent without leave:

1. More than 6 days if he has more than 90 days service, or
2. More than 30 days if he has less than 90 days service, or
3. More than 15 days if he is in transit.

On August 1, 1966 a deserter was redefined as a service member absent without leave for more than 15 days. At the same time, penalties for desertion were increased to:

1. Death if the deserter joins the enemy.
2. Hard labor for life if the deserter deserts in face of the enemy.
3. 5-20 years hard labor if the deserter deserts during an Operation.
4. 5 years hard labor for simple desertion.

Conviction will not result in imprisonment but in front line duty in labor units.

Chart 1 and Table 1 indicate that desertion rates for both the regular and the Regional/Popular Forces (RF/PF) have been decreasing. Moreover, the RF/PF desertion rates in absolute terms and per thousand strength have fallen below the regular force desertion rates for four of the six quarters shown, including the last two quarters of CY 1966. The data indicate that the change in definition and stronger penalties for desertion may have succeeded in reducing the desertion rates; however, the statistics are probably too tenuous for drawing conclusions yet.

Chart 2 and Table 2 show that conscripts comprised more than half of the personnel input to regular forces during the last half of CY 1966, a period in which the desertions rate declined considerably.

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GVN FORCES - DESERTIONS AND PERSONNEL INPUT





TABLE 1

GVN DESERTIONS - MONTHLY AVERAGE b/

	1965		1966				Ave 1966	1967	
	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr		1st Qtr	a/
<u>Deserters (000) b/</u>									
Regular Forces	3.7	5.1	6.2	5.6	5.3 ^{c/}	4.1	5.3		3.7
RF/PF	6.0	4.4	5.1	6.1	3.7	3.1	4.5		2.1
Total ^{d/}	9.7	9.5	11.3	11.7	9.0	7.2	9.8		5.8
<u>Strengths (000)^{e/}</u>									
Regular Forces	283.4	299.7	310.3	312.8	319.8	321.3	316.1		319.6
RF/PF	257.3	265.4	271.5	275.6	283.1	297.5	281.9		290.3
<u>Deserters Per 1000 Strength</u>									
Regular Forces	13	17	20	18	17	13	17		12
RF/PF	23	17	19	22	13	10	16		7

a/ Includes March MACV estimates.

b/ Regular Forces include ARVN, VNN, VIMC and VNAF.

c/ The definition of deserters was changed and the severity of penalties increased.

d/ Excludes desertions from CIDG, Armed Combat Youth and National Police.

e/ SEA Statistical Summary Table 1 Force Strengths.

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TABLE 2

GVN PERSONNEL INPUT - MONTHLY AVERAGE
(In 000)

	1965		1966				1967	
	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	
	%	%	%	%	%	φ	%	
Volunteers	8.5(60)	5.4(63)	4.5(54)	5.9(58)	4.1(47)	4.5(57)	4.1(62)	
Conscripts	4.4(34)	3.2(37)	3.9(46)	3.5(42)	4.6(53)	3.4(43)	2.5(38)	
Total	12.9(100)	8.6(100)	8.4(100)	8.4(100)	8.7(100)	7.9(100)	6.6(100)	

The desertions for Regular, Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PP) continued their downward trend (Table 1 and Graph 1). The RF/PP desertion rates stayed below the Regular Forces rates for the third consecutive quarter. The data indicates that stricter penalties and the change in definition have reduced the desertion rate (See January SEA Analysis Report, pp 11-12).


While the desertion rate decreased the percentage of Regular Forces personnel input who are volunteers has increased. (Table 2, Graph 2.)

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GVN FORCES - DESERTIONS AND PERSONNEL INPUT

During April-May 1967, Regular Forces and RF/PF (Regional Forces and Popular Forces) desertions continued their downward trend, but CIDG desertions more than tripled over 1st quarter 1967. In the second quarter of 1966 the CIDG desertion rate was also way up and a seasonal pattern may be evident. The RF/PF desertion rate remained below the Regular Forces rate.

The percentage of Regular Forces personnel input who are conscripts has increased to its highest level in the two years, but it is above 50% for only the second quarter in the last eight.



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TABLE 1

GVN DESERTIONS - MONTHLY AVERAGE

	1965		1966				1967		
	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Ave 1966	1st Qtr	Apr- May
<u>Deserters (000)</u>									
Regular Forces b/	3.7	5.1	6.2	5.6	5.3 ^{a/}	4.1	5.3	3.8	3.2
RF/PF	6.0	4.4	5.1	6.1	3.7	3.1	4.5	2.3	1.6
CIDG	.5	.2	.5	1.0	.5	.5	.6	.3	1.1
Total c/	10.2	9.7	11.8	12.7	9.5	7.7	10.4	6.4	5.9
<u>Strengths (000)d/</u>									
Regular Forces	283.4	299.7	310.3	312.8	319.8	321.3	316.1	319.6	323.0
RF/FF	257.3	265.4	271.5	275.6	283.1	297.5	281.9	289.5	283.8 ^{e/}
CIDG	23.6	27.7	28.3	29.4	31.9	34.6	31.0	32.7	36.3 ^{e/}
<u>Deserters/1000 Str</u>									
Regular Forces	13	17	20	18	17	13	17	12	10
RF/PF	23	17	19	22	13	10	16	8	6
CIDG	21	7	18	34	16	14	21	9	30

a/The definition of deserters was changed and the severity of penalties increased.

b/Includes ARVN, VNN, VNMC, and VNAF.

c/Excludes desertions from Armed Combat Youth and National Police.

d/Table 1 SEA Statistical Summary strengths.

e/May strength includes approximately 10,000 personnel not previously reported.

TABLE 2

REGULAR FORCES PERSONNEL INPUT (000) - MONTHLY AVERAGE

	1965		1966				1967	
	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	Apr- May
Volunteers	8.5(66)	5.4(63)	4.5(54)	5.9(63)	4.1(47)	4.5(57)	4.2(61)	3.3(44)
Conscripts	4.4(34)	3.2(37)	3.9(46)	3.5(37)	4.6(53)	3.4(43)	2.7(39)	4.2(56)
Total	12.9(100)	8.6(100)	8.4(100)	9.4(100)	8.7(100)	7.9(100)	6.9(100)	7.5(100)

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July 68

RVNAF DESERTIONS

Last month we reported in a post-Tet review* that desertions in February-April were 62% higher than in the first half of 1967 and that the rate per 1000 strength was 46% higher. Those findings were based on gross desertion figures. MACV has since released new data on deserters returned to military service, defining these returnees as deserters who, after being dropped from the rolls, have been returned to military control and are a gain to assigned strength. Now that returnee figures are available for Regular and Regional Forces (Table 1), we are able to reexamine the desertion figures.**

The new figures show that net desertion losses in RVNAF for January through May 1968 were about the same as in the similar 1967 period (33,431 in 1968 versus 33,186 in 1967); the average net desertion rate was 9.6 per 1000 RVNAF forces, versus 10.9 per 1000 for the corresponding 1967 period. Four times as many deserters returned during the first five months of 1968 as during all of 1967 (16,857 versus 4,083).

While the new figures improve the picture for early 1968, they still indicate that desertions remain an important problem to be overcome in keeping RVNAF up to strength. Gross desertions are dropping slowly while returnees are dropping rapidly, so the net desertions in May were the highest of the past 17 months and 55% over May 1967. The net desertion rate per 1000 RVNAF personnel was 12.9 in May, almost equalling the peak of 13.0 per 1000 in March 1967 and 23% above the 1967 rate. Both ARVN and total regular forces had May 1968 peak net desertion rates for the 17 month period. Taking the first five months of 1968, and then projecting net desertions for the rest of the year based on the May desertion rate yields a 1968 net desertion estimate of about 100,000, 29% over last year (Table 2). This is more than our projection of RVNAF total casualties for 1968 of 90,600. Thus, total RVNAF losses for 1968 could be close to 200,000.

The upward trend in net desertions derives from a sharp decline in returnees during April and May, despite continued high gross desertion rates. The returnee decline was to be expected, because special circumstances produced the record high rates in February and March. The enemy's Tet offensive hit Vietnamese units which were already about 50% understrength (most soldiers were on Tet leaves), and the present-for-duty strength of ARVN infantry divisions had hit a reported low of 68% by 10 February 1968.

* June 1968 Southeast Asia Analysis Report, page 21.

** Gross desertions, minus returnees, equal net desertions.

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To help recover strength, the Vietnamese JGS briefly declared a moratorium on classifying absent personnel as deserters and offered amnesty to all personnel who returned by 15 March. The reprieve and the threat of a general mobilization brought in 12,083 deserters in February and March or 72% of all returnees through May 1968. These circumstances suggest that we cannot expect the abnormally high February-May rate of returnees to recur in the months to come, and that the net desertion rate may continue to climb.

TABLE 2

PROJECTION OF RVNAF LOSSES

	<u>Thru</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>Total</u>
RVNAF Strength(000)	679*	765	771	777	783	789	795	801			
Net Deserters	32831*	9876	9953	10031	10108	10186	10263	10341	103,589		
KIA & WIA	35442*	5927*	8057	8120	8182	8245	8308	8370	90,651		
Total Expected Losses	68273*	15803	18010	18151	18290	18431	18571	18711	194,240		

* Actual, all other figures are estimates.

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TABLE 1
RVNAF NMT DESERTIONS *a/b*

	1967	1968	1967	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	1968	1967	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
	Total	Jan-May	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Total	Jan				
ARVN													
Strength (000)	288.6	322.6	281.8	253.9	289.6	297.9	308.4	281.9	280.1	281.2	283.2		
Gross Deserters	38307	26741	10732	5537	8542	10146	15706	3311	3798	3673	2874		
Deserters Returned	3590	14121	643	298	771	1178	11473	259	125	259	265		
Net Deserters	34717	12620	10139	7339	7771	8968	4233	3052	3673	3414	2609		
Net/1000 Str/Mo	10.0	7.8	12.0	9.2	8.9	10.0	4.6	10.8	13.1	12.1	9.2		
OTHER REGULAR													
Strength (000)	39.0	41.9	38.6	39.2	39.6	38.7	40.7	38.6	38.5	38.5	38.7		
Gross Deserters	3047	1936	512	519	1062	934	1108	140	197	175	142		
Deserters Returned	287	141	97	21	75	94	361	64	11	22	3		
Net Deserters	2760	1495	415	518	987	840	747	76	186	153	139		
Net/1000 Str/Mo	5.9	7.1	3.6	4.4	8.3	7.2	6.1	2.0	4.8	4.0	3.6		
TOTAL REGULAR													
Strength (000)	327.6	364.5	320.4	323.1	329.2	336.6	349.1	320.5	318.6	319.7	321.9		
Gross Deserters	41354	28677	11234	9376	9604	11080	16814	3451	3995	3848	3016		
Deserters Returned	3877	14562	740	1319	846	1272	11834	323	136	281	268		
Net Deserters	37477	14115	10554	5357	8758	9808	4960	3128	3859	3567	2748		
Net/1000 Str/Mo	9.5	7.7	11.0	9.6	8.9	9.7	4.8	9.8	12.1	11.2	8.3		
REGIONAL													
Strength (000)	144.5	160.8	145.3	141.7	142.3	146.8	153.5	145.9	143.7	141.8	142.0		
Gross Deserters	17410	9027	4467	1531	4251	4161	4756	1249	1481	1737	1545		
Deserters Returned	206	2295	-	-	14	192	766	-	-	-	-		
Net Deserters	17204	6732	4467	4321	4237	3969	3990	1249	1481	1737	1545		
Net/1000 Str/Mo	9.9	8.4	10.2	13.7	9.9	9.0	8.7	8.6	10.3	12.2	10.9		
POPULAR													
Strength (000)	144.1	153.3	146.8	142.2	140.8	144.9	151.1	147.4	146.0	143.6	142.5		
Gross Deserters	23033	11984	6231	5548	5702	5532	6033	2212	1497	2542	1426		
Deserters Returned	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Net Deserters	23033	11984	6231	5548	5702	5532	6033	2212	1497	2542	1426		
Net/1000 Str/Mo	13.3	15.6	14.2	13.0	13.5	12.7	13.3	15.0	10.3	17.7	10.0		
TOTAL RVNAF													
Strength (000)	616.2	678.6	612.5	677.0	612.3	628.3	653.7	613.8	608.3	605.1	606.4		
Gross Deserters	81797	49688	22012	19555	19557	20773	27603	6912	6973	8127	5907		
Deserters Returned	4083	16857	740	1019	860	1464	12600	323	136	281	268		
Net Deserters	77714	32831	21272	1836	18697	19309	15003	6589	6837	7846	5719		
Net/1000 Str/Mo	10.5	9.7	11.6	10.1	10.2	10.2	7.7	10.7	11.2	13.0	9.4		

a/ Source: MACV. Deserters returned data for Popular Forces and for Regional Forces for the period January-August 1967 are not presently available.

b/ End of month strength used for monthly rates. Average strength for the period used for yearly and quarterly rates.

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1968														
May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May		
284.3	286.9	288.7	290.3	292.6	295.9	300.4	302.8	302.0	303.9	324.6	347.1	354.9		
3021	2942	2777	2997	2769	3149	3270	3427	2479	6425	6802	5002	6033		
275	458	272	234	265	405	195	578	505	4536	6432	1534	1114		
2746	2484	2505	2763	2503	3044	3075	2849	1994	1889	370	3468	4919		
9.7	8.7	8.7	9.5	8.6	10.3	10.2	9.4	6.5	6.2	1.1	10.0	13.9		
39.7	39.9	39.1	39.5	39.8	34.7	39.9	40.1	40.4	40.1	42.3	43.8	44.6		
288	129	185	328	549	375	315	244	307	339	462	530	298		
9	9	9	36	30	14	21	59	12	31	318	36	42		
259	120	176	292	519	361	294	185	295	308	144	492	256		
6.5	3.0	4.5	7.4	13.0	10.4	7.4	4.6	7.3	7.7	3.4	11.2	5.7		
324.0	326.8	327.8	329.8	332.4	330.5	340.3	342.9	342.4	344.0	366.9	390.9	399.5		
3289	3071	2962	3325	3337	3824	3385	3671	2786	6764	7264	5532	6331		
204	467	281	270	295	419	216	637	517	4567	6750	1572	1156		
3005	2604	2681	3055	3022	3105	3369	3034	2269	2197	514	3960	5175		
19.3	8.0	8.2	9.3	9.1	10.3	9.9	8.8	6.6	6.4	1.4	10.1	13.0		
1	141.3	142.0	143.3	142.6	145.3	148.1	151.4	152.6	152.5	157.6	167.1	184.0		
1481	1378	1558	1315	1259	1493	1409	923	1430	2401	2125	2146			
1305	1481	1378	1558	1301	1133	1156	1380	925	1398	1667	978	1764		
10.6	10.5	9.7	10.9	9.1	7.8	9.8	9.1	6.1	9.2	10.6	5.9	9.6		
141.3	141.3	140.9	140.6	140.6	144.1	146.1	148.8	151.9	150.7	153.1	155.3	159.9		
1685	2437	1984	1711	2007	1777	1948	1804	1156	1827	3050	3293	2658		
1685	2437	1984	1711	2007	1777	1948	1807	1156	1827	3050	3293	2658		
11.9	17.2	16.1	18.2	14.3	12.3	13.3	12.1	7.6	12.1	19.9	21.2	16.6		
607.2	609.4	610.7	613.7	615.6	620.0	634.5	643.1	646.9	647.2	677.6	713.3	743.4		
6479	6989	6324	6594	6639	6860	7026	6887	4867	10021	12715	10950	11135		
284	467	281	270	309	545	253	666	517	4599	7484	2719	1538		
6195	6522	6043	6324	6330	6315	6773	6221	4350	5422	5231	8231	9597		
10.2	10.7	9.9	10.3	10.3	10.2	10.7	9.7	6.7	8.4	7.7	11.5	12.9		

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RVNAF COMBAT FORCE DESERTIONS

Summary

Vietnamese Army and Marine combat units will lose almost a third of their personnel to desertions per year, at current net monthly desertion rates.

The overall RVNAF desertion figures mask important variations among different types of units. This paper focuses only upon desertion rates in ARVN and Marine regular combat units. It considers all such units except Armor and Special Forces, which had to be excluded because of insufficient 1967 data. Support troops and troops in training are not considered.

Gross Desertions

Table 1 presents the average gross desertion rates for the major combat units of the RVN regular forces for 1967 and 1968. (Table 3 shows the rates by month.) The gross desertion rate in every unit except the 25th Division increased in 1968. With a few exceptions, units with the highest rates in 1967 have the highest rates in 1968. Also, despite the relative lull in July and August 1968, 11 out of the 15 units had their highest or second highest monthly desertion rates in those months.

The 1967 monthly average gross desertion rate for all units shown was 20.9 per 1000, or 2% per month. In 1968 the gross rate increased 51% to 31.5 per 1000, or better than 3% per month. At this rate, more than a third (38%) of the RVN regular combat forces will have deserted by the end of 1968.

Net Desertions

The gross desertion figures do not tell the whole story. Some deserters return voluntarily and others are arrested and returned to their units. In 1967 the average rate of return to all regular RVNAF units was 9.4% of gross desertions. In 1968, so far, the rate is 34.6%, but the abnormal return rate during the confused situation in the first quarter is a distorting factor. A better estimate of the current rate of return is 16.4% obtained from the April through August 1968 figures (Table 2).

Applying the returnee factors for all regular units to the gross rates for combat units yields a net annual desertion rate of 227 per 1000 strength for 1967, or 23%. The current rate is 316 per 1000, or 32%. This means that RVNAF regular combat units stand to lose almost a third of their personnel per year through desertions.

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CONFIDENTIALTABLE 1GROSS RVNAF DESERTION RATES PER
1000 ASSIGNED STRENGTH

<u>Unit</u>	<u>1967</u> Mo. <u>Avg.</u>	<u>1968^{a/}</u> Mo. <u>Avg.</u>	<u>1967/1968</u> <u>%</u> <u>Increase</u>
1st Inf Div	12.6	23.7	88
2nd Inf Div	10.7	21.2	98
5th Inf Div	24.8	32.0	29
7th Inf Div	19.7	24.9	26
9th Inf Div	26.2	40.2	53
18th Inf Div	31.7	36.2	14
21st Inf Div	27.5	42.1	53
22nd Inf Div	12.9	14.9	16
23rd Inf Div	12.0	24.9	107
25th Inf Div	40.6	35.3	-13
42nd Separate Regt	4.4	31.5	616
51st Separate Regt	19.4	33.2	71
Rangers	24.8	38.5	55
Airborne	20.9	46.0	120
Marine	24.9	28.4	14
Avg of All Units	20.9	31.5	51

a/ January through August.TABLE 2ESTIMATE OF DESERTERS RETURNING
TO ALL RVNAF REGULAR UNITS a/

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1968</u>		
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Total^{b/}</u>	<u>Apr-Aug</u>	<u>1Q</u>	<u>2Q</u>	<u>Jul-Aug</u>
Gross Deserters	41,354	49,885	33,071	16,814	18,404	14,667
Deserters Returning	3,877	17,276	5,442	11,834	3,557	1,885
Percent	9.4	34.6	16.4	70.4	19.2	12.9

a/ Source: MACV.b/ Through August 31, 1968.**CONFIDENTIAL**

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GROSS DESERTION RATE/1000 ASSIGNED STRENGTH

1967

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>Jan^a</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>
1st Inf Div	14.0	12.9	9.4	15.3	11.1	10.6	11.4	12.8	14.2	
2nd Inf Div	5.5	4.7	3.5	3.6	9.1	3.9	15.7	28.9	9.3	
5th Inf Div	40.6	42.2	22.5	14.8	21.7	17.3	29.2	15.7	20.1	
7th Inf Div	31.0	23.4	19.3	23.2	15.7	18.7	7.4	17.9	17.3	
9th Inf Div	31.0	28.1	29.4	31.4	13.3	15.0	26.2	23.5	35.3	
18th Inf Div	25.8	32.6	32.8	41.1	33.1	34.8	34.8	38.5	27.0	
21st Inf Div	25.1	12.9	14.0	38.0	33.2	18.1	27.3	44.9	35.4	
22nd Inf Div	14.0	14.1	16.4	9.5	10.2	18.4	15.1	8.6	12.3	
23rd Inf Div	21.9	12.9	15.4	21.0	11.1	5.3	6.7	3.1	11.6	
25th Inf Div	51.1	48.6	46.2	42.8	47.1	47.9	33.9	28.1	39.7	
42nd Separate Regt	3.1	1.2	1.8	2.5	2.3	14.4	5.7	5.1	8.3	
51st Separate Regt	18.8	22.3	27.0	11.4	36.5	22.5	20.1	7.7	12.3	
Rangers							17.9	23.5	27.5	30.2
Airborne	31.3	21.7	22.9	22.7	24.1	22.8	2.7	7.8	16.2	
Marine	26.1	31.6	23.5	20.0	18.7	0.0	44.3	25.1	34.9	
Avg of Above Units	24.2	22.1	20.3	21.2	19.4	17.8	20.3	19.7	21.6	

a/ Data not available.**CONFIDENTIAL**

		<u>1963</u>									
<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar^{a/}</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>		
22.8	3.9	10.1	a/		8.8	23.1	32.2	30.9	37.1		
17.6	15.5	10.3	21.6		18.9	21.4	18.4	26.4	31.7		
25.7	23.3	16.5	48.5		28.2	28.6	30.3	25.4	26.0		
20.7	22.3	11.7	26.5		23.3	26.8	34.2	25.3	26.8		
14.6	39.8	19.5	20.3		31.7	62.4	35.5	43.3	68.9		
23.7	23.9	28.8	60.3		33.8	33.8	25.1	35.3	35.4		
26.7	26.5	18.6	63.5		22.1	87.6	58.8	49.6	44.4		
10.1	13.3	8.0	25.2		15.7	14.4	14.9	10.0	16.1		
10.1	12.9	0.9	24.7		26.2	26.8	37.2	23.2	35.1		
32.0	29.6	20.2	27.5		30.5	27.3	51.7	50.2	39.8		
1.9	2.4	9.1	11.8		43.9	37.6	46.0	46.2	25.7		
12	22.9	8.3	14.7		19.5	28.8	30.7	59.1	71.4		
20.3	29.1	9.5	22.8		48.5	29.6	51.9	43.3	64.3		
22.4	35.4	38.5	59.3		61.1	39.4	41.9	42.3	39.6		
33.2	26.4	35.7	16.7		41.8	22.6	21.7	35.4	25.2		
19.6	22.3	16.4	29.6		30.3	34.0	35.4	36.6	39.2		

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RF/PF KIA AND DESERTION NUMBERS

KIA

RF/PF KIA numbers reported in the MACV Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) are about 55% more than the totals reported by the MACV OPREP-5 reports for 1968 through September. Table 1 gives the numbers from the respective sources and shows the percentage differences for each month.

TABLE 1

MACV OPREP-5 AND TFES RF/PF KIA DATA

	1968											Total
	Jan	Feb ^{a/}	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	
<u>RF KIA</u>												
OPREP-5	235		252	273	372	349	188	351	297	2317		
TFES	478		435	396	602	437	314	485	366	3513		
% Difference	103		73	45	62	25	67	38	23	52		
<u>PF KIA</u>												
OPREP-5	296		359	236	288	281	250	412	464	2586		
TFES	586		822	354	678	337	323	453	443	3996		
% Difference	98		129	50	135	20	29	10	- 5	55		

a/ Excluded because OPREP-5 reporting fell off as a result of Tet.

Table 2 shows how different are the enemy/friendly KIA ratios calculated by using the various data. The relationship of the RF and PF KIA to the Regular Forces KIA also changes depending on which set of data is used. OPREP-5 data shows RF and PF KIA as 76% of Regular KIA (6478) for 1968; the TFES figures are 116% of the Regular ones.

TABLE 2

RANGE OF POSSIBLE KILL RATIOS FOR RF AND PF

1968

	<u>CICV En KIA^{a/}</u> <u>TFES Fr KIA</u>	<u>CICV En KIA^{a/}</u> <u>OPREP-5 Fr KIA</u>	<u>TFES</u> <u>En/Fr KIA</u>
RF En/Fr Kill Ratios	2.1	3.9	4.5
PF En/Fr Kill Ratios	1.1	2.3	2.5

a/ CICV enemy KIA figure calculated as 46% of the TFES enemy KIA figure in accordance with recent MACV CORDS finding.

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CONFIDENTIALDesertions

The desertion numbers are another example of problems with RF/PF data. Table 3 shows that the MACV desertion messages report more RF and PF deserters than TFES. Part of the difference results because TFES excludes overhead personnel and reports only on field units, which account for about 67% of the RF and about 90% of the PF. But the TFES desertion figures are only 33% of the MACV message figures for RF and 61% for PF. The discrepancies could indicate that (1) TFES is not reporting all deserters, (2) two-thirds of RF deserters and one-third of the PF deserters come from the overhead, or (3) MACV numbers contain significant double-counting.

TABLE 3RF/PF DESERTIONS FROM MACV MESSAGES VS TFES

1968											
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Total	
RF											
Message a/	925	1398	1667	978	1764	2430	3216	3973	3810	19561	
TFES	275	806	573	655	583	673	925	825	1201	6516	
%	30	58	34	67	33	28	29	24	32	33	
PF											
Message a/	1156	1827	3050	3293	2658	1937	2609	1778	1672	19980	
TFES	600	2326	2172	1346	1359	1322	969	1048	1056	12198	
%	52	127	71	41	51	68	37	59	63	61	

a/ Net desertions.

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RVNAF REGULAR FORCE DESERTIONS

RVNAF Regular Force desertions (net and gross) hit a 2-year high in September. The ground combat forces are deserting (net) at an annual rate of 35% of their strength (gross rate for one-third of the units is more than 50%), or twice as fast as the Regular Forces as a whole (17%). Net desertions accounted for 68% of total attrition during the third quarter of 1968 and equaled 39% of the personnel input during the period. If the August-September trends continue (and gross October data indicates they are), the GVN will have trouble maintaining its current regular forces, and particularly the combat force, at current levels.

Trends in Regular Force Strength

In the wake of the Tet offensive, RVNAF Regular Force net desertions began a steady upward trend which has continued since March.^{1/} Net desertions, which accounted for 64% of total RVN Regular Force attrition in 1967, account for 68% of this attrition in the third quarter 1968 (Table 1).

Viewed against force levels (Graph 1), increasing desertions are steadily driving the attrition line upwards while force inputs are dropping as the bulk of the readily available volunteers and conscripts have been taken into the forces. If the trends continue, GVN will have considerable difficulty in maintaining a regular military establishment of present size.

Combat Force Desertions^{2/}

Since publication of our article on Regular combat force desertions last month,^{3/} we have received desertion data for September, 1968 and corrected data for the Tet offensive period (Feb-Mar 68). Since the new data has some effect on our previous findings, we have incorporated it into this article.

Gross Desertions

Table 2 presents the average gross desertion rates for the major ground combat units of the RVN Regular Forces for 1967 and 1968 (~~Table 5 shows the rates by month~~). The overall RVNAF desertion figures mask important variations among different types of units; the overall rate for RVN Regular Force desertions was 18.1 per thousand per month in September 1968, but the average monthly rate for ground combat forces was 37.0. Moreover, the 1968 monthly

^{1/} Net desertions equal gross desertions less returnees.

^{2/} This section focuses only upon desertion rates in ARVN and Marine regular combat units. It includes all such units except Armor and Special forces which had to be excluded because of insufficient 1967 data.

^{3/} "RVNAF Combat Force Desertions," Southeast Asia Analysis Report, October 1968, page 48.

^{4/} ARVN, Marines, Navy and Air Force.

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TABLE 1
RVN REGULAR FORCE ACCESSION & ATTRITION

	Total 1967	To Date 1968	S/	1968								
				Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
Net Desertions	37,447	39,982	2,269	2,197	514	3,960	5,175	5,802	6,267	6,515	7,283	
Total Casualties ^{a/}	21,568	39,001	3,853	9,374	3,940	3,496	4,964	3,859	1,884	4,082	3,549	
Total Attrition	59,015	78,983	6,122	11,271	4,454	7,456	10,139	9,661	8,151	10,597	10,832	
% Due to Desertion	64%	51%	37%	19%	12%	53%	51%	60%	77%	62%	67%	
Force Inputs ^{b/}	98,389	141,846	3,955	7,186	21,936	24,604	18,806	14,031	20,747	17,899	12,682	


Source: CASD/SA SEA Statistical Tables 4A, 4B & 4E.

^{a/} KIA, WIA, MIA/CPT

^{b/} Volunteers plus conscripts.

^{c/} January through September.

GRAPH 1



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average rates in Table 2 show that 5 of the 15 units studied will have over half of their personnel desert in 1968^{a/}. Only one unit, the 22nd Infantry Division, will lose less than 20% of its manpower in this way.

TABLE 2
GROSS RVNAF DESERTION RATES PER
1000 ASSIGNED STRENGTH

<u>Unit</u>	<u>1967</u> Mo. <u>Avg.</u>	<u>1968a/</u> Mo. <u>Avg.</u>	<u>1967/1968</u> % <u>Increase</u>
1st Inf Div	12.6	25.6	103
2nd Inf Div	10.8	27.4	154
5th Inf Div	24.8	30.8	24
7th Inf Div	20.0	28.3	42
9th Inf Div	26.7	48.4	81
18th Inf Div	31.2	37.7	21
21st Inf Div	27.5	45.0	64
22nd Inf Div	12.2	14.9	22
23rd Inf Div	11.8	24.7	109
25th Inf Div	41.5	43.7	5
42nd Separate Regt	4.4	28.5	548
51st Separate Regt	18.8	32.6	73
Rangers	24.8b/	43.1	74
Airborne	19.4	43.2	122
Marine	24.7	34.3	39
Avg of All Units	20.8	33.9	63

a/ January through September.

b/ Based on July through December data.

The gross desertion rate increased in every unit in 1968. Units with the highest rates in 1967 generally have the highest rates in 1968. Although the average quarterly rates for 1967 (Table 3) exhibited no clear trend, the 1968 rates rise steadily, particularly during the third quarter when combat activity was at its lowest point.

1/ The 9th, 21st, and 25th Divisions; Rangers; and Airborne.

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PER 1000 ASSIGNED STRENGTH

	1967				1968		
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q
Quarterly Rate	65.1	60.9	57.8	63.5	93.6	99.7	112.8

The 1967 monthly average gross desertion rate for all combat units shown was 2.1% per month. In 1968 the gross rate increased 63%, to 3.4% per month. At this rate, over 40% of the RVN regular combat units will have deserted by the end of 1968.

Net Desertions

The gross desertion figures do not tell the whole story. Some deserters return voluntarily and others are arrested and returned to their units. In 1967 the average rate of return to all regular RVNAF units was 9.4% of gross desertions. In 1968, so far, the rate is 30.7%, but the abnormal return rate during the confused situation in the first quarter is a distorting factor. A better estimate of the current rate of return is the 14.4% obtained from the April through September 1968 figures (Table 4).

TABLE 4ESTIMATE OF DESERTERS RETURNING
TO ALL RVNAF REGULAR UNITS a/

	1967	1968 b/	1968	1968		
	Total	Total	Apr-Sep	1Q	2Q	3Q
Gross Deserters	41,354	57,725	40,911	16,814	18,404	22,407
Deserters Returning	3,877	17,743	5,909	11,834	3,557	2,352
% Returned	9.4	30.7	14.4	70.4	19.3	10.5

a/ Source: MACV

b/ Through September 30, 1968.

Applying the returnee factors for all regular units to the gross rates for combat units yields a net annual desertion rate of 22.7% for 1967. The current rate is 34.8%. This means that RVNAF regular combat units stand to lose permanently over a third of their personnel per year through desertions.

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GROSS DESERTION RATE/1000 ASSIGNED STRENGTH

1967

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>
1st Inf Div	12.4	14.0	12.9	9.4	15.3	11.1	10.6	11.4	12.8	14.2
2nd Inf Div	12.0	5.5	4.7	3.5	3.6	9.1	3.9	15.7	28.9	9.3
5th Inf Div	25.0	40.6	42.2	22.5	14.8	21.7	17.3	29.2	15.7	20.1
7th Inf Div	23.4	31.0	23.4	19.3	23.2	15.7	18.7	7.4	17.9	17.3
9th Inf Div	32.3	31.0	28.1	29.4	31.4	13.3	15.0	26.2	23.5	35.3
18th Inf Div	25.6	25.8	32.6	32.8	41.1	33.1	34.8	34.8	38.5	27.0
21st Inf Div	27.3	25.1	12.9	14.0	38.0	33.2	18.1	27.3	44.9	35.4
22nd Inf Div	3.9	14.0	14.1	16.4	9.5	10.2	18.4	15.1	8.6	12.3
23rd Inf Div	9.1	21.9	12.9	15.4	21.0	11.1	5.3	6.7	3.1	11.6
25th Inf Div	51.6	51.1	48.6	46.2	42.8	47.1	47.9	33.9	28.1	39.7
42nd Sep Regt	4.1	3.1	1.2	1.8	2.5	2.3	14.4	5.7	5.1	8.3
51st Sep Regt	12.0	18.8	22.3	27.0	11.4	36.5	22.5	20.1	7.7	12.3
Rangers	a/	a/	a/	a/	a/	a/	17.9	23.5	27.5	30.2
Airborne	3.1	31.3	21.7	22.9	22.7	24.1	22.8	2.7	7.8	16.2
Marine	21.9	26.1	31.6	23.5	20.0	18.7	0.0	44.3	25.1	34.9
Avg of Above Units	18.8	24.2	22.1	20.3	21.2	19.4	17.8	20.3	19.7	21.6

Avg of all ARVN

Source: MACV

a/ Data not available.

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1968

<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>
22.8	3.9	10.1	a/	37.2	8.8	23.1	32.2	30.9	37.1	25.2
17.6	15.5	10.3	37.3	43.4	18.9	21.4	18.4	26.4	31.7	39.1
25.7	23.3	16.5	57.2	31.3	28.2	28.6	30.3	25.4	26.0	33.9
20.7	22.3	11.7	34.1	41.5	23.3	26.8	34.2	25.3	26.8	31.2
14.6	39.8	19.5	34.7	89.5	31.7	62.4	35.5	43.3	68.9	50.4
23.7	23.9	28.8	68.7	45.4	33.8	33.8	25.1	36.3	35.4	31.6
26.7	26.5	18.6	72.9	21.5	22.1	87.6	58.8	49.6	44.4	29.8
10.1	13.3	8.0	27.9	15.1	15.7	14.4	14.9	10.0	16.1	11.9
10.1	12.9	0.9	29.4	14.5	26.2	26.8	37.2	23.2	35.1	28.6
32.0	29.6	20.2	37.3	77.8	30.5	27.3	51.7	50.2	39.8	58.5
1.9	2.4	9.1	13.7	14.5	43.9	37.6	46.0	46.2	25.7	19.7
12.4	22.9	8.3	15.3	28.3	19.5	28.8	30.7	59.1	71.4	31.6
20.3	29.1	9.5	42.8	41.2	48.5	29.6	51.9	43.3	64.3	56.4
22	35.4	38.5	61.4	20.1	61.1	39.4	41.9	42.3	39.6	44.7
33.2	26.4	35.7	23.3	41.6	41.8	22.6	21.7	35.4	25.2	61.7
19.6	22.3	16.4	39.7	37.5	30.3	34.0	35.4	36.6	39.2	37.0
		8.2	21.4	21.0	14.4	17.0	17.6	17.9	19.0	18.4

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RVNAF DESERTIONS

Summary. As Vietnamization of the war proceeds, desertions in the Vietnamese Armed Forces remain a critical problem for reasons of manpower and force effectiveness. Despite intensive desertion control measures, RVNAF net desertions for the first four months of 1969 are running only 30% below the levels of second half 1968; MACV believes that a 50% reduction is necessary to maintain programmed force levels. RVNAF desertion rates did decline steadily from November 1968 through February 1969, but March and April data exhibit the beginnings of an upward desertion trend for all RVNAF components except Popular Forces. As the RVNAF accepts a larger share of the combat burden under Vietnamization, casualty rates and hardships will likely increase. It is not inconceivable that this could lead to increased desertions. This, coupled with the heavier casualties could seriously degrade the effectiveness of the RVNAF.

Desertion Control Measures and Results

Desertions have always been a problem for the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. Even in a relatively good year such as 1967 the combined loss for Regular, Regional and Popular Forces amounted to about 12% of average strength. However, the desertion problem became critical following the rapid expansion of RVNAF in 1968. Desertions increased faster than casualties, and as Table 1 and Graph 1 show for the Regular Forces, desertions steadily became a greater factor in attrition until November 1968. During the first four months of 1969 desertions still accounted for 55% of Regular Force attrition.

The high level of desertions is a critical problem for three reasons. The first is the manpower problem. The GVN has already reached deeply into its manpower reserves and replacements for losses may become increasingly difficult to find. By December 31, 1969, approximately 90% of the physically fit manpower aged 18-44 estimated to be available to the GVN is scheduled to be in the RVNAF or paramilitary forces. ^{1/} During planning for the Phase II modernization program, manpower planners estimated that RVNAF desertion rates had to be cut by 50% to maintain programmed force levels. ^{2/} Although the planned force expansion has largely been on schedule up to now, reports from Saigon indicate that either 39-44 year olds or 17 year olds (both age groups are now exempt from the draft) will have to be called up soon to maintain the necessary level of inputs.

^{1/} This does not include the People's Self Defense Forces.

^{2/} The level from which a 50% reduction is expected is not clear from documents held in Washington. We have assumed that to meet the objective, net desertions in 1969 should be 50% of net desertions in second half 1968, the period of greatest net manpower loss. However, some references mention gross desertions in the first 7 months of 1968 as the benchmark. RVNAF gross desertion rates are down 21% in 1969 compared to the first 7 months of 1968.

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The desertion rate is critical for a second reason. High desertion rates are detrimental to force effectiveness. Even if the deserters return to the manpower pool or voluntarily rejoin other units, thus overcoming some of the drain on manpower, RVNAF effectiveness will still suffer if high desertion rates affect present for duty strength or the morale of other soldiers.

Finally, perhaps the most significant concern is that as the RVNAF accepts a larger share of the combat burden under Vietnamization, casualty rates and hardships will likely increase. It is not inconceivable that this could lead to increased desertions. This coupled with the heavier casualties could seriously degrade the effectiveness of the RVNAF.

As desertions increased last summer, MACV recognized the serious nature of the situation and brought the matter to the attention of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS). Discussions last fall led to a combination of measures designed both to remove many of the grievances which lead men to desert and to make desertion a more serious offense for the deserter and his commander:

1. JGS directed commanders to "unfreeze" leave policies and to be more liberal in approving requests for annual leave. In addition, special graduation leaves were to be granted where applicable.
2. JGS directed RVNAF units to assist servicemen going on leave with transportation. In two special "test cases" US units are assisting South Vietnamese servicemen with transportation on a trial basis.
3. JGS ordered additional recognition for heroes on the battlefield by increasing award of the Gallantry Cross, primarily for lower ranks and RF/PF.
4. In September 1968, JGS established maximum acceptable levels of desertions for all commands. Failure to meet this level was to result in disciplinary action against the commander. 1/
5. In November 1968, RVNAF began participating in the National Police records system. All RVNAF personnel are to be fingerprinted with records kept in a central file. Positive identification will aid in deserter control.
6. Decree Law 15 dealing with desertion is to be more firmly and more quickly applied. Measures have been taken to encourage the general population to report deserters to ARVN or police units.
7. Desertion control committees have been ordered formed at unit level. More attention is to be given to morale, grievances of recruits and conscripts are to be answered at induction, and US advisors have been instructed to watch the problem carefully.

1/ We understand that the JGS did not apply this as stated, but reversed it so that commanders who met desertion goals received commendations. No action has been taken against those who failed to meet goals as far as we know.

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The desertion control measures appear to have had a significant impact on desertion rates. Table 2 compares 1969 desertion rates with those of second half 1968. Except for the paramilitary, all elements of the GVN forces have substantially reduced desertions. At the present time, the Popular Forces have had the greatest success with a 47% reduction in net desertion rates, and are the only force near the 50% reduction considered necessary to maintain the RVNAF force levels. The Regional Forces have reduced desertions by 31% and the Regular Forces by 25% for an overall RVNAF reduction of 30%. Only the paramilitary elements show an increase in desertions 1/ -- a very large 131%. This may be largely attributable to increased dissatisfaction among Revolutionary Development Cadre with some of the new conditions under which they must operate. 2/

TABLE 2

REDUCTION IN DESERTION RATES a/
(Monthly Average Net Desertion Per 1000 Strength)

	Jul-Dec 1968	Jan-Apr 1969	% Change
Total RVNAF	15.0	10.5	-30
Regular Forces	16.2	12.2	-25
(Ground Combat Forces) b/	35.8	27.2	-24
Regional Forces	16.3	11.2	-31
Popular Forces c/	10.3	5.5	-47
Paramilitary Forces d/	3.8	8.8	+131

Source: MACV

OASD(SA) SEA Statistical Tables

OSD Comptroller SEA Statistical Summary

a/ Rates calculated on end month strength.

b/ Includes ARVN divisions, separate regiments, armor, rangers, special forces and Marine units.

c/ No record of deserters returned to duty maintained until March, 1969.

d/ Estimated gross desertion rate -- includes CIDG, National Police, RD and TS Cadre, Armed Propaganda Teams, Kit Carson Scouts.

Table 3 presents net desertion rates by month since September 1968 and reveals that desertion control progress has virtually stopped in March and April 1969. 1968 desertions peaked in October and steadily decreased throughout the remainder of the year as desertion control measures took effect. The decline in desertions continued through February for all RVNAF forces. The

1/ Gross desertion figures. Net figures are unavailable.

2/ Such as smaller teams of 30 rather than 60 cadre, increased enemy action against cadre, and inability to work as close to their home hamlet as before.

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particularly low RVNAF February figure -- the lowest net figure since March 1968 and the fewest gross desertions since January 1968 -- can be attributed to extraordinary precautions taken by JGS around Tet 1969. Soldiers were restricted to their quarters and in some cases the families of servicemen were even brought into ARVN compounds.

However, since February all RVNAF forces except PF show a steady upward trend. We would not expect the February performance to be repeated in March, but the continued increase in desertion rates in April signals a potential resurgence of the desertion problem. The increase in desertions in March and April has nearly brought RVNAF desertion rates back to or above January levels for Regular Forces, the Ground Combat Forces, and Regional Forces, leaving only the Popular Forces with a significant percentage reduction in 1969.

TABLE 3

NET DESERTIONS/1000 STRENGTH/MONTH a/

	1968				1969			
	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Total RVNAF	15.6	17.2	14.6	12.6	11.5	8.4	10.9	11.2
Regular Forces	17.0	19.2	15.7	15.0	13.7	10.3	11.7	13.0
(Grd Combat Forces)b/	35.8	40.6	35.6	32.6	29.9	21.9	25.1	28.3
Regional Forces	17.6	19.0	17.5	12.2	11.5	8.1	12.3	12.9
Popular Forces c/	9.7	10.2	8.3	7.4	6.1	3.9	5.0	5.0
Paramilitary Forces d/	2.7	3.8	3.6	3.4	7.9	5.4	10.6	11.0

Source: MACV

OASD(SA) SEA Statistical Tables

OSD Comptroller SEA Statistical Summary

a/ Rates calculated on end month strength.

b/ Includes ARVN divisions, separate regiments, armor, rangers, special forces, and Marine units.

c/ No record of deserters returned to duty maintained until March 1969.

d/ Estimated Gross Rate - includes CIDG, National Police, RD and TS Cadre, Armed Propaganda Teams, and Kit Carson Scouts.

Ground Combat Forces

In the November 1968 Analysis Report, we called attention to the serious desertion problem which exists in those ARVN and Marine units which actually do the fighting. ^{1/} As shown in Table 4 the desertion rates in the combat divisions and regiments run about twice the rate for Regular Forces as a whole. In 1968, one-third of the Army and Marine ground combat units had an annual gross desertion rate of over 50%.

^{1/} "RVNAF Regular Force Desertions", SEA Analysis Report, November 1968, p. 31.

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Desertion control measures were aimed at these ground combat units and there has been considerable improvement in most areas. Of the 17 major ground combat units, 13 have lower gross desertion rates in 1969 than in second half 1968 according to Table 4. ^{1/} The 25th Infantry Division and the Airborne Division have had outstanding success in reducing desertions, with both reporting over a 60% reduction. Both were among the divisions with the highest desertion rates in 1968. The Marines and Special Forces have reduced desertions by over 40%.

TABLE 4

GROUND COMBAT FORCE GROSS DESERTION RATES

	Jul-Dec 1968	Jan-Apr 1969	% Change	1969			
				Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
1st Inf Div	31.1	19.2	- 38	19.4	14.7	16.5	26.2
2nd Inf Div	32.2	28.3	- 12	28.4	17.6	36.2	31.1
5th Inf Div	29.1	20.5	- 30	23.6	20.1	17.2	21.1
7th Inf Div	28.4	22.5	- 21	21.5	14.0	18.9	35.5
9th Inf Div	54.6	39.8	- 27	44.1	22.6	51.7	41.0
18th Inf Div	37.8	47.2	+ 25	51.6	39.5	39.9	57.6
21st Inf Div	49.8	52.7	+ 6	58.7	60.1	50.3	41.6
22nd Inf Div	19.2	17.8	- 7	17.2	19.8	24.2	9.8
23rd Inf Div	28.9	25.7	- 11	24.1	16.5	35.6	26.5
25th Inf Div	50.1	16.4	- 67	21.1	12.9	14.0	17.7
42nd Sep. Regt.	35.5	23.6	- 34	29.1	26.1	18.6	20.6
51st Sep. Regt.	46.4	56.5	+ 22	60.4	54.6	56.4	54.5
Ranger	59.7	37.2	- 38	54.6	27.3	29.4	37.7
Airborne	37.1	13.4	- 64	10.2	11.5	9.6	22.4
Armor	6.6	13.0	+ 97	8.0	7.7	11.9	24.4
Special Forces	10.4	6.0	- 42	5.1	6.0	5.2	7.9
Marines	46.6	25.8	- 45	41.4	25.1	16.9	19.9

On the other hand, despite the desertion control campaign, desertions increased in almost 25% (4 out of 17) of the ground combat units. Table 4 shows that desertions in the armored units increased 97% in 1969. While their present gross rate of 13 per 1000 strength per month is low compared to other units, it is extremely high for these elite troops, given their history of low desertions. The other three units shown in Table 5, the 18th and 21st Divisions and the 51st Separate Regiment, have desertion rates which exceed 55% of unit strength per year; only the 21st Infantry Division seems to be making progress in reducing its rates. From January through April 1969, these latter three units, which comprise 5% of Regular Force strength, have accounted for 20% of Regular Force gross desertions.

^{1/} Gross desertions are used in this section since the JGS defined unit desertion reduction goals in terms of gross rather than net desertions.

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TABLE 5

DESERTION PRONE ARVN UNITS - 1969
(GROSS DESERTIONS)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>1969 Monthly Rate b/</u>	<u>% of Unit Deserting</u>	<u>Number of Deserter's</u>
			<u>1 Year c/</u>	<u>Expected c/</u>
51st Separate Regt.	3,375	56.5	68	2,290
21st Infantry Div.	10,761	52.7	63	6,780
18th Infantry Div.	9,692	47.2	57	5,520

a/ Based on Assigned Strength as of 30 April 1969.

b/ Based on Jan-April data - gross deserters/1000 strength.

c/ Assuming 1969 monthly rate continues for 12 months.

Moreover, few of the ground combat units are making progress in reducing desertions in 1969. Eight of the seventeen units had a higher desertion rate in April than in January. Five of the nine remaining units, have higher desertion rates in April than in March. The lack of progress is highlighted by comparing the performance of the ground combat units against the desertion goals set by JGS for March 1969. Table 6 shows that only three of 15 units, the 25th, Airborne and Marine Divisions, met their goals for March, with two other units (the 5th and 7th Divisions) reasonably close. The situation deteriorated in April with only three units meeting the March goals (the 22nd, 25th and Marine Divisions) and with none of the remaining 12 units even close to theirs.

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TABLE 6

GROUND COMBAT UNIT DESERTION REDUCTION
(Gross Desertions)

	<u>Goal a/</u> <u>March 1969</u>	<u>Actual Gross Desertions</u>	
		<u>March 1969</u>	<u>April 1969</u>
1st Infantry Div.	230	270	419
2nd Infantry Div.	200	371	322
5th Infantry Div.	200	207	248
7th Infantry Div.	200	211	371
9th Infantry Div.	200	510	389
18th Infantry Div.	200	120	558
21st Infantry Div.	200	564	448
22nd Infantry Div.	167	278	111
23rd Infantry Div.	200	396	291
25th Infantry Div.	200	159	194
42nd Separate Regt.	30	52	55
51st Separate Regt.	30	198	184
Ranger Command	320	491	615
Airborne	200	111	245
Marines	200	147	173

Source: MACV

a/ Set by Vietnamese JGS.

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REGULAR FORCE GAINS AND LOSSES

	1968												1969			
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR
Net Desertions	2230	2197	514	3960	5173	5801	6157	6513	1293	8252	6774	6303	9364	4436	5054	5699
Total Casualties ^{a/}	4911	10434	4728	3640	6134	4114	1-12	-993	4347	2414	2869	3160	3713	4379	4918	3877 ^{b/}
Total Attrition	7180	12629	5242	7600	12009	9016	1639	11508	11630	10635	9643	9543	9577	8815	9572	9566
% Due to Desertion	32	17	10	52	43	59	72	57	63	77	70	67	61	50	51	59
Force Inputs ^{c/}	3955	7186	81936	84604	18506	14031	22777	17899	12682	13622	10918	11100	10325	9497	13937	14018

Sources: CHART(6) DIA Statistical Summary.

OASD(RA) DIA Statistical Tables.


a/ Includes KIA, WIA, MIA/OPR.

b/ April figure based on JCS confirmed data adjusted to reflect average increase to final

verified figures.

c/ Volunteers plus conscripts.

GRAPH 1

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ARVN DESERTIONS AND COMBAT PAY

Summary. The rate of desertions from ARVN combat units is about 6 times the RF desertion rate, 7 times the PF rate, and 13 times the rate for ARVN non-combat units. The high desertion rate for ARVN combat units probably stems from their greater exposure to combat; ARVN KIA per 1000 ARVN combat troops were more than twice as high as the comparable RF or PF rates for the first three quarters of 1969. Combat pay for ARVN combat units only has been suggested as a means for reducing incentives to desert. Such pay could probably be administered in a fair and non-inflationary way, but we have no evidence as to how it would affect desertion rates.

Desertion Patterns

Based on the first eleven months of the year, net monthly RVNAF desertion rates for 1969 are the lowest in the past four years. Net desertions per thousand troops per month fell from 12.7 in 1968 to 10.1 in 1969. There are, however, wide differences among these rates for the different types of forces. In the reasonably typical month of November 1969, for example, these differences were as follows:

Regular Forces	11.1/1000 troops
ARVN Combat Units 1/	28.6/1000 troops
Other ARVN Units	2.2/1000 troops
Regional Forces	7.4/1000 troops
Popular Forces	3.9/1000 troops

Causes

Certainly, long recognized factors such as poor leadership, assignment policy, promotion policy, housing and care of dependents have an impact on desertion rates. A thorough study of the problem would require careful examination of the effects which improvements in each of these areas should be expected to have on desertion rates. Of particular present concern, however, are the factors which explain the vast difference between the desertion rates for the Regional Forces and for the ARVN combat units.

The difference may be partially explained by the fact that the Regional Forces are stationed relatively close to their home villages. This means that not only are they perhaps more conscious of fighting for their "homes and families" than are the regulars, but also they do not have the option

1/ ARVN Divisions, separate Regiments, and Rangers.

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of returning to their home village and enlisting in the RF or PF if they desert. There is good reason to believe that the latter is done by many ARVN deserters.

A far more important explanatory factor, however, seems to be combat. The ARVN combat units are exposed to more combat and suffer greater casualties than do either the Regional or Popular Forces which are concerned primarily with local security. ARVN combat units in the first three quarters of 1969 experienced KIA rates per thousand troops which were more than twice as high as those experienced by the RF or PF.

The explanatory importance of combat is further supported by recent data on the ARVN divisions. The divisions which suffered the greatest casualties per thousand in early 1969 also had the highest desertion rates over roughly the same period (with the exception of the ARVN 18th Division, considered to be one of the poorest in South Vietnam, which had a high desertion rate while taking only moderate casualties.) Moreover, there is some evidence that desertions tend to go up in any particular ARVN unit as combat intensifies. The ARVN unit defending Ben Het last summer experienced a doubling of its desertion rates at that time. Since units suffering higher casualties require replacements, part of this increase may be explained by the fact that most of the replacements are new troops, who are more prone to desert.

Combat Pay

Despite the fact that combat forces suffer much higher casualty rates and have much higher desertion rates, the fact remains that there is no financial incentive for an RVNAF soldier to face combat. In fact there may well be financial incentives for him to avoid it since non-combat assignments in cities and villages offer greater opportunity for "moonlighting." Granted, this is only one of many problems with a cumbersome pay structure which, among other things, rewards reproduction much more than promotion, but it is a problem which demands attention as the RVNAF takes responsibility for more of the fighting.

The data available on the effect of past pay increases on desertions do not, however, give us a solid foundation for predicting the effect of combat pay on desertions. There have been three major military pay increases since 1966. The first occurred on January 1, 1966, but the data available on desertions at that time are very soft and not sufficiently detailed to allow us to see how this pay increase affected desertion rates in the ARVN combat units. The second major military pay increase occurred on January 1, 1968, but the desertion data again are inaccurate and conclusions about the effect of this increase are impossible because of the Tet offensive. The most promising observation is the recent pay increase of 1000 piasters per man per month announced on August 23, 1969. Desertion rates for ARVN combat units for July through November 1969 are shown on the following page. The data for RVNAF KIA, ARVN battalion size operations and VC/NVA attacks are shown to indicate that these months comprise a period with a reasonably constant level of hostilities.

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	<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>
<u>Desertions</u>					
ARVN Combat Unit Net Desesations (/1000/month)					
	29.6	26.3	23.4	25.6	28.6
<u>Combat Tempo</u>					
RVNAF KIA	1299	1425	1319	1274	1356
ARVN Bn Size Operations	1070	1032	1027	987	905
VC/NVA Attacks	205	245	309	192	339

Since the announcement of the pay increase came a week before the end of August, we would expect, other factors remaining unchanged, that the effect of the pay increase should show itself most clearly in the September desertion figures. The decline, however, is only 2.9 per thousand per month (480 men total) for what was nearly a 20% pay increase for an ARVN private with five dependents. Even if we assume optimistically that the total decline between July and September of 6.2 per thousand was due solely to the pay increase, this appears to be a fairly expensive means of reducing desertions. The thousand piasters per month increase for each of the then 165,000 members of ARVN combat units cost about 2 billion piasters annually or about 2 million piasters (\$17,000) per man who was assumed to be deterred from desertion by the pay increase.

These data, however, do little to predict the effect of combat pay on desertions. They show that the effect of an across-the-board increase in military pay is at best transitory; by November the ARVN combat unit desertion rate was once again close to its July level. The August pay increase, however, covered all forces, and the possibility of enlisting in RF or PF after desertion remained. Thus, the August pay increase generated little or no financial incentive not to desert. The effect of combat pay should not be transitory and should be expected to be significantly greater than the August pay increase. In the short run, however, it would probalby still be somewhat expensive per man deterred from desertion.

Criticisms of Combat Pay

Two criticisms are made of a system of combat pay for the RVNAF: (1) it would be very difficult to structure criteria for qualification for combat pay and to administer such a system, and (2) such a pay increase would be inflationary. Both of these criticisms are relevant but can be overcome.

There is no question that the criteria for qualification must be carefully constructed so as not to generate harmful or counter-productive incentives, and they must be simple to administrate. Moreover, the US should take care to insure that, if such a system were instituted, those who qualified for combat pay did receive it. Yet there does exist at least one simple and workable

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criterion for qualification; viz., assignment to one of the ARVN combat units, since these are the units with the highest desertion rates.

If the additional cost of the combat pay were financed by the GVN it would certainly be inflationary. If this piaster cost (or the cost of any other ARVN improvement) were financed with US dollars, however, it could be handled in a manner which either has little effect on inflation or is deflationary, depending on the exchange rate which is used to calculate the dollar equivalent of the piaster cost. For example, if the dollar equivalent were calculated at the official exchange rate, the GVN would be able to collect more import revenues than the cost of the combat pay. The net effect would be deflationary, provided there was no buildup of foreign exchange held by the GVN.

Thus neither of the criticisms commonly made of combat pay is necessarily valid. At present, however, it is impossible to determine how combat pay would affect desertion rates.

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ARVN DESERTIONS AND COMBAT PAY: A COMMENT

We have received the following personal comments from an officer in the Army staff on our ARVN desertions article which appeared in last month's report (January 1970 issue, p. 18). His comments follow:

"The following comments pertain to the conclusions contained in the article 'ARVN Desertions and Combat Pay', pages 18-21, subject report. Although the intensity of combat probably influences the desertion rate in RVN units, as it does in any army, the primary reason for the higher rate in regular units as compared to RF/PP units, is socio-economic. The PP desertion rate is the lowest because the soldier stays at home. The RF rate is next because the soldier stays near home. The ARVN rate is highest because the soldier is often sent far away from home. He is concerned about his family's safety and their food supply. For these reasons his desertion rate rises when increased enemy activity is reported in the area of his village and when it is time to sow and reap. Statistics to prove these statements should be easily obtainable.

"Finally, the report indicates that increased pay is not the answer because the reduction in desertion rates attributable to the last pay raise was small. The fact is that the current ARVN soldier's pay is wholly inadequate in terms of his family's cost of living. This is particularly true in the Highlands (for example in the Pleiku-Kontum area) and accounts in my opinion more than any other single factor, for the high desertion rate. When the living conditions of the ARVN soldier's family are improved, his desertion rate will decline significantly."

SEAPRO Comment. The analysis of ARVN ground combat force desertions appearing elsewhere in this issue tends to support the foregoing contention that combat is not the primary cause of desertions. Unfortunately, statistics on the socio-economic aspects of ARVN desertions are not easily obtainable in Washington. However, we are undertaking a study of the limited amount of such data in the System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF and will report any worthwhile results in a future issue. For the moment, we tend to agree that improvement in the living conditions of the ARVN soldier's family may reduce desertions more than any other single factor.

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DESERTIONS FROM ARVN/VNMC GROUND COMBAT FORCES

Summary. In 1969, the desertion rates for ARVN/VNMC combat forces dropped to about 18% below 1968 rates. However, the rates remained fairly level throughout 1969, rising at the end of the year. The ARVN divisions do not have similar patterns of desertions and there seems to be no statistical relationship between fluctuations in ARVN/VNMC combat deaths and desertion rates. Only the 25th Division has shown clear and definite progress in reducing desertions over the past three years.

The desertion rates for the RVNAF ground combat forces (ARVN and Marines, but not RF/PF) dropped about 18% last year; the rate declined from an average of 34.0 down to 27.9 desertions per thousand strength per month between 1968 and 1969. Graph #1 indicates that the desertion rate dropped to a new lower level, but did not continue to decline throughout 1969; in fact, November and December had the highest rates of the year.

The desertion rates for the other Vietnamese regular forces have remained fairly constant at about 5 per thousand strength per month for the past two years, or at one-sixth (15%) the rates of the ground combat forces.

Table 1 shows that 11 of the 17 types of units shown reduced their desertion rates during 1969. The 25th Division had the largest decline, and cut both its 1967 and 1968 rates in half. It was the only unit to cut desertions well below its 1967 rates. Airborne units had the next best record, cutting their 1968 rate by 55% in 1969; however, the 1969 rate was only 8% below their 1967 rate. The Marines, Rangers, and the 1st, 5th, and 9th Divisions, cut their desertion rates by 7.5 to 14.4 per thousand friendly strength in 1969, but only the 5th Division and Marines cut their rates below their 1967 averages.


The largest increases in desertions occurred in the Armored units, the 51st and 42nd Regiments, and the 18th Division. The 42nd Separate Regiment showed the most spectacular increase over the past two years, from a monthly rate of 4.4 per thousand in 1967 to 41.0 in 1969.

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GRAPH 1

RVNAF REGULAR FORCE DESERTION RATES
(Monthly Average Desertions per 1000 Friendly Strength)



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In the past, it has been assumed on the basis of anecdotal evidence that as the amount of combat goes up, so do desertions, (for example, the large desertions from the 42nd Regiment after Ben Het). Evidence of an association between combat and desertions is seen in the difference between ground combat desertion rates and those for the Air Force, Navy and non-combatant ARVN units. As already noted, ground combat desertion rates are about six times higher than those for the other units (see Graph 1).

However, evidence gathered from a statistical correlation analysis of data on friendly KIA indicated that there is little or no statistical relationship between KIA in ARVN/VNMC units and desertions from those units. Since KIA apparently is not responsible for changes in the number of desertions, studies of data on pay, housing, and other items are underway to discover if other causes can be directly identified.

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TABLE 1
DESERTION RATES OF RVNAF GROUND COMBAT FORCES^a

<u>Infantry Divisions and Regiments</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>Change 1968-1969</u>
1st Div	12.5	27.9	20.1	- 7.8
2nd Div	10.8	28.6	33.3	- 4.7
51st Regt	18.9	34.1	43.7	- 9.6
22nd Div	12.2	17.6	15.7	- 1.9
23rd Div	11.7	25.7	25.2	- .5
42nd Regt	4.4	31.5	41.0	- 9.5
5th Div	24.8	30.6	21.5	- 9.7
18th Div	31.2	38.6	45.4	- 6.8
25th Div	41.6	45.5	19.7	-25.8
7th Div	20.0	28.5	29.1	- .6
9th Div	26.7	50.1	41.8	- 8.3
21st Div	27.5	48.4	46.8	- 1.5
<u>Other Units</u>				
Rangers	NA	43.5	36.0	- 7.5
Airborne	19.4	40.2	17.9	-22.3
Armor	NA	8.2	22.4	14.2
Special Forces	NA	8.1	5.6	- 2.5
Marines	25.5	38.9	24.5	-14.4


^a Source: RVNAF Selected Personnel Data.

An examination of Graphs 2 through 5 reveals no patterns or trends common to the quarterly desertion rates for all ARVN divisions. Some units have had fairly large, but sporadic increases, e.g., the 42nd Regiment (from 2.2 in 2nd Quarter 1967 to 62.9 in 4th Quarter 1969), 2nd Division (5.4 in 2nd Quarter 1967 to 39.1 in 4th quarter 1969), and the 51st Regiment. Other divisions have had smaller increases but their rates still fluctuated widely from quarter to quarter, e.g., the 22nd Division, which went from 10.7 in 1st Quarter 1967 to 19.8 in 4th Quarter 1969, and the 9th and 21st Divisions. Other units have experienced changes but there were no wide quarterly fluctuations, e.g., the 22nd and 7th Division. Still other units have shown decreases over the three years, such as the 5th and 25th Divisions.

Not only were there no common patterns over the three years among the divisions, but there were also no similarities at key points in time. For example, during Tet 1968 (1st Quarter 1968) only seven of the twelve units showed a peak in their rates. In the second quarter 1968 the rates for three units peaked, but those for four more hit a low point. The period in which there is the greatest similarity among the divisions is the 4th Quarter 1969 in which the rates for all but two units (1st and 25th Divisions) increased. (Table 2, following the graphs, presents the quarterly figures for each type of unit.)

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
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
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
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TABLE 2

COMBAT FORCE DESERTION RATES

<u>DESERTION RATES</u> (Per 1000)	1968				1969				1967				1967			
	1967	1968	1969	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr
Non-Combat				4.2	4.7	4.4	3.6	4.2	4.6	4.7	5.1	4.2	4.6			
Combat				34.0	27.9	31.1	31.4	36.3	37.0	26.4	27.1	27.5	30.7			
Combat by Unit:																
1st Inf Div	12.5	27.9	20.1		NA	21.4	31.1	31.2	16.9	23.0	22.5	17.8				
2nd Inf Div	10.8	28.6	33.3		30.3	19.6	32.4	32.0	27.4	31.8	34.9	39.1				
5th Inf Div	24.8	30.6	21.5		35.0	29.0	28.4	29.8	20.3	21.5	19.7	24.5				
7th Inf Div	20.0	28.5	29.1		29.1	28.1	27.8	29.0	18.1	27.3	34.6	36.3				
9th Inf Div	26.7	50.1	41.8		47.9	43.2	54.2	55.0	39.5	38.5	40.2	49.1				
18th Inf Div	31.2	38.6	45.4		47.6	30.9	34.4	41.3	43.7	48.5	42.9	46.6				
21st Inf Div	27.5	48.4	46.8		37.7	56.2	41.3	58.3	56.4	42.4	41.7	46.5				
22nd Inf Div	12.2	17.6	15.7		17.0	15.0	12.7	25.7	20.4	9.8	12.9	19.8				
23rd Inf Div	11.7	25.7	25.2		14.9	30.1	29.0	28.8	25.4	26.0	23.2	26.2				
25th Inf Div	41.6	45.5	19.7		45.1	26.5	49.5	50.8	16.0	17.0	23.0	22.7				
42nd Sep Regt	4.4	31.5	41.0		12.4	42.5	30.5	40.5	24.6	36.2	40.2	62.9				
51st Sep Regt	18.9	34.1	43.7		17.3	26.3	54.0	38.8	57.1	35.3	33.8	47.7				
Rangers	NA	43.5	36.0		31.2	43.3	54.7	44.7	37.1	35.6	36.9	34.4				
Airborne	19.4	40.2	17.9		40.0	46.0	42.2	32.4	10.4	22.6	18.9	19.7				
Marine	25.5	38.9	24.5		33.5	28.7	40.8	52.4	27.8	19.8	26.0	24.4				
Armor	NA	8.2	22.4		10.9	8.6	7.9	5.4	9.2	18.3	11.8					
Special Forces	NA	8.1	5.6		5.9	5.5	13.7	7.2	5.4	6.7	3.6	6.6				

a/ Source: USMACV Selected RVNAF Personnel Data.

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CAUSES OF RVNAF DESERTIONS

Summary. Analysis of several sources of data on the causes of desertion from RVNAF reveals that such causes are much more likely to be socio-economic than military. In Vietnamese interviews with deserters who are now prisoners, nearly 70% said that they deserted because of concern for their families and homesickness; only 15% said fear of danger and death was a cause. This supports an earlier study which showed no correlation between ARVN combat deaths and desertions. In the SEER^{1/} Quarterly Report, US advisors to Vietnamese units indicated they felt family-related causes to be the major reason for RVNAF desertions. Extensive correlational analysis of data from SEER revealed only two statistically significant relationships between desertion rates and various possible causes of desertions; quality and quantity of dependent housing, and pay and rations delay--both socio-economic--were found to be slightly correlated with desertions. Since desertions appear to be related to socio-economic problems arising from combat rather than to fear of combat itself, immediate improvement can be expected in the desertions situation once the socio-economic problems are remedied.

Causes of RVNAF Desertion. In the February 1969 issue of the Analysis Report, the desertion rates for the various RVNAF regular forces were described and preliminary analysis of one possible cause of desertions, friendly combat deaths, showed it to have no association with desertions. There are four sources of data on causes of desertions--a list of causes developed from studies by the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) interviews with deserters themselves, US advisor estimates of causes, and correlational analysis of SEER ratings. Analysis of these four sources reveals that the causes of desertions are more likely to be socio-economic (e.g. lack of dependent housing, homesickness) than military. It is becoming clear that cowardice is not a prime factor in most desertions. The single most predominant cause of desertions appears to be concern for one's family; most other causes can be related to it directly or indirectly. Poor leadership appears to be the main, purely military cause of desertions, but nevertheless is not as important as the socio-economic causes.

The JGS, as the result of various studies, has presented an extended list of desertion causes. These fall into six groups:

1. Deficiencies in leadership at the small unit level.
2. Homesickness.
3. Concern for the welfare of the soldier's family.
4. Poor quality of military life (poor troop mess and housing facilities, too little leave, lack of transportation, failure to receive entitlements, etc.).
5. Fear of hardship and danger.
6. Inability to enforce laws against desertion and lenient treatment of deserters.

^{1/} System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER).

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Homesickness and family hardship appear to be the major causes of desertions, according to interview data gathered by the Vietnamese from deserters who are now prisoners. Table 1 reveals that nearly 70% of the deserters left their units because of homesickness or the financial hardship of their family; only 15% felt fear of death was a reason for desertion. Another desertion cause listed in the JGS study (but not in the table) was lack of leadership from officers; this was exemplified by the severe treatment of subordinates and little association between the commanders and their soldiers.

TABLE 1
REASONS FOR DESERTION

	<u>Number a/</u>	<u>% Replying Yes a/</u>
Too Many Operations	181	35
Fear of Danger or Death	78	15
Inadequate Living Conditions	237	46
Family Hardships & Homesickness	355	68
Low Pay	214	41

Source: Minutes of the May 14, 1969 meeting of the Standing Committee on Anti-Desertion.

a/ Multiple answers from 520 respondents.

In addition to specifying causes of desertions, these interviews also show that the soldier is more likely to desert while in camp than on leave; 58% of the prisoners deserted while in camp, 4% while on operations, and 38% while on TDY or leave.

Table 2 shows that the deserter is usually caught or reported in his home corps. For example, 77% of the deserters native to I Corps were caught or reported in I Corps. The table also shows that 61% of the deserters were caught or reported in III CTZ while only 42% were native to that corps area; 95% of the deserters were caught in either their home CTZ or III Corps. Three fourths (74%) of the deserters had more than six months of service while only a fourth had served less than six months. These findings tend to support homesickness and concern for family as the major desertion causes.

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TABLE 2

DESERTERS BY HOME CTZ AND CTZ WHERE CAUGHT

Deserter Caught Or Reported In	Deserter Native to:		I CTZ		II CTZ		III CTZ		IV CTZ		Various Areas		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
I CTZ	243	77	4	2	18	2	7	1	16	288	12			
II CTZ	8	2	171	75	9	1	10	2	9	207	9			
III CTZ	63	20	49	21	932	95	208	35	174	1426	61			
IV CTZ	3	1	4	2	18	2	370	62	4	399	17			
Total	317	100	228	100	977	100	595	100	203	2320	99			

Source: Minutes of the May 14, 1969 meeting of the Standing Committee on Anti-Desertion.

Table 3 shows data gathered from one question in SEER which asks the US advisor (and his superior) to mark all the personal factors leading to desertions in his unit. Family matters accounted for 25% of the responses in 4th quarter of 1969. Proximity of home, lack of dependent housing, inadequate pay and too little leave, each account for 15-17%.

TABLE 3

PERSONAL FACTORS CAUSING DESERTIONS
(4th Qtr 1969)

Cause	Number of Responses	Percentage of Total
Family Matters	116	25
Inadequate Pay	84	18
Proximity of Home	77	17
Too Little Leave	80	17
Lack of Dependent Housing	70	15
Holidays	33	7
Subversive Agents' Influence	2	1
Subtotal	462	100
Cannot Judge	40	

Source: SEER; AMFEA Question 76.

Table 4 shows that the major military causes of desertions, according to US advisors, are protracted operations (35%), isolated location (26%), and poor leadership (16%). However, only one of these, poor leadership, is purely military. Protracted operations (since they reduce the amount of time a soldier can spend with his family) and isolated location (since the cost of living is higher in remote areas and the serviceman often must leave his family behind) can both be considered as more socio-economic in nature than military.

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TABLE 4

MILITARY FACTORS CAUSL. DESERTIONS
(4th Qtr 1969)

<u>Cause</u>	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percentage of Total</u>
Protracted Operations	87	35
Isolated Location	65	26
Poor Leadership	39	16
Excessive Patrols w/o Contact	19	8
Low Unit Morale	20	8
Intense Combat	9	4
Inactivity	5	2
Excessive Punishment	5	2
Total	249	100 a/

a/ Total due to rounding.

Source: SEER, AMFEA Question 77.

A fourth source of statistical data (also from SEER) tends to support the great importance of socio-economic factors as causes of desertions. Extensive statistical analysis indicates no relationship between ARVN KIA and ARVN desertions; further analysis shows hostility of the populace, leadership, aggressiveness, and training are also not statistically related to desertions.

In fact, of all the possible desertion causes studied through correlational analysis, only two were found to be even weakly correlated to desertion rates-- quality and quantity of dependent housing, and pay and rations delays. With better data, larger correlations might be found between desertions and all the potential causes studied, but the fact remains that housing and delay of entitlements were the only variables found to be statistically correlated with desertions in ARVN units.

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RVNAF DESERTIONS

Summary. The total RVNAF desertion rate per thousand strength was down slightly in the 1st half of 1970 (compared to 1st half 1969). However, the desertion rates in combat units increased (by 23%), particularly in May and June and the month to month trend for RVNAF as a whole is clearly upward.

RVNAF As A Whole

Table 1 shows that an average of about 9027 men deserted RVNAF each month during the last half of 1969. This rose to 10,277 per month in the 1st half of 1970.

The desertion rate per 1000 troops decreased slightly, from 10.6 to 10.2, due to the growth of RVNAF. However, the rate steadily increases in every month of 1970 except February, rising from 9.2 per 1,000 in January to 12.1 per 1,000 in June. The trend is clearly upward.

TABLE 1

RVNAF DESERTIONS a/
Net Desertions/1000 Strength

	1969			1970				
	Net	Rate	Strength	Per/1000	Net	Rate	Strength	Per/1000
Jan.	9433	823.2		11.5	9487	979.6		9.7
Feb.	6974	834.5		8.4	8484	988.4		8.6
Mar.	9227	844.6		10.9	9830	1008.6		9.8
Apr.	9672	856.7		11.3	10329	1016.1		10.2
May	9296	869.6		10.7	11177	1018.9		11.0
June	9563	875.8		10.9	12310	1018.4		12.1
Total	54165	--		63.7	61667	--		61.4
Mo. Avg.	9027	850.7		10.6	10277	1005.0		10.2

a/ OASD(C) Statistical Summary.

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The most severe problem is in the combat units where desertion rates are triple the total RVNAF rates. Table 2 indicates that the average desertion rate for the ARVN Divisions and the Marines was 34.6 in the first half of 1970; up from 28.1 in 1969. In May and June the rates rose sharply; the June average was 40.7.

The 1st ARVN division has the lowest rates in 1970. It also has the finest combat record. The 5th Division has the next lowest desertion rate.

The divisions with the worst rates are the 9th and 21st (54.0 and 49.6 per thousand). The 18th ARVN Division is the only one which had a lower desertion rate in 1970 than in 1969.

TABLE 2

REGULAR FORCE DESERTION a/
Gross Monthly Rate/1000 Troop Strength

	1969	1969	1970	1970					
	Total	Jan-Jun	Jan-Jun	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun
1st Div	20.1	19.9	20.3	20.2	11.2	14.6	22.3	26.1	27.3
2nd. Div	33.3	29.6	40.3	39.5	38.1	56.4	36.7	32.2	38.9
7th Div	29.1	22.9	35.1	31.9	30.0	47.5	35.3	33.3	32.6
22nd Div*	15.7	15.1	27.6	22.3	16.3	19.1	20.2	48.5	39.2
23rd Div*	25.2	25.7	29.5	23.9	24.7	28.8	31.5	33.6	34.2
5th Div*	21.5	20.9	23.3	15.8	28.2	19.0	22.8	25.2	29.0
18th Div*	45.4	46.1	35.1	37.4	30.9	26.3	34.4	34.2	47.5
25th Div*	19.7	16.5	29.0	19.9	23.3	32.9	27.2	32.1	38.7
9th Div*	41.8	39.0	54.0	53.9	50.4	47.5	53.6	58.6	60.2
21st Div*	46.8	49.4	49.6	60.4	50.6	37.0	44.6	48.3	56.7
Marines*	24.5	23.8	37.2	48.5	24.5	35.4	31.7	39.2	43.9
Marine & ARVN Division Avg.	29.4	28.1	34.6	33.9	29.8	33.1	32.8	37.4	40.7
a/	MACV RVNAF (Personnel Data.								
* Operated in Cambodia.									

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RVNAF DESERTIONS

Summary

Analysis of RVNAF desertion rates from 1966 to present shows that:

- There was no increase in desertions during the 1967 presidential election period.
- Current desertion rates are approaching the high levels of 1966 and 1968 (15 - 16 per thousand per month).
- The overall RVNAF desertion rate is about 30-40% above what we estimate US desertions would be under Vietnamese rules.
- RVNAF desertions tend to be permanent; only 14% of all deserters are reported as returned to military control.
- The desertion problem in GVN forces is concentrated in the ground combat units, implying yet another limitation on their ability for sustained operations.
- The three worst ARVN units (those with chronic desertion problems) are:
 - The 51st Infantry Regiment (Quang Nam).
 - The 9th Division (MR 4).
 - The 21st Division (MR 4).

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RVNAF DESERTION RATES

Overview and Perspective

The approach of the GVN presidential elections in early October has led to concern that RVNAF desertion rates may rise even more sharply than they have already. Two possible factors for such an increase are cited:

- The inevitable conflicts which will build within RVNAF as their leaders lend individual support to various candidates (all of whom are military men).
- The natural reluctance of leaders to exert pressure to stem the flow of desertions during the elections period for fear of alienating military supporters (who are also voters).

The historical desertion data do not support this thesis. In 1967, the year of the last presidential election (on Sep 3) RVNAF desertion rates were remarkably stable for the entire year. They averaged 11.1 men per thousand troops per month, lower than the previous year (16.3 per thousand per month) and the following year (15.0 per thousand per month). During the four month period immediately preceding the election, desertions ranged from 10.4-11.5 per thousand each month. They held constant at about 11 per thousand for each of the four months following the election.

However, desertions still pose one of the most worrisome drains on trained manpower from RVNAF. Gross desertions per 1000 troops are reaching record highs this year, continuing a generally upward trend over the last 2½ years. In April the gross rate rose to 14.1 per thousand, nearly 10% above the average rate earlier this year and approaching the average rates of 1966 and 1968 (15-16 per thousand per month).

RVNAF combat units represent less than 20% of the force but had 50% of the desertions in April. We therefore feel that the current rates reflect the burden of GVN military initiatives in Laos, the U Minh Forest, Seven Mountains and other VC base/areas, together with the increased level of military involvement in Cambodia, the western highlands and below the DMZ.

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TABLE 1

RVNAF DESERTIONS

	<u>1st Qtr 1969</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1970</u>	<u>1st Qtr 1971</u>	<u>April 1971</u>
Number of Desertions (gross)	28,382	32,378	40,743	14,900
Average Strength (000)	834.1	992.2	1,053.7	1,058.2
Gross/1000troops/month	11.3	10.9	12.9	14.1

Putting the Data into Perspective

Most analyses concerned with RVNAF desertion rates give the reader little basis from which to judge whether the numbers are reasonable or startling. We feel there are two valid ways of viewing the data:

- in relation to US rates
- by component within RVNAF

Comparing the Data with US Rates

RVNAF desertion criteria differ from the two types of unauthorized absences defined for US forces (AWOL and desertion). A US soldier is carried as AWOL for thirty days and then administratively designated a deserter. A Vietnamese soldier is considered a deserter if he is absent without leave for more than fifteen days. We therefore speculated that if RVNAF desertion rates were not out of line with US unauthorized absences, they ought to be:

- higher than US desertion rates
- below US AWOL rates

This has been precisely the case for the past 21 months. Table 2 shows that the gross desertion rate for RVNAF has ranged from 10.9-13.4 per thousand per month for the last two years. US Army desertions (world-wide) in the same period ranged from 3.3-6.4 per thousand per month - about 30% to 50% of the RVNAF gross rate. However, the US AWOL-rate has been climbing steadily and, for the last year, has surpassed the Vietnamese gross desertion rate. Additionally, the US Army AWOL rate has been at or above the RVNAF net desertion rate for the past 21 months.

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TABLE 2

US AND RVNAF DESERTION RATES
(Rates per 1000 troops per month)

RVNAF	1969				1970				1971	
	1st Q	2d Q	3d Q	4th Q	1st Q	2d Q	3d Q	4th Q	1st Q	
Gross Desertions	11.3	12.5	11.4	10.9	10.9	12.9	13.4	11.9	12.9	
Net Desertions a/	10.2	11.0	10.1	9.1	9.4	11.0	11.6	9.3	10.9	
<u>US ARMY (world-wide)</u>										
Desertions	4.2	3.3	3.6	3.6	4.5	5.1	6.4	6.4	6.4	
AWOL	10.7	9.0	10.1	9.1	12.1	12.8	14.7	14.7	15.7	

a/ Adjusted for returns to military control

Source: RVNAF data - OSD Comptroller
U.S. Army data - DCSEER, Hq DA

US Army data shows that the average AWOL is absent about eleven days. If we assume a reasonable distribution above and below that average value, then a significant number of US Army AWOL's would classify as deserters under the GVN criteria. We estimated that, if the US Army used a 15 day criteria, Vietnamese desertions would only run about 30-40% higher than US desertions. However, the crux of the Vietnamese problem lies in the permanence of desertions. Over the past two years only about 14% of their deserters have been reported as returned to military control. In contrast about 60% of US Army AWOLs return to military control.

Comparing the Components within RVNAF

ARVN combat units have the real desertion problem within RVNAF. Taken as a group, these units experience desertions at about 4-5 times the rate of the non-combat ARVN units and the PF, and at about 3 times the rate for RF units. They are usually about 2.5 times as high as the RVNAF-wide desertion rate (Table 3).

Some observers feel that many of the regulars who desert do so to return home, joining the territorial forces upon arrival. Obviously, these men would not be a true loss to the system as a whole, but they remain a source of disruption representing a manpower drain on regular units. Data are not available to judge the extent of this type of "desertion."

1/ Data on deserters returned to military control are not immediately available.

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(Number per thousand per month)

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971^{a/}</u>
<u>ARVN</u>			
Combat units	28.2	32.2	35.6 ^{b/}
Non-combat units	5.4	5.9	7.0 ^{b/}
<u>TERRITORIAL FORCES</u>			
Regional (RF)	11.9	10.9	10.7
Popular (PF)	6.1	7.4	7.9
<u>RVNAF</u>	11.5	12.3	13.2

^{a/} Thru April
^{b/} preliminary

A Closer Look at the Combat Units

Three ARVN units have had chronic^{1/} desertion problems:

- the 51st Infantry Regiment (operating in Quang Nam province): Recent rates are 41.2 per 1000 in February; 42.2 in March; but an encouraging drop to 22.5 in April.

- the 9th Division (operating in and around the Seven Mountains area and the remote base areas of MR IV): 55.4 per 1000 in February; 80.3 in March; 49.1 in April.

- the 21st Division (operating in the U Minh forest campaign in MR IV): 83.0 per 1000 in February; 48.3 in March; 43.7 in April.

Almost all the ARVN combat units which were involved in major operations have had substantial increases in desertions in recent months (Jan--April 1971):

- Units in Laos:

-- 1st Division: 38 per 1000 in April the highest rate in 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ years.

^{1/} Arbitrarily defined as unit rates above the gross ARVN combat unit desertion rate for the last 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ years (without exception).

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-- Ranger Command: 35.4 per 1000 in March, up from 16.5 per 1000 in January (although not as high as the prevailing rates before September 1970), down slightly to 32.2 in April.

-- Airborne Division: 40.6 per 1000 in February, down to the normal level for the unit in March (17.8/1000), but up sharply to 45.2 in April.

- Units in Cambodia

-- 5th Division: 46.8 per 1000 per month in March, the highest rate in over two years; remaining high at 43.1 in April.

-- 25th Division: A steadily rising rate for the last year and a half, from 22.6 in 4th quarter 1969 to 59.1 in March 1971, down slightly to 43.6 in April.

-- 18th Division: An exception. Below its own rate for the last two years in the 1st quarter 1971 and also below the combat unit average, but a sharp jump to 47.3 in April.

It appears obvious that the desertions regularly experienced in ARVN's combat units cast further doubt on the RVNAF's ability to sustain operations either out-of-country or within the remote areas of RVN for long periods of time. (The problem is further compounded by many combat units being persistently below authorized strength by as much as 20%.) It seems equally obvious that, despite the failure of previous studies to show a statistically valid correlation between combat activity and desertions, that this is the most important one which exists. Given these problems, an increased strength authorization resulting in more units would not do RVNAF nearly as much good as bringing their existing combat units to full strength and keeping them there by a concerted attack on the desertion problem.

Possible Solutions

A longer term method of reducing RVNAF desertion rates has been suggested by members of the Department of the Army staff. They note that 250-350,000 men become eligible for the draft in Vietnam each year. Of these, 45-65% enter military training centers (160,000 men each year in 1969 and 1970). Given these data, they feel two things could be done:

- limit the term of service of men now in uniform (removing the "in for the duration" syndrome which now exists in RVNAF)

- take up the slack by increasing the number of draft eligibles now inducted.

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These two steps, if taken together, in addition to reducing desertions, provide the benefit of returning mature, militarily proficient men to civilian life as motivated, productive members of society (and a core around which effective hamlet and village defenses could be built). It could also permit a more equitable distribution of the defense of South Vietnam.

An experienced observer of Vietnam with a long involvement with US efforts there has suggested a variation on the theme described above. He feels that a Vietnamese youth should be obligated for a twelve year term of service which is served in three equal increments:

- in ARVN for the first 4 years
- with the Regional Forces (RF) for the middle 4 years
- with the Popular Forces (PF) for the last 4 years.

In effect, the Vietnamese soldier would "work his way home."

The advantages of such a scheme are manifold:

- A younger Army would presumably have fewer problems with dependent care, inadequate pay, etc.
- One source of corruption - position peddling - might be eliminated. The younger, probably unmarried soldier would tend to take assignments as they come during the initial four years, knowing he will not be in ARVN indefinitely.
- As the soldier matures and acquires a family he would also be heading home - working in his home province with RF, and then in his home district in the PF. This reduces the current most commonly cited causes for desertion: separation from family and concern for their welfare.

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RVNAF IMPROVEMENT FROM PHASE I MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

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Summary. Considering regular RVNAF ground forces only, we estimate that their total combat capability will increase by 56% (or 31 additional US battalion equivalents) by June 1970 as a result of the Phase I RVNAF mobilization and modernization program. It is difficult to state RF/PF improvements in regular force equivalents. However, the RF/PF is scheduled to take over gradually the mission of regular battalions now supporting pacification. Through this substitution and the results of expansion and modernization, Vietnamese regular ground forces available for combat operations could increase 128%, or 38.5 extra US battalion equivalents, by June 1970. Vietnamese forces will continue to be dependent on US naval and air support if fighting stays at current or higher levels.

The program to modernize and improve RVNAF forces is proceeding in two phases. Phase I is designed to maximize the ground combat capability of RVNAF with those forces remaining dependent on US naval, air and some logistic support. Phase II of the plan is designed to create a more self-sufficient force appropriate to the military environment when it is implemented. This paper addresses PVNAF improvement expected to result from Phase I of the program.

Ground Forces

Improvement in RVNAF military capability should result from increasing personnel strength, re-equipping with modern weapons, and increasing the number of units available for offensive missions. To date manpower has not been a problem (812,000 men under arms on 30 September versus Phase I goal of 801,000). However, the JCS Phase I Plan expects re-equipment and organization of RVNAF ground forces to take at least until the spring of 1970. Further, no schedule is available for substitution of RF/PF for ARVN battalions in the territorial security role so that these regular forces can assume offensive missions.

A precise computation of the Phase I improvement of military capability is impossible because it will be the product of many separate programs for different components of Vietnamese forces proceeding at different paces which must be skillfully integrated for success. In addition, improvement will be subject to enemy action, other contingencies, and psychological and morale factors whose impact is uncertain. Nevertheless, we have used static projection techniques to estimate the Phase I capability improvement which we believe may be roughly right. The calculations which follow estimate Vietnamese force capability from a study of its equipment and organization; this is in contrast to our previous studies which evaluated RVNAF effectiveness based on performance measured in terms of battlefield results.

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Table 1 shows the increased number of RVNAF units resulting from the RVNAF expansion to 801,000 personnel. We used a MACV study on comparing US and ARVN battalion capability (1 US Inf Bn = 3.2 ARVN Infantry Battalions) to calculate that the Vietnamese infantry battalion capability equated to 52.5 US infantry battalions at the end of FY 1968 (Table 2). We add a 5.5 US cavalry squadron equivalent for the reorganized Vietnamese cavalry squadron to state a total Vietnamese capability equivalent to 58 US combat battalions at end FY 68.* The modernization program provides a 55% increase in infantry firepower, so we inserted this increase into the MACV capability model to estimate FY 69 and 70 infantry battalion capability equivalents. We find a total (cavalry plus infantry) capability increase of 54% (from 58 US battalions equivalents in June 1968 to 89.1 in June 1970) for Vietnamese ground forces.

Increased ARVN artillery at Division and Corps per division almost provides the same number of tubes of division organic artillery as provided for a US infantry division. However, US corps artillery is so large that the Phase I addition changes only slightly the ratio of US to ARVN artillery support. (A US soldier in a maneuver battalion gets ten times more artillery support than does a Vietnamese soldier in a combat unit.) However, the increase will permit ARVN to concentrate artillery to provide more artillery support for large operations.

We do not attempt to state projected RF/FF improvement in regular force equivalents. The RF/FF have increased their strength by 82,000 men from January 1968 through August and selected units have begun re-equipping. Most RF/FF will receive their new equipment in phases, although priority units can obtain it all at once. When complete, RF company firepower should increase by 25% and FF platoon firepower by 75%, thereby achieving rough parity with local enemy forces.

In addition to improving and expanding ARVN, the Phase I plan calls for putting the 41 ARVN battalions now on pacification duty back into offensive combat missions by gradually assigning the pacification security mission to the upgraded RF/FF forces. We do not have the detailed MACV plans, but the M-16 delivery schedule and the small number of RF/FF units to be added suggest that no more than 10 of the ARVN battalions can be freed for offensive operations by June 1969, with the resultant shift of battalion days of effort shown in Estimate 1 of Table 3.

However, MACV has requested a further RVNAF force strength increase to 850,000 by year end. MACV plans to put most of this increase into RF (300 more RF companies in FY 69) which could relieve at least 10 more regular

* We calculate the ARVN cavalry capability differently because, related to US forces, it has more capability than ARVN infantry. We rate the modernized Vietnamese squadron at one half the capability of the US cavalry squadron, based on the number of combat vehicles.

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PHASE I VIETNAMESE
ARMED FORCES CHANGES

	End FY 68	End FY 69	% Change	End FY 70	Tot % Fr FY 68
REGULAR GROUND FORCES					
Infantry Bns 1/	168	180	+ 7	175	+ 4
Armor Cav Sqns	11	14	+ 27	17	+ 55
Total Combat Bns	179	194	+ 8	192	+ 7
Artillery Bn (105mm)	23	29	+ 26	38	+ 65
Artillery Bn (155mm)	6	10	+ 67	10	+ 67
Total Combat Support	29	39	+ 34	48	+ 66

RF

Companies	1053	1196	+ 14	1196	+ 14
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PF

Platoons	4561	4861	+ 7	4861	+ 7
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1/ Includes add-on of equivalent of 5 3 rifle company battalions for 11 newly formed 4 rifle company battalions.

TABLE 2

VIETNAMESE MILITARY CAPABILITY ESTIMATED
IN US EQUIVALENTS

	End FY 68	End FY 69	% Change	End FY 70	Tot % Fr FY 68
Regular Infantry Bns	52.5	83.0	58	80.6	54
Cavalry Squadrons	5.5	7.0	27	8.5	55
Total Combat	58.0	90.0	55	89.1	54

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TABLE 3

**ESTIMATED CHANGES IN
RVNAF REGULAR BN DAYS OF
EFFORT**

	June 68		June 69		June 70 ^{4/}	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Combat	2520	52	3203	61	3476	66
Pacification	1233	26	933	18	633	12
Reserve	34	7	398	7	420	8
Security	616	13	616	12	616	12
Training	84	2	99	2	105	2
	4799	100	5249	100	5250	100
					5185	100

1/ Source: JCS GUAVA Computer File.

2/ Estimate 1 based on 10 battalions released from pacification duties and added to 15 battalion force increase.

3/ Estimate 2 based on 20 battalions released from pacification duties and added to 15 battalion force increase.

4/ Estimate total 41 battalions released from pacification and added to 13 battalion increase.

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battalions of the RD mission by June 1969 (Estimate 2 in Table 3 shows the shift of effort resulting). We anticipate that some of the new RVN companies would also be used to expand territorial security into the contested areas under the pacification counter offensive plan. In summary, about 10-20 more ARVN battalions could be on offensive operations by June 1969 and 40 more battalions by June 1970 if the substitution works out.

The foregoing calculations assume that newly formed units and those released from pacification will perform primarily offensive missions 91% of the time, spending the remaining 9% of the time in training and reserve. This would result in an increase of 38.5 US battalion equivalents (128% increase over end FY 68) carrying out combat missions (Table 4).

Table 5 relates the total increased RVNAF capability to all expected friendly deployments to SVN. It forecasts an increase in end FY 70 ground force capability equivalent to 35 US Army battalions (17% increase) from additional Vietnamese and third country efforts.

Air Force

Phase I increases the previously planned provision of UH-1 helicopters for VNAF from 3 squadrons (60 aircraft) by March 1971 to 8 squadrons (248 aircraft) by December 1970. We estimate that 325 helicopters are required to support the build-up and attrition. Helicopters must be diverted from deliveries to US forces to VNAF to implement the Phase I Plan. Reduced attrition lately should ease this problem considerably. Based on a 70% availability rate, approval of this program will provide 50% more VNAF helicopter lift capability by FY 69 as compared to FY 68, 100% more by end FY 70 and 200% more by end FY 71. VNAF will probably use 10-20% of this flying time to provide helicopter gunship support. By December 1970, the VNAF should have the capability to provide RVNAF lift support about equal to that currently received from the US Army.

The four fighter/attack squadrons (3 A-1 and 1 F-5) are expanded to 6 (2 A-1, 1 F-5, and 3 A-37) by the end of FY 69. We forecast no difficulty in maintaining this expanded force at current loss rates. The six squadrons will generate 2600 attack sorties (versus 1800 now, an increase of 44%). We expect the modernized VNAF to fly about 14% of total sorties (versus 10% now). Therefore, Vietnamese ground forces will continue to be dependent on USAF for a large part of their air support.

Navy

The personnel strength in the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) will increase by 2166 during Phase I. 30% of the increase goes to combat/combat support forces to

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TABLE 4

FORECAST CHANGE
IN RVNAF BN CAPABILITY
STATED IN US EQUIVALENTS BY MISSION
(Includes Expansion, Modernization and Anticipated
Change in Mission)

	End FY 68		End FY 69		End FY 70	
	Proj 1		Proj 2			
	Bn	%	Bn	%	Bn	%
Combat	30.1	52	54.9	61	59.4	66
Pacification	15.1	26	16.2	18	10.8	12
Other	12.8	22	18.9	21	19.8	22
Total	58.0	100	90.0	100	90.9	100
	89.1				89.1	100

TABLE 5

TOTAL MILITARY CAPABILITY
IN SVN STATED IN US ARMY
BN EQUIVALENTS

	End FY 68		End FY 69		End FY 70	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
US	121	59	120	50	120	50
RVNAF	58	28	90	37	89	37
FW	26	13	31	13	31	13
Total	205	100	241	100	240	100

1/ Figure includes US Marine battalions rated at 1.33 USA battalions based on manpower differences.

2/ FW troops assumed equal in capability to USA battalions.

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provide better support for Vietnamese ground force operations. Six (of 13) River Assault Groups (RAGs) will be more heavily armed and armored so they can penetrate areas where the VNN does not now operate. The Navy also gains an underwater demolition capability.

The remaining 70% of the VNN strength increase goes into command and logistics support. Most goes to the shore establishment, thereby increasing it from 24.4% of the VNN force structure to 27.5%. The remainder goes into additional fleet logistics/transport capability, an additional LST and some increases in the command structure. The net result of all these changes is a decrease in the percentage of total VNN force structure for combat elements from 33% now to 30% at the end of FY 69.

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RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS AND MODERNIZATION

Recent reports from MACV and our analysis indicate that the RVNAF measurably improved their performance in 1968. Most observers agree that RVNAF today is a better combat force than it was a year ago. However, the RVNAF have serious deficiencies which reduce the probability that they could successfully counter an insurgency alone. Moreover, it is questionable if they can maintain the present military balance if the NVA do not withdraw but US forces do.

One of our key objectives in Vietnam is to assist the Vietnamese Armed Forces (RVNAF) to assume a greater share of the combat burden. In 1968 the US implemented two improvement and modernization programs designed to (1) increase the ground combat power of RVNAF (Phase I) and (2) to build it into a self-sufficient force able to meet insurgency requirements if North Vietnamese and US forces withdraw (Phase II). At the same time, the Government of Vietnam ordered a general mobilization and began to progress toward Phase I and Phase II goals. In early 1969, the Phase II plan was accelerated.

The purpose of this analysis is to summarize various estimates of current RVNAF effectiveness, and to assess the current improvement and modernization programs.

Current RVNAF Effectiveness

No single, authoritative estimate of RVNAF effectiveness and capabilities exists in Washington. This section attempts to pull together the results of available MACV studies of RVNAF effectiveness and the results of four sets of calculations made here in an attempt to establish the possible ranges of RVNAF effectiveness, as compared to that of US forces.

A MACV study^{1/} over a year ago assessed the relative capability of US and ARVN infantry battalions. (The date of the study is early 1968, and is presumably based on 1967 performance data.) The study focused on the following five functions of land warfare: firepower, mobility, command and control, intelligence and service support. MACV measured the capability of US and ARVN organizations in different environments (each Vietnamese CTZ) and in the types of operation relevant to each Corps. It found the relative capability of an ARVN infantry battalion was 31% of a US infantry battalion. The MACV model indicated that the greatest improvement in RVNAF capability would be achieved by increasing organic firepower. The RVNAF modernization program is designed to do precisely this. However, some observers feel that training and leadership is as critical as organic firepower in improving RVNAF performance.^{2/}

^{1/} MACEVAL Study No. 2-68, "Capability Study of US and ARVN Infantry Battalions".
^{2/} When faced with a similar problem in Korea, General Ridgeway chose to concentrate on qualitative improvements before increasing ROK strength or modernizing its equipment.

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Other MACV reports^{1/} provide the US advisors' subjective judgments of RVNAF improvement. Based on questionnaires, they assess effectiveness, combat support received, leadership, personnel and logistics. They also report judgments based on statistical reports such as number of operations, contacts and body counts. These reports show improvement for the majority of ARVN units in almost every indicator used. But the precise, overall level of improvement is not reported. Another MACV report^{2/} gives an overall rating such as excellent, average, etc.

None of these reports or analyses provide us with a simple quantitative measure of RVNAF effectiveness as it changes over time. Therefore we have attempted to develop such measures and to find ways to equate RVNAF to US troop equivalents.

Our approach consists of 4 calculations using the different sets of statistics that are available. All four calculations are based on the number of enemy killed per thousand friendly troops. The first calculation relates total RVNAF (Regular, RF and PF) to total US performance (Table 1). The second relates ARVN regular force maneuver battalions to US maneuver battalions based on enemy killed per equivalent maneuver battalion strength (Table 2).

Data for the first two calculations are derived from a computer file (GUAVA) which is based on initial operational reports (OPREP-5). To check these results, we compared them with the results from our incomplete set of final KIA figures from the MACV reports containing enemy killed by each component of RVNAF. The results for total RVNAF and the regular forces are shown in Table 3. Those for the RF and PF are shown in Table 4.

We recognize that this approach is incomplete because it relies solely on measurement of enemy killed and fails to measure performance of the different types of missions assigned to various forces (i.e., provision of territorial security, protection of a key installation, etc.). Since determining military capability is at best inexact and highly theoretical, the results are tenuous. However, we hope to arrive at a more precise overall indicator of RVNAF and regular force performance than is currently available.

^{1/} "US MACV ARVN/Marine and Naval Forces Advisory Reports."

^{2/} MACV "Quarterly Evaluations."

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Total RVNAF Vs. US. Table 1 shows that total RVNAF relative effectiveness in killing VC/NVA per 1000 RVNAF troops rose from an average of 43% of US effectiveness in 1967 to a high of 57% in 1968 but declined to 46% in 1st quarter 1969. The decline was produced by the combination of an 11% decrease in enemy KIA by RVNAF and an average 10% RVNAF strength increase during 1st quarter 1969. The number of enemy killed by US forces doubled in 1968 while those killed by RVNAF increased to 2.6 times the 1967 average. In first quarter 1969 US forces killed the enemy at about the same rate as 1968 quarterly average but RVNAF killed the enemy at only 89% of their 1968 rate.

TABLE 1
VC/NVA KILLED PER THOUSAND FRIENDLY STRENGTH a/

	1967	1968	1969
	Qtr	Qtr	1st
	Avg	Avg	Qtr
US			
VC/NVA Killed d/	12384	24135	24587
Avg Strength (000) c/	445	525	540
VC/NVA Killed per 1000 Str	28	46	46
RVNAF			
VC/NVA Killed b/	7461	19424	17273
Avg Strength (000) c/	615	756	834
VC/NVA Killed per 1000 Str	12	26	21
Effectiveness of RVNAF Compared to US	43%	57%	46%

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA computer file. Based on OPREP-5.
1967 data are VC/NVA killed in friendly offensive actions.

b/ Source: JCS GUAVA (GU20R).

c/ Source: OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2.

d/ JCS GUAVA, Special Retrieval, US large and small unit operations.

ARVN Vs. US Maneuver Battalions. Similar calculations of US and ARVN battalion performance in large operations indicate that the regular forces are more effective than the RVNAF as a whole. Table 2 shows a 1967 figure of 47% of US effectiveness for regular Vietnamese battalions and a 1968 figure of 56%. But regular Vietnamese force effectiveness continued to increase to a record 73% of US forces during 1st quarter 1969, in marked contrast to the declining results for the total force.

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TABLE 2

VC/NVA KILLED IN BATTALION SIZED AND LARGER OPERATIONS a/
 (By ARVN and US Maneuver Battalion Strength Equivalents)

	1967	1968	1969
	Qtr	Qtr	1st
	Avg	Avg	Qtr
Enemy KIA by US d/	10018	19890	20491
Maneuver Bn e/	93	120	120
KIA/Maneuver Bn	108	166	171
Enemy KIA by ARVN b/	5045	9509	13338
Maneuver Bn (Adjusted) c/	98	102	108
KIA/Maneuver Bn	51	93	124
Effectiveness of ARVN Compared to US	47%	56%e/	73%

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA computer file.

b/ Source: JCS GUAVA (GULSR).

c/ Source: OASD(SA) SEA deployment program summary, Table 1.
 Average present for duty strength of ARVN battalion is .6 the strength
 of US Army battalion. Figures shown are adjusted accordingly on the
 basis of the average number of maneuver battalions present per quarter.

d/ Source: JCS GUAVA special retrieval, US large and small unit
 operations.

e/ Calculated as 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarter averages only. ARVN results are
 not completely reported in GUAVA for the 1st Qtr; there is a known
 underreporting of total enemy KIA of 50% in part of the file for 1st
 quarter 1968.

In a third set of calculations, we compared our results with final enemy KIA totals as reported by MACV. Table 3 shows that the effectiveness of total RVNAF compared to US was 53% in 1968 and 46% in 1st quarter 1969. This compares with our figures in Table 1 of 57% and 46%. Effectiveness of total regular forces compared to US forces was 68% in 1968 and 62% in 1st quarter 1969. This is better than our 1969 figure for regular forces (56%) but lower than our first quarter figure (73%) and the trend changes.

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TABLE 3 a/

VC/NVA KILLED BY RVNAF/REGULAR FORCES AND US

	1968 (7 months total) ^{a/}	1969 1Qtr
Enemy Killed by US	54185	26884
Avg Strength (000)	525	540
VC/NVA Killed per 1000 Strength	103	50
Enemy KIA by all RVNAF	41305	19282
Avg Strength (000)	756	834
VC/NVA Killed per 1000 Strength	55	23
Effectiveness of RVNAF Compared to US	53%	46%
Enemy Killed by Regular Forces b/	29874	13449
Avg Strength (000)	427	430
VC/NVA Killed per 1000 Strength	70	31
Effectiveness of Regular Forces Compared to US	68%	62%

a/ Source: MACV Measurement of Progress Report. (Available data does not include Jan., Feb., Mar., and Oct-Nov 1968.)

b/ Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps only.

Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF). It is difficult to compare RF/PF performance with ARVN and US performance since RF/PF missions and force structures differ substantially from allied main force units. The basic PF units are platoons and their mission is almost entirely static defense of small populationcenters, military facilities and lines of communication (LOCs). The RF basic units are companies; they are primarily territorial security forces, but engage in offensive operations as well. Table 4 shows the 4th set of calculations; enemy KIA by RF/PF per 1000 average strength. The RF kill rate was about 40% of the regular force KIA per 1000 men and the PF rate is about half the RF rate (or 25% of regular rate).

TABLE 4

VC/NVA KIA BY RF/PF

	1968 (7 months total) ^{a/}	1969 1Qtr
Enemy KIA by RF a/	5719	2936
Average Strength (000) b/	198.0	228.5
VC/NVA KIA Per (000) Strength	29	13
Enemy KIA by PF a/	2519	1490
Average Strength (000) b/	165.4	174.7
VC/NVA KIA Per (000) Strength	15	9
a/ MACV Measurement of Progress Report. Available data does not include Jan., Feb., Mar. and Oct,Nov 1968.		
b/ OASD(C) SEA Statistical	Summary, Table 1.	

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Key factors in RF/PF performance appear to be leadership, training and ARVN performance in the same area of operation as RF/PF units. In those areas where ARVN performance has been good and leadership ratings high, RF/PF have performed well. For instance, the worst performing RF/PF operate in III Corps where the ARVN divisions are poor. The best performing RF/PF, in terms of enemy KIA, operate in I Corps where the ARVN divisions have excellent ratings.

Summary. The four sets of calculations consistently show:

1. Total RVNAF effectiveness is better than one would expect on the basis of MACV's 31% capability rating, but about what would be expected on the basis of more recent US advisory reports.
2. Total RVNAF effectiveness, measured in terms of enemy killed per 1000 troop strength ranges 46% to 57% of US force effectiveness.
3. Regular Force effectiveness measured in terms of enemy killed per 1000 troops strength or by equivalent regular force maneuver battalions ranges from 56% to 73% of US force effectiveness.
4. RF effectiveness, measured in terms of enemy killed per 1000 troops is about 40% of regular force effectiveness and PF killed about half as many enemy as RF did.

II. RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Programs

The overall RVNAF modernization program (through Phase II accelerated) places major emphasis on increasing the strength of RVNAF and modernizing its equipment. Table 5 indicates that the final RVNAF force level will be about 875,000 personnel.

TABLE 5

RVNAF PERSONNEL STRENGTH INCREASES a/
(December 1967-June 1970)

	<u>1967</u> <u>(Dec)</u>	<u>1968</u> <u>(Dec)</u>	<u>1969-72b/</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Increase</u>
ARMY	302.8	380.3	374.1	71.3
VNN	16.0	18.6	28.7	12.7
VNNMC	8.0	9.1	9.3	1.3
VNAF	16.1	13.9	32.6	16.5
Total Regular	342.9	426.9	444.7	101.8
Regional	151.4	219.8	252.9	101.5
Popular	148.8	172.5	178.1	29.3
Total RVNAF	643.1	819.2	875.7	232.6

a/ OASD(SA) SEA Statistical Tables.
b/ JCSM 6-69, Planned.

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In addition to RVNAF, planned increases in the paramilitary forces (RD cadre, National Police) will bring over 1 million Vietnamese under arms by the end of 1972, compared to 800,000 in 1967.¹⁷ The Phase II force levels may completely absorb the physically fit Vietnamese manpower. Over one million men under arms represents approximately 90% of the 18-44 year group of physically fit manpower available to GVN and about 6% of the total population. By contrast, North Vietnam has 27% of its physically fit manpower pool and 3% of its total population in the military. Any additional mobilization will likely require callup of skilled manpower or the under 18 age group.

The equipment needed to meet Phase II accelerated goals is being provided by turnover of items from selected US units in SVN and from other sources (i.e., production, reserve units, and war reserve stocks). Turnover of equipment from US units began in February 1969, with several US Navy riverine craft. The Army began the turnover process in March 1969 by co-manning selected units, but transfer of assets will not occur until June 1969. Most of the ground forces and naval equipment will be turned over to the Vietnamese by end of FY 1970. Due to the long lead time in training, most of the aviation equipment turnover will take place in FY 71 and FY 72.

Provision of additional equipment is constrained by the shortage of skilled Vietnamese manpower. There may be short term marginal advantages in providing them with limited quantities of more sophisticated equipment such as night vision devices, sensors, and additional radios. And, in the long term, we may wish to increase their mobility by additional helicopters. However, many of these improvements will be subject to long lead time training requirements. The USAF is already experiencing difficulty in meeting current activation schedules due to the 17-24 month lead time required for pilot training. At the present time, it appears that primary emphasis is needed on training the Vietnamese to use currently programmed equipment and not on additional augmentations.

Regular Forces

Personnel. The regular forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) will total 444,700 personnel by end of 1972. A partial listing of the major combat and combat support units appears in Table 6.

¹⁷ In addition the GVN is planning a 450 thousand increase to the People's Self Defense Force which does not affect the manpower pool. This force is the outgrowth of a program which responded to the appeals of civilians and civic organizations after Tet 1968 for arms to defend themselves, their families and property from enemy attack.

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TABLE 6

REGULAR FORCE UNITS (1967-1972) b/
 (Partial Listing)

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Increase</u>
<u>ARVN b/</u>							
Maneuver Bn. c/	176	185	186	186	186	10	
Armor Brigade	0	2	2	2	2	2	
Armor Cav. Sq.	11	16	17	17	17	6	
Arty. Bn.	29	49	55	55	55	26	
<u>VNN</u>							
RAGs	13	19	19	19	19	6	
PBRs	32	250	250	250	250	218	
<u>VNAF</u>							
Fighter Sq.	6	6	6	6	9	3	
Helicopter Sq.	5 d/	7	7	12	14	--	

a/ JCSM 577-68, 678-68; 6-69.

b/ Includes VNMC.

c/ OASD(SA) SEA Deployment Program Summary.

d/ Conversion of four H-34 squadrons.

Equipment. By 30 April 1969, the regular forces had received about 64% of their requirements for modern individual weapons (100% of M-16s), 75% of their howitzers-mortars, 48% of their tanks, 71% of their personnel carriers, 50% of their modern trucks and about 41% of their modern radios. Four VNAF H-34 squadrons are currently being converted to UH-1 squadrons. Some problems are being experienced in delivering equipment to meet activation and training schedules in the areas of communications, cranes, trucks, M-79 grenade launchers, and material handling equipment. However, the US Service Secretaries recently reported that they did not expect significant difficulty in meeting equipment shortfalls.

By the end of 1972, the regular forces should have a completely modernized Army/Marine Corps of 186 maneuver battalions; a Navy of 6 modern river assault groups, over 250 patrol craft, and two DEs; and an Air Force of 14 helicopter squadrons and 9 tactical squadrons.

The forces were structured to handle a VC threat, on the assumption of an NVA withdrawal, and are therefore lightly equipped in comparison with US forces. If the NVA do not withdraw, the regular forces would probably need additional support in the form of firepower and mobility if they are to play a larger role and engage the larger and "heavier" NVA units. At present an NVA unit reportedly has 60% more firepower than a VC unit.

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At the end of Phase II, the ARVN will be equipped with an equivalent of 87% of the light artillery (105H) and 89% of the medium artillery (155H) tubes now held by US forces in SVN. Although ARVN divisions will be brought up to US standards (three 105 battalions and one 155 battalion per division) they will have no heavy artillery. The 9 VNAF tactical air squadrons will be capable of flying only 180 sorties per day, about what the ARVN receive from US and VNAF. However, this represents only about 37% of the tactical air support US forces now receive in SVN.^{1/} The VNAF will have the capability to provide about 30-40% of the troop lift and 7-10% of the logistical lift normally provided to US forces.

Other Problem Areas

Some observers believe that the qualitative deficiencies of RVNAF are more important than equipment shortfalls. Current improvement programs appear to emphasize personnel strength increases and equipment modernization (i.e., quantitative improvement). Available data indicate that qualitative improvements may not be receiving the same emphasis. Weakness in leadership, training, morale, and the desertion problem continue to plague the regular forces. These factors are discussed below.

Leadership. The promotion system while better, has not been able to cope with the expansion of Regular Forces. (Due to the increase in authorized officer slots, there is still a shortage (45%) of regular force officers in the rank of captain to colonel.) Although repeatedly urged by COMUSMACV to grant battlefield promotions, the RVNAF seldom do so.

Training. Less than 16% of the regular forces are undergoing unit training even though division training areas are available throughout SVN. Less than 1000 Vietnamese are scheduled to receive training in the US. In spite of repeated directives, "in place" training of Vietnamese has not been restored to the pre-Tet 1968 levels.

Desertions. The seriousness of the RVNAF desertion problem is underscored by the fact that unless desertions are reduced by 50% from 1968 levels, planned strength increases cannot be realized. While desertion rates have declined in recent months, the 50% reduction objective still appears difficult to achieve.

Morale. Inflation increased the cost of living by 40% in 1967-68 and the value of currency was halved in the past 2^{1/2} years. Yet the regular forces have not received a pay increase in 2 years. Programs to better the living conditions of soldiers and their families have made little progress.

^{1/} At present an average of about 580 attack sorties per day are flown in SVN by US and about 70 sorties per day are flown by VNAF. About 95 of the US sorties are in support of ARVN for a total of about 165 for ARVN, and 485 for US forces.

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The conclusions regarding weaknesses in the regular forces are supported by MACV advisors' comments. Areas of continued weakness listed in the ARVN, Marine and Naval Force Advisory Report are: (1) over-emphasis on centralized authority, (2) shortage of commanders, (3) failure to exploit tactical intelligence, (4) lack of thoroughness in planning, (5) high rate of desertions and (6) low level of technical skills.

Regional Forces (RF) - Popular Forces (PF)

Personnel. Regional and Popular Forces are scheduled to reach their planned strength ceilings by the end of June 1969. By 31 March, RF had 94% (252,900) of its planned strength assigned and PF had 98% (174,400). RF rifle companies totaled 1241 in March, 81% of the planned unit total of 1479 in June. PF was short only 43 platoons (1%) of the 4861 ceiling.

Equipment. The MACV program to improve RF/FF equipment concentrates primarily on weapons. The goal is to provide 106 automatic weapons per RF rifle company and 34 per PF platoon for a total of about 322,000 automatic weapons. Some 299,300 M-16s (93% of automatic weapons authorized) are allocated for delivery to the RF/FF during FY 69 and FY 70, and deliveries are on schedule. By July this year the RF/FF will have about two-thirds of their M-16s and all priority units should be fully equipped with automatic weapons. (In terms of firepower, US advisors rated 16% of RF units and 26% of PF units inferior to the VC as of 31 March 1968, compared to 34% of RF and 52% of PF a year earlier.)

Since June 1968, an additional 383 RF companies and 880 RF platoons became fully equipped with radios (six per RF company and two per PF platoon). This brings the total units fully equipped to 916 RF (62% of authorized companies) and 2470 PF (51% of authorized platoons) as of March 31. But serious radio shortages still remain, especially for PF. At the current rate, it will take about one year to fully equip all RF units with radios and two years to fully equip all PF units.

Leadership. Although total RF/FF assigned strength is 94-98% of the authorized ceiling, leadership spaces are not being filled at a comparable rate. The RF increased 4500 officers between March and December 1968, but the proportion in combat billets (38%) did not increase in 1968. In addition, there continues to be a serious shortage of NCOs.

The quality of leadership, as rated by US advisors, has improved. In March, 64% (up from 49% in 2nd Qtr 1968) of RF units received good or excellent leadership ratings. PF units with good ratings rose from 39% to 48% of the total.

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Training. In-place training is a prerequisite for PF and RF to learn how to use the new weapons. We estimate that 20-40 hours are required to develop individual proficiency with a new automatic weapon for a soldier already trained with a semi-automatic or similar weapon. The current goal, judging from the rating categories in the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES), indicates that four to six hours of training a week is acceptable for a unit. At this rate, it would take 4-10 weeks for a unit to become proficient with their new weapons.

The number of RF units getting four or more hours per week of in-place training increased 47% in the last half of 1968. Still, only 55% of the units were getting this much training by the end of the year. The 47% increase in the number of units getting four or more hours per week training produced a 35% increase in units with good or excellent weapons proficiency. Advisors rated about 52% of the units good or excellent in the fourth quarter 1968, up from 43% in the second.

PF units receiving four or more hours of training a week doubled in the last half of 1968. Yet, only 41% of the units were receiving four hours or more training at the end of 1969. The 95% improvement in units training four or more hours per week produced 20% more units rated good or excellent in weapons proficiency between June and the fourth quarter. At the end of 1968, 38% of all units received such ratings.

The MACV Mobile Training Teams (MATTs) provide most of the RF/FF training in II, III and IV Corps and the Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP) provide most of the training in I Corps.

The MATT program began in 1967 and now numbers 353 teams. Their primary mission is to advise RF companies and FF platoons and FF/RF group headquarters on field fortifications, barrier systems, requests and adjustments of indirect fire, and small unit operations. MACV has reported excellent results from the expanded MATT program in II, III and IV Corps.

In I Corps, the Marine command has emphasized improvement of RF/FF forces since 1966. The Combined Action Program now numbers 4 Groups, 20 Companies, 111 Platoons and 5 Mobile Training Teams. Their mission is to train the RF/FF with emphasis on small unit operations. A record 13,500 patrols and ambushes were conducted by combined action units in March 1969.

A major RF/FF deficiency is a lack of tactical air and artillery support. RF/FF receive less than ARVN forces. A RAND study has reported that even the small amount of fires provided the RF/FF is not being exploited efficiently. The reasons listed include: (1) lack of RF/FF appreciation of the benefits of air support, (2) lack of fire support planning at the District level and below, and (3) a cumbersome tactical air/artillery request system for paramilitary forces.

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Summary. Current improvement and modernization programs stress personnel and equipment increases to provide the RVNAF enough capability to counter an insurgency which might remain after NVA and US forces eventually withdraw. If forced to engage NVA units alone, RVNAF will probably need additional support in the form of helilift, artillery and tactical air.

Current deficiencies in RVNAF leadership, training, desertions and morale indicate that qualitative improvement programs may not be progressing as well as the personnel and equipment programs. Since the Phase II improvement and modernization program will completely absorb the available Vietnamese manpower pool, future RVNAF improvement is likely to depend mostly on programs which improve RVNAF leadership, training, desertion rates and morale.

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RVNAF EXPANSION AND MODERNIZATION

Summary

The RVNAF expansion and modernization program is on schedule. RVNAF has made much progress as a result of the improvement program. They have demonstrated they can operate in Cambodia (flying up to 50% of their own air support there) and in a rugged and hostile area of Laos, with adequate air support. Their firepower has doubled in the last 2 1/2 years.

All of this bodes well for their eventual development into a force which can hold the NVA at bay in South Vietnam, and mount occasional hit and run raids into Cambodia and Laos to keep NVA units off balance.

This paper summarizes the past progress and future plans for expanding and modernizing the armed forces of Vietnam (RVNAF). The goal is to help the GVN develop an armed force that can cope with the combined VC and NVA forces after US troops redeploy.

Force Strength. The FY 73 RVNAF strength goal of 1,100,000 has virtually been met. Current RVNAF strength is about 1,050,000, and increase of 230,000 (25%) in the past two years. Territorial forces accounted for more than half of the increase.

TABLE 1
RVNAF STRENGTH (000)

	Actual		Plan
	1 Jan 1970	1 Jan 1971	30 June 1973
Army and Marines	432	428	461
Navy	32	40	40
Air Force	36	45	47
Regional Forces	258	283	294
Popular Forces	216	251	258
Total RVNAF	974	1047	1100

Land Forces. Initial emphasis was on rapid expansion and modernization of the ground combat forces. The development of support and logistics capabilities, which takes longer, was to proceed as fast as possible, but was expected to trail the progress of the combat forces.

The ground units table indicates that this is what happened. The Army and Marine combat units had met their June 1973 goals by January 1971 and the RF/PF units were at least 97% complete. On the other hand, the artillery and combat service support units had met 82% and 92% of their goals. The combat service support units will be complete by next September, and the artillery units 99% complete by March 1972.

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TABLE 2

RVNAF GROUND UNITS

	Actual		Plan
	June 1969	1 Jan 1971	June 1973
<u>Army/Marine Battalions</u>			
Maneuver	184	188	188
Artillery	47	70 a/	85 a/
Combat Support	40	47	47
Combat Service Support b/	37	46	50
<u>Territorial Units</u>			
RF Rifle Cos.	1407	1672	1679
PF Platoons	4839	7222	7479

a/ Includes battalion equivalents of the two-howitzer local defense platoons.

b/ Battalion equivalents of ordnance, engineer, and transportation companies.

The same pattern is evident in the major equipment items. By the first of this year, RVNAF had 93% of its planned M-16's and 90% of its light weapons, but only 63% to 80% of the other items. The equipment program is on schedule. All items shown in the table should be 96% to 98% complete by June 1972, except for trucks and armored vehicles, which will be at 85% and 88%.

TABLE 3

EQUIPMENT ON HAND FOR RVNAF GROUND FORCES (000)

	Actual		Plan
	1 Jan 1969	1 Jan 1971	30 June 1975
M-16 Rifles	764	807	866
Light Support Weapons	50	61	69
Artillery	1.0	1.2	1.6
Armored Vehicles	2.0	2.1	2.6
Trucks, tractors, cranes	46	53	84
Radios	36	39	52

Navy. The US Navy has turned over all but one of the combat craft programmed for the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). The remaining Destroyer Escort (DE) and 162 logistics and miscellaneous craft are scheduled for turnover by April 1972. In all, our Navy has turned over 793 of the 956 ships or boats scheduled for the VNN.

Air Force. Rapid expansion of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) started later than for the other forces, because of the long lead times required to train pilots and technicians. In the year prior to June 1970, only 1 squadron was added to VNAF, but 8 more were activated in the next six months, and another 7 are scheduled for activation by June of this year. The program is on schedule and current plans call for an expansion to 50 squadrons by June 1973.

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The helicopter squadrons have already doubled, and will almost triple by July 1.

TABLE 4

VNAF SQUADRONS

<u>Squadrons</u>	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Plan</u> <u>June 1973</u>
	<u>June 1970</u>	<u>1 Jan 1971</u>	
Helicopter	5	10	18
Fighter/Attack	6	9	12
Transport	2	2	6
Other	9	9	14
Total	22	30	50

The total VNAF aircraft inventory almost doubled in the past two years, while the helicopter inventory nearly tripled. The plan is to double the force again by June 1973.

TABLE 5

VNAF AIRCRAFT INVENTORY

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Plan</u> <u>June 1973</u>
	<u>1 Jan 1970</u>	<u>1 Jan 1971</u>	
Fixed Wing	310	406	771
Helicopters	101	289	528
Total	411	695	1299

VNAF attack sorties will double next year (including a fourfold increase in gunship sorties), and will increase to about 8,200 sorties per month in FY 73. Helicopter sorties have quadrupled since the program began, and should be at 26,000 per month in FY 73.

US tactical air sorties will decline by half in FY 73, but the VNAF and Laotian (RLAF) buildups will maintain the total near current levels. US helicopter sorties will decline by only 20%, thus leaving ample helicopter support for the RVNAF.

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TABLE 6

SORTIE RATES PER MONTH
(Monthly Average - CCC)

	Actual		Projection
	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71 a/</u>	<u>FY 73 b/</u>
Tactical Air			
VNAF	3.5	3.2	8.2
US	21.2	12.8	5.6
Laotian (RLAF)	1.5	2.6	3.2
Total	<u>26</u>	<u>18.6</u>	<u>17</u>
B-52	1.5	1.1	.7 c/
Helicopter			
VNAF	13.9	19.8	26.3 d/
US	695.2	550.7	432.4
Total	<u>709.3</u>	<u>570.5</u>	<u>458.7</u>

a/ Projected for entire fiscal year at rates flown in July-March.

b/ Based on tentative fiscal guidance.

c/ A JCS proposal to fly 800 B-52 sorties per month is under consideration.

d/ Projected at the rate of 1.5 flying hours per sortie.

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ARTILLERY SUPPORT FOR RVNAF

Summary

RVNAF receives one-third the artillery rounds which US forces get in SVN and about one-fourth of all the artillery rounds expended. Only 3% of US fired rounds support RVNAF. Per man, the US soldier in a maneuver battalion gets more than 70 times the rounds of artillery supporting a Vietnamese in a tactical unit. The amount of artillery illumination rounds fired by ARVN is so small that we have doubts about RVNAF's ability to conduct active night defenses. We suspect that getting timely, accurate artillery fire when engaged is still a problem for many RVNAF units.

Artillery Support for US Forces vs. RVNAF

Recently, scattered reports have become available which permit a preliminary estimate of artillery support for RVNAF. Table 1 shows that ARVN has 60% as much light artillery (105mm) as the US forces in Vietnam, and 41% as much medium (155mm) artillery. ARVN has no heavy artillery. FY 69 artillery increases will raise the ARVN percentage to 71% and 66% respectively. In FY 70, MACV plans to bring ARVN divisional artillery strength up to US standards (3 light artillery battalions per division). The 105mm howitzer increases for FY 69 and 70 add ten 105mm battalions, or 180 more tubes to the present 23 battalions and 484 105mm howitzer tubes.

Table 2 brings together available data to show total artillery rounds fired in support of RVNAF in May and the estimated support for the first half of CY 1968. In terms of total rounds fired, ARVN received one-third the artillery support which US forces received and about 25% of the total rounds fired.

Table 3 shows that 3% of the 1.3 million rounds fired by US forces per month during the 2nd quarter 1968 supported RVNAF. The support is unevenly distributed within Vietnam; the number of rounds varies from a low of .5% of the total fired in May by III MAF to a high of 17% fired by I Field Force in July. As CTZ data is not available for ARVN artillery rounds fired in support of RVNAF, we cannot analyze the adequacy of the overall RVNAF artillery coverage.

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TABLE 1

NUMBER OF ARTILLERY WEAPONS
(1st Half CY 68)

Weapons	ARVN			US Forces # of Tubes
	# of Tubes 1968 1st Half	Proposed Under FY 69	Modernization	
105mm Howitzer	484	574 (+90)		803
155mm Howitzer	115	187 (+72)		283
4.2 in Mortar	216	Unk		392

Source: MACMA Fact Sheet, U.S. Artillery Support to RVNAF.

TABLE 2

ARTILLERY ROUNDS FIRED IN SUPPORT
OF RVNAF AND US FORCES a/

	<u>May 1968</u>	<u>Est Jan-Jul 68</u>	
		<u>Monthly Average</u>	
<u>In Support of RVNAF</u>			
Fired by ARVN	452,092	419,076	b/
Fired by US	49,903	45,437	c/
Total	501,995	464,513	
<u>In Support of US Forces</u>			
Fired by US	1,474,305	1,280,499	c/
<u>Total Rounds Fired</u>	<u>1,976,300</u>	<u>1,745,012</u>	
% In Support of RVNAF	25	27	

a/ Source: MACMA Fact Sheet, Op cit.

b/ Jan-Jun 68 average.

c/ May and July 68 average.

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TABLE 3

US ARTILLERY SUPPORT TO
RVNAF BY UNIT a/

<u>Unit</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>May-Jul 68</u>
<u>Prov Corps</u>				
Total Rounds Fired	299897	175937	219398	695232
Fired for RVNAF	5385	4614	2504	12503
% Fired for RVNAF	1.8	2.6	1.1	1.8
<u>Americal Div</u>				
Total Rounds Fired	95854	72402	82005	250261
Fired for RVNAF	2213	1866	2537	6616
% Fired for RVNAF	2.3	2.6	3.1	2.6
<u>III MAF</u>				
Total Rounds Fired	326637	Unk	314745	Unk
Fired for RVNAF	1526	Unk	2825	Unk
% Fired for RVNAF	.5	Unk	.9	Unk
<u>I Field Force</u>				
Total Rounds Fired	297564	205739	138206	641509
Fired for RVNAF	17569	15117	23502	56188
% Fired for RVNAF	5.9	7.3	17	8.8
<u>II Field Force</u>				
Total Rounds Fired	504256	391594	373311	1269161
Fired for RVNAF	23210	15624	9602	48436
% Fired for RVNAF	4.6	4.0	2.6	3.8
<u>Countrywide</u>				
Total Rounds Fired	1524208	Unk	1127665	Unk
Fired for RVNAF	49903	Unk	40970	Unk
% Fired for RVNAF	3.3	Unk	3.6	Unk

a/ Source: MACMA Fact Sheet, Op Cit.

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Other available data^{a/} indicates that less than 1^{1/2} of the US heavy artillery (8 inch Howitzer and 175mm gun) missions supported RVNAF. US forces not only get more rounds, but heavier ones on average.

RVNAF Need for US Support

In SVN there is a need for continuous artillery area coverage over the more densely populated areas of the entire country as well as conventional support to maneuver forces: about 80% of the RVNAF artillery is dispersed in small firing units to provide area coverage. This means that the concentration of artillery that can normally be brought to bear quickly on a SVN battle area is likely to be less than when there is a linear battle line such as in Korea. b/ The dispersed RVNAF artillery, and lack of helicopters to airlift it, indicates that the Vietnamese must have to depend heavily on US support to get concentrated fire support during a fight.

Evaluation of RVNAF Artillery Support

Evaluating the adequacy of artillery support requires relating the rounds ^{b/} expended to the number of men supported. In the Vietnamese conflict, rear installations are subject to attack and require artillery defense, but we do not have mission data showing how many rounds were fired to support troops on offensive operations and how many were fired to defend rear bases. As a substitute, we have applied the total number of rounds fired against (1) the number of men in tactical units to estimate an offensive combat support figure, and (2) the total number of men in country in an attempt to estimate base defense support.

US troops in maneuver battalions received more than 10 times as many artillery rounds per man as did RVNAF soldiers in tactical units (Table 4). Based on our crude method, we estimate US rounds fired to defend airfields, base camps and other installations at about four times that fired for RVNAF per man defended.

a/ FMF-PAC, "Monthly Stat REP," April 1968.

b/ The total of 1685 US Army and RVNAF artillery weapons (105mm) is almost one-third greater than the 1279 tubes available during Jun-Dec 1952 in Korea (1953 data is not available). Artillery rounds expended in SVN for an average month during Jan-Jun 1968 (1,745,000) are 17% greater than the monthly rate of 1,487,000 rounds fired during the Jan-Jun 1953 peak expenditure period in Korea. c/ We should use weight according to caliber, but the data is not available.

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TABLE 4

COMPARATIVE US AND RVNAF ARTILLERY SUPPORT

	<u>May 68</u>	<u>2nd Qtr 68</u>
<u>Troops Supported (000)</u>		
In Tactical Units a/		
RVNAF	351 <i>400</i>	354
US	95	95
Total Strength b/		
RVNAF	743	725
US	536	527
<u>Rounds Per Man Per Month</u>		
In Tactical Units		
RVNAF	1.43	1.31 c/
US	15.52	13.48 c/
Total Strength		
RVNAF	.68	.64 c/
US	2.75	2.43 c/

a/ Calculated from SEA Tables and TFES data.

b/ Source: Table 2, OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary.

c/ Calculated using strengths in this table and Table 2 monthly RVNAF data for rounds fired.

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Getting the right type of fire on target when required is more important than maximizing the number of rounds fired. Table 5 shows that ARVN fired less than 400 rounds of artillery illumination per night for the entire country (13% of that expended by the US). This amount provides about 7 hours of continuous light for one outpost at minimum standards. Aircraft delivered 3400 flares per night during the same period but data is not available as to how many supported RVNAF. Since air delivered flares usually support engaged units, we suspect that RVNAF has little illumination available for planned use in defense of its positions at night. Further, data previously published suggests that fire support was not available when required (engaged with the enemy) for RF/PF 65% of the time.* Data available to us indicates that many RVNAF units do not get timely and appropriate artillery support; we would welcome additional data to permit a fuller evaluation of this problem.

Additional Considerations

It has been argued that the deployment of RVNAF forces to provide territorial security brings many Vietnamese units under the protective umbrella of US artillery. Thus, US firing of many harassment and interdiction (H&I) fires might belie the statistic that only 3% of all US rounds support the RVNAF. We do not have data to analyze the point. However, we note that US operations against main forces tend to take place where there are few Vietnamese territorial forces. On the other hand, RVNAF located near US base camps get the same benefit (whatever it is) from H&I fires that US forces do. The volume of such fire or number of RVNAF units is unknown. The critical question that remains is whether the 3% of total rounds fired by US artillery provides timely reinforcing fire when RVNAF requires it.

* See our article in July 1968 Southeast Asia Analysis Report, "The Flight of the Vietnamese Popular Forces," p. 21.

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TABLE 5

JAN-JUN 68 NIGHT ILLUMINATION

	Artillery Rounds Per Day		
	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>US Forces</u>	<u>ARVN as % Of US Forces</u>
105mm	348	2087	17
155mm	37	526	7
4.2 in	71	815	9
Total	<u>456</u>	<u>3428</u>	<u>13</u>

Source: MACMA Fact Sheet Op Cit.

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ARMY COMMENTS ON SEPTEMBER 1968 ARTICLES

We received the following comments on 3 September Analysis Report articles from the Army Staff:

"The September issue of your Southeast Asia Analysis Report contains a number of interesting and useful articles. The value of these articles lies in the presentation of potentially useful data and the fresh look given to many old problems. I find, however, that three of the articles appear to warrant comment in order to prevent misunderstanding on the part of interested readers.

"Military Initiative in South Vietnam (page 6)

This article purports to show that it is the VC/NVA who have the military initiative in South Vietnam and bases this conclusion on a study of the opposing forces ability to control casualties. There is a serious doubt that control of casualties is a 'good measure of military initiative'; for example, efforts to conserve casualties may do little to extend control over the combat situation. Said another way, a side which uses its 'military initiative' principally to avoid combat is not trying to dominate the battlefield but only to maintain a presence there; this is not military initiative. I do not believe that the VC/NVA dominate the battlefield in Vietnam nor do I agree that their willingness to stand and fight, or even their decisions to attack, are entirely voluntary. Perhaps a better measure of military initiative could be obtained by examining the relative ability to successfully engage an opponent in decisive combat. This might be done by comparing the rate of casualty fluctuations to fluctuations in opposing initiatives.

"Even assuming that ability to control casualties is a good measure of military initiative, the finding of the article is erroneous in that the analysis is fallacious. The analysis attempts to determine military initiative by comparing fluctuations of opposing military actions with fluctuations in casualties. However, the measure of military activity used is friendly large unit operations (number, number with contact, and battalion days on operations) for friendly forces, and attacks for enemy forces. These representations of military activity are not comparable; this system of measurement, for instance, could give the same weight to an enemy squad-size attack as it does to a three-division friendly operation. Even friendly 'operations with contact' is not a comparable measure of friendly military

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activity because an operation qualifies under this category if it has one or more contacts in a day (it could have had a dozen and be enumerated as one operation with contact). Even comparing battalion days on operations with enemy attacks is not valid, although, as recognized in the article, its correlation with casualties is better. To be comparable an enemy attack, which is an enemy initiated contact, must be compared to a friendly initiated contact.

"In summary, the premise that ability to control casualties is a good measure of military initiative is questionable, and the tests applied to measure relative degrees of 'military initiative' are invalid due to lack of comparability in measurement of the tempo of military operations of opposing forces.

"Artillery Support for RVNAF (page 19)

This article is premature. It implies that the distribution of artillery support is improper, but admittedly contains no examination of the basis of distribution. As pointed out in the article, a great deal more information is needed in order to arrive at any meaningful conclusion. It might, therefore, have been better to simply state the facts available, drawing no conclusions, or withhold the article until sufficient information to evaluate the situation was available. In addition to examination of raw ammunition expenditures data, a look at missions, organization for combat, firing restrictions, targets, and other fire support means available would add much to a study of the adequacy of artillery support.

"RVNAF Effectiveness: An Update (page 36)

While it is encouraging to note the improved effectiveness of RVNAF, caution must be exercised to insure that it is not over-rated. This is particularly true when considering the current high level emphasis on developing the RVNAF to take over more of the war from US Forces.

"The evaluation of RVNAF contained in this article bases its primary conclusions on the number of enemy killed; it overlooks friendly losses. The article also points out that the missions assigned to various forces have not been considered, yet this fact has been omitted from the summary and conclusions. Additionally, other indicators such as leadership, morale, training, and aggressiveness which must be included in a full evaluation have not been considered. Based on the facts presented, this

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article can only conclude that RVNAF has killed more enemy recently; this suggests an improved capability to perform the missions assigned during this period. An examination of its demonstrated effectiveness in performing various missions might prove useful as we look to the assumption by RVNAF of greater military responsibility in Vietnam.

"Expressing increased RVNAF strength and effectiveness (based on enemy killed), in terms of US force equivalents, is invalid, and tends to be misleading. As emphasized earlier, to omit consideration of assigned missions and other influencing factors, and without evaluating the capability to perform missions currently assigned to US units, it is inappropriate to rate RVNAF in terms of US equivalency. Equating this improved RVNAF effectiveness to US units suggests that the RVNAF is now able to assume tasks assigned to the stated number of US units -- this is not proven in this article, and is undoubtedly not true at this time.

"In the final analysis, the greater number of enemy killed by the RVNAF, while encouraging, is not a true measure of its overall effectiveness. Other tests must be applied to determine its current and projected capability to perform the complete spectrum of missions which it must assume if US and Free World forces are to be phased down."

SEAPRO COMMENTS

Military Initiative

The treatment of military initiative suggested in the comments fits a conventional limited war such as the one in Korea. There the "relative ability to successfully engage an opponent in decisive combat" did constitute military initiative for either side. But we wonder if the same holds true in the Vietnam war where many of the principles of guerrilla warfare and protracted conflict seem to explain enemy strategy best.

We suspect that the ability to control casualties is an integral part of the overall enemy strategy in Vietnam. His attacks and other activities are designed to have the maximum psychological impact by inflicting heavy allied casualties, projecting an aura of countrywide strength and continual presence, and gradually reducing the US will to continue. This in turn implies that the enemy must expend his resources at a rate low enough for him to hold out longer than the allies. It must be clear to him after his spring offensive that he cannot win by engaging us in short, decisive combat and that he must frame his strategy within the rules of protracted conflict. In such a conflict, control of the casualty rates is critical.

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The comments also suggest that the only comparable measure of operations is enemy initiated contacts and friendly initiated contacts. This reasoning assumes that the "contacts per operation rate" for VC/NVA and friendly forces are identical, but they clearly are not. Most of the time on friendly operations (large or small) is spent looking for the enemy and the resulting contacts per operation rate is low. On the other hand, few VC/NVA operations do not produce contact. The comparison suggested in the comments would overlook the vast amount of friendly operational effort that produces no contact and thus would wash out the value of the comparison.

The fact that the VC/NVA can nearly always find us and we usually can't find him unless he wants us to or our intelligence is exceptionally good, is at the heart of military initiative in Vietnam. The implicit assumption in the comments is that both sides are operating under identical objectives, strategy, and tactics as in a conventional war. Under these conditions, contact per operation rates might be approximately equivalent and the ability to engage in decisive combat would be critical to both sides.

Artillery Support for RVNAF

Our article contained data which show that the volume and weight of artillery support for RVNAF is much less than that for US forces. We acknowledge that we lack the information necessary for a thorough evaluation of the adequacy of RVNAF artillery support, and of the distribution of fire support between US and RVNAF. Nevertheless, available data strongly suggest that artillery support for RVNAF may not be adequate. Further examination of the problem is required. More data on the artillery support for RVNAF would be most useful.

RVNAF Effectiveness

The article does not overlook losses; Table 3 (page 41) indicates that the ARVN enemy kill ratio in large operations improved. We have addressed the RVNAF leadership problems in the June and August reports. We agree that an examination of RVNAF's demonstrated effectiveness in performing various missions would prove useful in evaluating RVNAF's ability to assume greater military responsibility in Vietnam. Data for this is scarce at the moment, but should become available as we get information from MACV's new reporting system for RVNAF forces.

We compared the performance of RVNAF ground forces in killing VC/NVA with the US performance in two ways. First, we compared the effectiveness of Vietnamese ground force battalions to US battalions. We found that in 1968 the Vietnamese performance in killing VC/NVA increased more than the US performance, and that it would have taken 16 additional US maneuver battalions to kill the additional VC/NVA, if the RVNAF kill rate had not improved. Second, a comparison of total enemy killed by all RVNAF forces to those killed by all US forces indicated that the improved Vietnamese performance was equivalent to an addition of 194,000 US troops.

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In addition, the article pointed out that RVNAF battalions on average have been consistently killing VC/NVA at a significantly higher rate than the MACV ARVN capability model would lead us to expect. Aside from being unable to undertake long field operations, many Vietnamese battalions presently perform much the same missions that US forces do. The low level of support and fire power provided Vietnamese forces may help account for the greater time their battalions spend on static security and training missions and for their reported lack of aggressiveness. If true, providing better support and fire power to RVNAF forces may enable them to perform missions now entrusted to US forces sooner than we might otherwise expect. We think that attempting to state RVNAF improvement in terms of US force equivalents is a useful way to gain perspective on the rate of improvement as the RVNAF modernization and improvement programs proceed.

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ARTILLERY SUPPORT FOR RVNAF

Summary. During 1969 the U.S. fired about 20% of the direct artillery support of ARVN/VNMC. The countrywide percentage of ARVN/VNMC direct artillery support rendered by the Vietnamese increased from 72% to 83%, and all Corps areas showed some improvements in 1969. Data on total artillery support of RVNAF (ARVN/VNMC and RF/PP) rendered by the Vietnamese themselves shows that IV Corps received the greatest number of rounds in 1969 (39%) and II Corps, the smallest (15%).

RF/PP units received about 30% of the Vietnamese-fired artillery support in 1969 (ARVN/VNMC received the rest); however, RF/PP in I Corps received only 7% of the rounds fired in I Corps.

One-third (32%) of the Vietnamese-fired artillery support of RVNAF in 1969 was interdiction (H&I fire); data indicates that relatively more interdiction is fired for RF/PP (40% of their support) than for ARVN/VNMC (29% of their support).

There are two sources of information on artillery support in SEER; one allows us to look at such support from the infantry advisor's viewpoint (support received) and the other, from the artillery advisor's viewpoint (support rendered). Unfortunately, the two sources are not comparable.

The artillery advisor reports type of support rendered, the exact number of rounds fired, and whether support is given to ARVN/VNMC or RF/PP. The data on Vietnamese-fired support is good, but since we have no comparably complete file on US support, we must use the infantry advisor's data to estimate the proportion of ARVN/VNMC support fired by the US.

The ARVN/VNMC infantry advisor does report on support received from both the US and ARVN but no such reports are available for RF/PP. The figures obtained from the infantry advisor are not very reliable because he gives rounds of support in terms of broad ranges; so, the number of rounds reported by the infantry advisor are approximate only and do not correspond to data from the artillery advisor reports.

US Fires About 20%. Table 1 shows artillery support as seen by the infantry advisor with ARVN/VNMC units. It indicates nearly 80% of direct artillery support for ARVN/VNMC in 1969 was fired by Vietnamese artillery units. It also shows that this percentage is not constant in the four corps areas; in IV Corps, ARVN/VNMC units provided 98% of their own support in 1969. In I CTZ, II CTZ, and III CTZ, ARVN/VNMC provided 80%, 70%, and 66% (respectively) of their own artillery support.

Table 1 also shows ARVN is now (4th Qtr 1969) firing 11% more of its own support than it was in the first quarter of 1969 (an increase from 72% to 83%).

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TABLE 1

ARTILLERY ROUNDS FIRED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF ARVN/VNMC
(In Thousands)

	1st Qtr		2nd Qtr		3rd Qtr		4th Qtr		ARVN Proportion of 1969 Total
	US	ARVN	US	ARVN	US	ARVN	US	ARVN	
I CTZ	34.8	85.5	28.7	99.9	13.6	82.8	8.9	75.6	80%
II CTZ	18.1	29.2	20.5	50.6	6.2	25.7	16.2	37.6	70%
III CTZ	38.5	75.0	37.0	77.0	49.0	70.8	44.6	109.4	66%
IV CTZ	7.7	70.7	1.4	103.9	0	82.6	0	124.2	98%
Total	99.1	260.4	87.6	331.4	68.8	261.9	69.7	346.8	
ARVN Proportion of Countrywide	72%		79%		79%		83%		79%
Total									

Sources: SEER infantry advisor reports - data is reported as the number of ARVN/VNMC battalions receiving (a) 0-20, (b) 21-100, (c) 101-500, (d) 501-2000, or (e) over 2,000 rounds of artillery support. The above data were calculated by using MACV conversion factors - (a) 10, (b) 60, (c) 300, (d) 1,200, and (e) 2,000 rounds. For this reason the numbers of rounds in this table are approximate only, but the ARVN proportion of total support should be close to true.

The examination of infantry advisor data in Table 1 was necessary to get an idea of what proportion of artillery support the Vietnamese provide for themselves (80%), but the figures cited in Table 1 are only approximate for reasons explained in the footnote to the table, and cover only support provided to regular ARVN/VNMC forces. The following data from artillery advisors provide us with an accurate picture of total Vietnamese-fired support (we lack such data for the U.S. portion of RVNAF artillery support-- around 20%).

Vietnamese Support of RVNAF. Table 2 shows that about 4.4 million artillery rounds were fired by the Vietnamese in 1969 in support of all RVNAF forces. IV Corps received the largest amount of such support, 39%; and II CTZ had the least, 15%. On the average, the second quarter was the most active; 30% of the artillery rounds were fired then. The first quarter was least active, with only 21% (see Table 3).

I Corps RF/FF on the other hand receive very little artillery support. While the RF/FF in the other corps areas received 30%-37% of the artillery support in their respective CTZ's, I Corps RF/FF got only 7%. It is not yet clear why there was so little Vietnamese-fired artillery support of RF/FF in I Corps. It may be that they received most of their support from the U.S. (for which we have no record). Or, it may simply be that they do not request as much support as territorial forces in other corps.

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TABLE 2

ARTILLERY SUPPORT RENDERED RVNAF, BY CTZ

	<u>ARVN/VNMC</u>	<u>RF/PF</u>	<u>Total</u>
I CTZ	966,442	77,690	1,044,132
II CTZ	435,912	230,218	666,130
III CTZ	676,636	289,808	966,444
IV CTZ	1,070,607	633,398	1,704,005
Countrywide	3,149,597	1,231,114	4,380,711

Source: SEER AMFES Artillery advisor reports.

Table 3 shows that for 1969 RF/PF received 28% of the artillery rounds fired in support of RVNAF. It also shows that there was no appreciable change in this figure between the first and fourth quarters of the year.

TABLE 3

ARTILLERY SUPPORT RENDERED RVNAF, BY QUARTER

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>	<u>Year</u>
ARVN/VNMC	637,904	944,465	815,369	751,859	3,149,597
RF/PF	272,516	373,656	232,454	352,488	1,231,114
Total	910,420	1,318,121	1,047,823	1,104,347	4,380,711

Source: SEER AMFES Artillery advisor reports.

Type of Support. The above discussion has been based upon total rounds fired, but the artillery advisor also provides information on type of support. He lists six types of combat support, plus rounds fired during the training:

1. Interdiction - consists of firing one round or small barrages at suspected enemy locations, usually at night; ineffective in terms of confirmed KIA or materiel destroyed.
2. Targets of opportunity - consists of fire on unexpected targets, i.e., not preplanned fires; fire directed by forward observers; most effective in terms of confirmed KIA or materiel destroyed.
3. Illumination - used to illuminate night battlefields; effectiveness in terms of KIA and materiel destroyed difficult to determine.
4. Preparation - consists of fire on enemy positions before friendly troops attack; moderately effective in terms of KIA and materiel destroyed.
5. Counter-battery - fire against enemy rocket or mortar positions; moderately effective.

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6. Defense concentration - consists of preplanned usually pre-adjusted fires which are used predominately at night against likely enemy routes of attack; somewhat effective, through less so than preparation and counter-battery fires.

Table 4 shows that interdiction (H2I fire) accounted for 32% of the artillery rounds fired in support of RVNAF in 1969. Targets of opportunity accounted for slightly more--36%.

RF/FF artillery support is probably less effective in terms of KIA and materiel destroyed. Table 4 shows that 36% of ARVN/VNMC support falls into the categories of interdiction and defense concentration (the two least effective types of support). But 48% of the RF/FF support falls into these two categories.

TABLE 4
TYPE OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT RENDERED RVNAF DURING 1969

	<u>ARVN/VNMC</u>	<u>RF/FF</u>	<u>Total</u>
Interdiction	925,192	494,279	1,419,471
Targets of Opportunity	1,168,835	389,763	1,558,598
Illumination	107,180	40,334	147,514
Preparation	391,707	130,059	521,766
Counter Battery	297,517	71,577	369,094
Defense Concentration	211,718	102,055	313,773
Training	47,448	3,047	50,495
Total	3,149,597	1,231,114	4,380,711

Source: SEIR AMFES Artillery Advisor Reports

Detailed Analysis of Type of Support

By Quarter -- Table 5 shows the categories of artillery support by quarter and indicates four important facts:

- The percentage of artillery support that is interdiction has decreased from a 2nd quarter high (also the high point of all artillery activity) of 37% to 27% in the 4th quarter. This decrease is due to the drop from 52% (2nd quarter) to 28% (4th quarter) in the proportion of RF/FF support that is interdiction. ARVN/VNMC interdiction support has not decreased.

- There was a decrease in targets of opportunity support of RVNAF from 47% (1st quarter) to 35% (4th quarter) of total artillery support of RVNAF. This decrease occurred equally in ARVN/VNMC and RF/FF support.

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- There was a significant increase from 7% (1st quarter) to 17% (4th quarter) in the proportion of RVNAF artillery support that is preparation fires. This rise was due mostly to an increase from 2% to 24% in RF/FF preparation support. This may indicate that RF/FF units were used in an offensive role in the 4th quarter. However, this would be true only for units in II Corps where 67% of the RF/FF preparation rounds were fired and IV Corps where 27% were fired. There were no preparation rounds fired in support of RF/FF units in I Corps in the 4th quarter, indicating they maintained their role of pacification and security, or that reporting practices are different there.^{1/} ARVN/VNMC preparation support also increased, though less significantly, from 9% (1st Qtr) to 14% (4th Qtr).

- The vast majority of training rounds were fired in the third quarter. Table 4 shows that 94% of these rounds were fired while supporting ARVN/VNMC. IV Corps accounts for almost all ARVN/VNMC training rounds while II Corps accounts for nearly all RF/FF training rounds.

TABLE 5

TYPE OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT RENDERED RVNAF, BY QUARTER

	1st Qtr		2nd Qtr		3rd Qtr		4th Qtr	
	Nr.	%	Nr.	%	Nr.	%	Nr.	%
Interdiction	289,854	32	484,925	37	343,945	33	300,747	27
Targets of Opportunity	422,832	47	430,529	32	320,987	31	384,250	35
Illumination	28,826	3	35,574	3	41,937	4	41,177	4
Preparation	63,867	7	167,448	13	99,590	9	190,861	17
Counter Battery	47,462	5	116,929	9	138,343	13	66,360	6
Defense Concentration	55,259	6	80,828	6	58,242	6	119,444	11
Training	2,320	.3	1,888	.1	44,779	4	1,508	.1
Total	910,420	100	1,318,121	100	1,047,823	100	1,104,347	100

Source: SEER AMFES Artillery Advisor Reports.

By Corps -- Table 6 shows the categories of artillery support by CTZ for RVNAF and indicates that I Corps units used relatively little interdiction support; only 19% of their total support was reported as interdiction compared to 32-43% for the other CTZ's. This is true for both I Corps ARVN/VNMC and RF/FF. I Corps does, however report a relatively high amount of support against targets of opportunity, 38%. This is especially true for I CTZ RF/FF where 61% of their support is allocated to targets of opportunity. Finally, I Corps is highest of the four CTZ's in counter battery fire; 19% of the RVNAF support belonged to this category in I CTZ, while the other CTZ's ran 3-9%. Almost all of this I Corps counter-battery fire was in support of ARVN/VNMC units and 53% of it occurred in the third quarter.

^{1/} It is realized that increased preparation fires may not mean that RF/FF units are doing more attacking. It may simply mean that they are now getting preparation support for the attacks they have been conducting throughout the year.

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The patterns of total RVNAF support for II and III Corps pictured in Table 6 look very much alike. A large amount, about 40%, goes to interdiction. About 25% of the II and III Corps RVNAF artillery support is fired against targets of opportunity; this is significantly lower than the other two CTZ's. While the total RVNAF support patterns as well as those for ARVN/VNMC are alike for II and III Corps, the RF/PF support patterns are different. II Corps artillery fired in support of RF/PF is about one-third less interdiction, a third more targets of opportunity, and over twice as much preparation as III Corps artillery fires in support of RF/PF.

Finally, IV Corps artillery fires 46% of its RVNAF support at targets of opportunity. It has an unusually low amount of preparation fire--7% (versus around 15% for the other CTZ's). It also fires the lowest percentage of counter battery fire of the CTZ's. While the support pattern for ARVN/VNMU units looks much like that for the total RVNAF (except more targets of opportunity support is given ARVN/VNMC-52%), support for RF/PF in IV Corps is different--heavily weighted with interdiction (45%) and with less targets of opportunity fired (36%).

TABLE 6
TYPE OF ARTILLERY SUPPORT RENDERED RVNAF, BY CTZ

	I CTZ		II CTZ		III CTZ		IV CTZ	
	Nr.	%	Nr.	%	Nr.	%	Nr.	%
Interdiction	197355	19	253055	38	413904	43	555157	32
Targets of Opportunity	394366	38	173199	26	209727	22	781306	46
Illumination	58906	5	26036	4	36763	4	25809	2
Preparation	132877	13	116956	17	150211	15	121712	7
Counter Battery	195399	19	56303	8	60784	6	56608	3
Defense Concentration	63591	6	36474	6	94636	10	119072	7
Training	1638	.2	4097	.6	419	0	44341	3
Total	1044132	100	666130	100	966444	100	1704005	100

Source: SEER AMFES Artillery Advisor Reports.

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AIR SUPPORT FOR RVNAF

As with artillery support, RVNAF receives about one-third of the attack sorties which US forces get in SVN. Per man, the US soldier in a maneuver battalion gets about 10 times the attack sorties supporting a Vietnamese in a tactical unit. While only 3% of US fired artillery rounds support RVNAF, about 20% of US attack sorties go to RVNAF, indicating that RVNAF relies more on the US for air support than it does for artillery support.

Table 1 indicates that RVNAF received about 40% of the air attack sorties that US forces got in SVN in the first 8 months of 1968. However, the US sorties figures reported in the table by MACV show 14% fewer sorties than does the OSD SEA Statistical Summary (Table 2). If we assume that the extra sorties all went to support US forces, the RVNAF share drops to 28%. On balance, RVNAF forces probably get about one-third of the attack sorties US forces receive. On the same basis, RVNAF forces probably get about a fourth of all the attack sorties flown in SVN (range is 25% to 29%). Both cases are about the same as the artillery support figures.

However, RVNAF gets about 20% (18%-21%) of US attack sorties flown, much higher than the 3% of US artillery rounds RVNAF receives (Table 2). Finally, Table 1 indicates US air support for RVNAF has been increasing since April, absolutely and proportionately. (No data is available for trends in past years.)

Table 2 shows that RVNAF gets about 6% of the US attack sorties in I CTZ, 26% in II CTZ, 19% in III CTZ and virtually all of them in IV CTZ. The trends in II and III CTZ are up; in I CTZ and IV CTZ they are more constant.

Table 3 indicates that US troops in maneuver battalions received about 10 times the attack sorties per man as did RVNAF soldiers in tactical units.

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TABLE 1

ATTACK SORTIES IN SUPPORT
OF RVNAF AND US FORCES - 1968

SORTIES	Total Thru Aug	Monthly Avg											
		1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	Jul Aug	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	
For RVNAF													
By VNAF	1,909	2,119	1,837	1,703	1,956	2,185	2,186	1,790	1,808	1,912	1,801	1,605	
By US	3,493	2,754	3,253	4,919	2,570	2,391	2,401	2,408	3,683	3,695	4,457	5,440	
Total	5,402	4,873	5,100	6,652	4,556	5,176	4,587	4,198	5,493	5,607	5,258	7,083	
For US	13,247	11,370	11,907	13,567	11,917	10,749	11,382	12,820	16,522	15,381	13,446	13,568	
TOTAL SORTIES	18,649	16,243	20,007	20,219	16,043	15,524	15,959	17,018	22,013	20,988	19,704	20,733	
% Total for RVNAF	29	30	25	33	29	33	29	25	25	25	27	32	34

a/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2, November 26, 1968. We assumed all VNAF sorties supported RVNAF.

b/ Source: MACV.

TABLE 2

US TACTICAL AIR SORTIES
IN SUPPORT OF RVNAF - 1968

SORTIES	Total Thru Aug	Monthly Avg											
		1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	Jul Aug	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	
I CTZ													
For RVNAF	519	511	446	595	595	556	439	375	585	377	483	707	
Total	8,207	6,711	9,213	8,942	6,517	6,524	6,992	7,969	10,489	9,180	8,288	9,596	
RVNAF %	6	8	5	7	9	9	6	5	6	4	6	7	
II CTZ													
For RVNAF	815	706	768	1,050	793	682	643	631	785	887	806	1,294	
Total	3,142	2,954	3,658	2,635	3,514	2,615	2,733	3,164	3,925	3,886	2,642	2,628	
RVNAF %	26	24	21	40	22	26	24	20	20	23	31	49	
III CTZ													
For RVNAF	749	434	760	1,204	445	501	355	443	971	867	1,269	1,139	
Total	3,972	3,379	3,995	4,835	3,662	3,373	3,086	3,136	4,449	4,401	5,065	4,604	
RVNAF %	19	13	19	35	12	15	12	14	22	20	25	25	
IV CTZ													
For RVNAF	1,411	1,073	1,289	2,100	1,034	1,222	964	959	1,344	1,564	1,899	2,300	
Total	1,419	1,074	1,304	2,104	1,034	1,222	972	959	1,344	1,609	1,908	2,300	
RVNAF %	99	100	99	100	100	100	99	100	100	97	100	100	
Total													
For RVNAF	3,493	2,754	3,263	4,919	2,870	2,991	2,401	2,408	3,685	3,695	4,457	5,440	
Total	16,740	14,124	18,170	18,516	14,857	15,732	13,783	15,228	20,207	19,016	17,903	19,128	
RVNAF %	21	19	18	27	19	22	17	16	18	19	23	28	

OSD Figures For
Total US Attack
Sorties in SVN 19,385 17,773 20,618 19,957 15,882 16,132 19,305 18,447 21,920 21,486 19,002 20,912

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TABLE 3a/

COMPARATIVE U. S. AND RVNAF AIR SUPPORT
(1st & 2nd Qtrs 1968)

<u>TROOPS SUPPORTED (000)</u>	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>
In Tactical Units		
RVNAF	351	354
US	95	95
Total Strength b/		
RVNAF	677	725
US	515	527
<u>SORTIES PER MAN PER MONTH</u>		
In Tactical Units		
RVNAF	.04	.04
US	.36	.47
Total Strength b/		
RVNAF	.02	.03
US	.06	.08

a/ Source: SEA Statistical Tables and IFES Data.

b/ Source: Table 2. OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary.

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AIR SUPPORT FOR ARVN-VNMC UNITS

Summary. Statistics from the ARVN/VNMC portion of the SEER reports indicate how much air support each unit received; they show that the VNAF flew more sorties and a higher share of the total in the 3rd quarter of 1969 than in the 2nd quarter. Helilift and fixed wing gunship sorties accounted for most of the increase and most of it occurred in IV Corps. The VNAF had received about 74 UH 1-H's and 16 AC-47's during the period, and this may have had some effect. Increased ARVN/VNMC operational activity in IV Corps (making the ARVN 9th Division into a mobile reaction force, for example) after redeployment of the US 9th Division units there probably generated many of the additional sorties.

Most of the air sorties data in this article comes from the MACV System For Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER). They come from reports of the US Advisors serving with Vietnamese Army and Marine units on the ground, and therefore should give us some idea of how much air support the Vietnamese ground combat units receive. This article simply surveys the available data for the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1967. It does not include data from the VNAF part of SEER. Readers' comments on the data and our findings would be welcome.

Table 1 shows the number of air sorties of all types flown in support of GVN ground forces in the second and third quarters of 1969; it indicates that the VNAF sorties and the VNAF share of the total nearly doubled (from 3,962, or 9% of the total sorties in the 2nd quarter of 1969, to 7,568 or 17% of the total in 3rd quarter 1969).

The large increase in sorties (+3,600) was due solely to a 150% (+3,950 sorties) increase in VNAF Helicopter Airlift sorties. The increase may stem from VNAF use of about 74 UH-1H helicopters it received during the second quarter as part of the RVNAF improvement and modernization; IV Corps accounted for most of the sortie increase. All other categories shown in Table 1, except fixed wing gunships, either had fewer sorties during the 3rd quarter or remained about the same; VNAF fixed wing gunship sorties flown in support of ARVN/VNMC units increased by 60%. As with helicopters, the VNAF had received more gunships from the US - about 5 AC-47's in the 2nd quarter, and 11 more in the 3rd quarter. Thus, the VNAF seem to be using their new equipment right away.

In terms of the VNAF share of the total sorties flown for ARVN/VNMC, Helicopter Airlift (up from 9% to 20% of all such sorties), and fixed wing gunships (from 5% to 19%) led the pack; the VNAF share of tactical air sorties also rose. In four of the seven categories of air support, the percentage of air sorties flown by VNAF either remained the same or dropped; the percentage of helicopter gunship, helicopter medevac, and fixed wing airlift sorties flown by VNAF remained the same. The Vietnamese portion of air resupply dropped from 12% to 7%.

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Table 1 seems to indicate that substantial VNAF shortfalls exist in all the areas of air support, since the US was flying 83% of the sorties during the 3rd quarter. The areas of helicopter gunships and medevac seem particularly weak.

TABLE 1 a/

AIR SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN/VNMC b/

	2nd Qtr			3rd Qtr		
	US	VNAF	VNAF % of Total	US	VNAF	VNAF % of Total
Tactical Air	1957	663	25%	937	402	30%
Helo Gunship	4525	183	4%	4381	182	4%
Fixed Wing Gunship	423	28	6%	203	45	18%
Helicopter Airlift	26444	2516	9%	25213	6465	20%
Helicopter Medevac	2544	150	6%	2432	164	6%
Air Resupply	2995	418	12%	3884	301	7%
Fixed Wing Airlift	83	10	11%	74	9	11%
	38999	3962	9%	37124	7568	17%

a/ Source: SEER

b/ Includes all ARVN Maneuver Battalions, Regimental and Division headquarters, Ranger, Airborne, Artillery, Cavalry, and VNMC units.

VNAF showed improvement not only in the percentage of support sorties flown for Vietnamese regular ground troops but also in the percentage of requests for support that were answered during the 3rd quarter. Table 2 shows that VNAF improved in every category in the third quarter except fixed wing airlift, which remained at 100%. In all but the resupply and medevac categories the answer rate was 80% or above in the third quarter of 1969. Table 2 also indicates that the US fill rate dropped sharply for fixed wing airlift, from 100% to 37% of requests answered, and for tactical air sorties, from 78% to 59%. The drop in fixed wing airlift was due to an extremely high number of requests in July (30 out of quarterly countrywide total of 49) by the 18th and 25th Divisions which were not filled. This may have been an error in reporting.

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TABLE 2

PROPORTION OF REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT ANSWERED BY US AND VNAF

	2nd Qtr			3rd Qtr		
	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans
<u>US</u>						
Tactical Air	1109	866	78	707	414	59
Helo Gunship	2134	2040	96	2016	1947	97
Fixed Wing Gunship	339	322	95	143	137	96
Helo Airlift	1914	1971	103	2586	2592	100
Helo Medevac	2339	2339	100	2358	2336	99
Air Resupply	1166	1155	99	1522	1497	98
Fixed Wing Airlift	28	29	104	49	18	37
<u>VNAF</u>						
Tactical Air	341	275	81	180	170	94
Helo Gunship	101	60	59	75	67	89
Fixed Wing Gunship	46	32	70	47	38	81
Helo Airlift	218	199	91	542	526	97
Helo Medevac	410	151	37	201	139	69
Air Resupply	302	185	61	135	99	73
Fixed Wing Airlift	5	5	100	2	2	100

Table 3 indicates that only 2.2% to 3.8% of all US fixed wing tactical air sorties flown in South Vietnam supported ARVN and Marine units. Only 4.5% to 8.4% of the total VNAF attack sorties were reported in the SEER. Moreover, the VNAF flew 13% more total sorties in the 3rd quarter, but their sorties in support of ARVN/VNMC units apparently dropped about 40%. Our reports apparently do not include air support flown in support of RF/PF and CIDG troops, and they may account for some additional sorties. A previous article (Nov/Dec 1969, p.31) indicated that only about 10% of all tactical air sorties are flown in support of troops in contact with the enemy. The figures in Table 3 are of comparable magnitude, and may represent part of those 10%.

TABLE 3

TOTAL TACTICAL AIR SORTIES VERSUS THOSE IN SUPPORT OF ARVN/VNMC UNITS

	2nd Qtr		3rd Qtr	
	US	VNAF	US	VNAF
Total Tactical Air Sorties a/	50916	7857	42813	8900
Sorties in Support of VNMC/ARVN b/	1957	663	937	402
% in Support of ARVN/VNMC	3.8	8.4	2.2	4.5

a/ Source: Table 2, OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

b/ Source: SEER reports.

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DETAILS OF THE ANALYSIS

Tactical Air. Table 4 shows a 49% drop in the number of US-VNAF tactical air sorties flown in support of Vietnamese ground forces during the 3rd quarter; there was also a 39% drop in the number of requests for tactical air support. The drops were probably due to the 3rd quarter lull; as indicated in the Nov/Dec Southeast Asia Analysis Report, tactical air sorties in support of troops in contact tend to rise and fall with the level of combat activity.

The VNAF share of tactical air sorties increased from 25% in the second quarter of 1969 to 30% in the third, although their number of sorties declined by 57%. The VNAF answer rate also increased from 81% of requests answered to 94%, but this increase may be due to the 47% decline in the number of requests; it does not necessarily reflect increased VNAF capability in answering tactical air requests.

VNAF made the greatest improvement in the percentage of sorties flown in I and IV Corps. In I Corps, VNAF increased their percentage of tac air sorties from .4% to 13%, which reflected an increase from 2 sorties in 2nd quarter to 73 in 3rd quarter. In IV Corps, VNAF's percentage increased from 17% to 52%, again reflecting a real increase from 46 sorties in 2nd quarter to 118 in 3rd quarter. VNAF also made its greatest improvement in answer rates in I and IV CTZ's.

VNAF tactical air support was strongest in the IV Corps and for the special units; they accounted for 78% of the VNAF sorties in 2nd quarter and 66% in the 3rd. US tactical air went primarily to I Corps and the special units; in the 3rd quarter the 1st ARVN Division accounted for 36% of all US tactical air sorties flown in support of Vietnamese ground troops. The US response rates are lowest in I Corps (specifically, in the 1st Division). This may indicate these units operate differently than other Vietnamese troops by asking for tactical air support whenever they think they need it, rather than asking for support only when they believe they are fairly sure to get it.

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TABLE 4

VNAF AND US TAC AIR SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN/VNMC a/b/

	1969			3rd Qtr		
	2nd Qtr		VNAF % of Total	3rd Qtr		VNAF % of Total
	US	VNAF		US	VNAF	
<u>RVNAF Corps</u>						
I CTZ	526	2	1	477	73	13
II CTZ	282	6	2	81	7	8
III CTZ	317	139	30	141	57	29
IV CTZ	217	46	17	111	118	52
Special Units c/	615	470	43	127	147	54
Total Sorties	1957	663	25	937	402	30

US & VNAF ANSWER RATES FOR TACTICAL AIR REQUESTS
BY ARVN AND VNMC

	2nd Qtr						3rd Qtr					
	US			VNAF			US			VNAF		
	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans
I	437	211	48%	30	1	3%	490	213	43%	36	35	97%
II	104	99	95%	1	1	100%	32	30	94%	4	3	75%
III	123	137	111%	62	47	76%	73	70	96%	29	27	93%
IV	105	102	97%	28	23	82%	56	52	93%	48	43	90%
Special Units c/	340	317	93%	220	203	92%	56	49	88%	63	62	98%
Total	1109	866	78%	341	275	31%	707	414	59%	180	170	94%

a/ Source: SEER

b/ Includes Maneuver Battalion, Regimental Headquarters and Division Headquarters in all figures.

c/ Rangers, Airborne, Marines, Special Forces and Armor in this and following tables

Helicopter Gunships. Table 5 shows there was no improvement in the number or percentage of helicopter gunship sorties flown by VNAF during the 3rd quarter. US troops flew 96% of the helicopter gunships sorties in both quarters. In contrast to the decline in the number of tactical air sorties, helicopter gunship sorties remained fairly constant.

The answer rate for VNAF, however, did increase from 59% to 80%; though this was partially due to a rise in the number of answers, the increase came mostly from a 25% drop in the number of requests for VNAF helo gunship support. Thus the improved answer rate does not necessarily reflect a better Vietnamese capability to fill helo gunship requests.

VNAF support shifted from the IV Corps infantry divisions where 96% of the VNAF sorties were run in the second quarter to the special units, who received 72% of the sorties in the third quarter. This shift was in response to a shift in requests for support from IV Corps to special units.

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An opposite trend is seen in US support where helo gunship sorties shifted to IV Corps infantry divisions from III Corps and the special units. As a result of the US shifts to IV Corps divisional units (because of a doubling of support requests by the Vietnamese) the percentage of total US and VNAF sorties run for IV Corps infantry rose from 26% to 37%. These US and VNAF shifts may indicate that since the Vietnamese were unable to handle the greatly increased number of requests for helo-guns from IV Corps (they had devoted most of their effort in the second quarter to IV Corps), the US took over the support role there and "traded" to the Vietnamese increased responsibility for support of special units where it was more likely the Vietnamese could handle the load because the total number of requests had dropped by about 30%.

Of the divisions in IV Corps, the 7th received the vast majority, 75%, and the 9th, only .5% of VNAF helo gunship support for both quarters; US support, on the other hand, was fairly evenly spread among the divisions in IV CTZ. There were increases in the number of VNAF sorties flown in II and III Corps but together these areas accounted for only 5% of Vietnamese sorties for both quarters, though 24% of the requests for VNAF support came from these CTZ's. The number of US sorties decreased in both II and III Corps.

TABLE 5

VNAF AND US HELO GUNSHIP SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN/VNMC^{a/b/}

	1969					
	2nd Qtr			3rd Qtr		
	US	VNAF	VNAF % of Total	US	VNAF	VNAF % of Total
RVNAF Corps						
I CTZ	361	0	0	360	0	0
II CTZ	860	0	0	576	9	2
III CTZ	1288	6	.5	978	12	1
IV CTZ	1030	175	15	1649	30	2
Special Units	986	2	.2	818	131	14
Total Sorties	4525	183	4	4381	182	4

US & VNAF ANSWER RATES FOR HELICOPTER GUNSHIP REQUESTS
BY ARVN and VNMC

	2nd Qtr						3rd Qtr					
	US			VNAF			US			VNAF		
	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans
I	249	206	83%	3	0	0	161	155	96%	1	0	0
II	416	391	94%	0	0	-	209	202	97%	1	1	100%
III	435	434	99%	37	3	8%	436	415	95%	5	5	100%
IV	413	414	100%	56	56	100%	860	841	98%	28	19	68%
Special Units	621	595	96%	5	1	20%	350	334	95%	40	42	105%
Total	2134	2040	96%	101	60	59%	2016	1947	97%	75	67	89%

a/ Source: SEER

b/ Includes Maneuver Battalion, Regimental Headquarters and Division Headquarters in all figures.

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Fixed Wing Gunships. Like tactical air support, the total number of US fixed wing gunship sorties fell off nearly 50% in the third quarter of 1969 as did the total number of requests; however, as Table 6 shows, VNAF increased its number of sorties by 60% (from 28 to 45) in the third quarter, thereby raising its proportion of total fixed-wing gunship sorties from 6% to 18%. This is probably due to an increase of about 16 AC-47's turned over to the Vietnamese in the second and third quarters. VNAF also increased its answer rate from 70% to 81% even though the number of requests remained the same. All VNAF sorties were flown for ARVN infantry divisions in III and IV Corps and for the special units; IV Corps received the majority of these, 56%, in both quarters. All but one out of 93 requests for VNAF support for both quarters originated in III and IV Corps and in the special units. U.S. emphasis shifted toward III Corps (40% of US sorties) in the third quarter; only 15% of the US fixed wing gunship sorties went to ARVN infantry divisions in I and II Corps in that quarter.

TABLE 6

VNAF AND US FIXED WING GUNSHIP SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN/VNMC^{a/b}

	1969			3rd Qtr		
	2nd Qtr		VNAF % of Total	3rd Qtr		VNAF % of Total
	US	VNAF		US	VNAF	
<u>RVNAF Corps</u>						
I CTZ	116	0	0	22	0	0
II CTZ	54	0	0	9	0	0
III CTZ	65	7	10	77	10	11
IV CTZ	63	16	20	43	25	37
Special Units	125	5	4	52	10	16
Total Sorties	423	28	6	203	45	18

US & VNAF ANSWER RATES FOR FIXED WING GUNSHIP REQUESTS BY ARVN AND VNMC

	2nd Qtr						3rd Qtr					
	US			VNAF			US			VNAF		
	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans
I	68	69	101%	0	0	-	17	17	100%	1	0	0
II	42	37	88%	0	0	-	9	8	89%	0	0	-
III	48	44	92%	14	7	50%	48	49	102%	10	10	100%
IV	55	55	100%	26	21	77%	42	39	93%	27	19	70%
Special Units	126	117	93%	6	5	33%	27	24	89%	9	9	100%
Total	339	322	95%	46	32	70%	143	137	96%	47	38	81%

a/ Source: SEER

b/ Includes Maneuver Battalion, Regimental Headquarters and Division Headquarters in all figures.

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Summary of Attack Air Support. The largest category of attack air support for ARVN/VNMC units in terms of sorties run is helicopter gunship; it ran 4,000 to 4,500 sorties for both quarters and is about twice as large as the tactical air category, which has about 1,500 to 2,000 sorties a quarter. The smallest category is fixed wing gunship with 250 to 350 sorties a quarter. The total number of US-VNAF sorties dropped by about 50% in the third quarter of 1969 for both tactical air and fixed wing gunships but the number of halo gunships sorties remained about the same.

IV Corps appears to receive the most VNAF attack air support with the special units (ranger, cavalry, airborne, marines) a close second. However, US support is generally more evenly divided among the corps, except for fixed wing tactical air support, over half of which went to I Corps, which had nearly 70% of the requests for such support in the 3rd quarter. In short, I Corps seems to get a lot of tactical air but few halo gunships, while IV Corps tends to get more halo gunships and less tactical air. This may reflect the differences in terrain and in concepts of how the war in the two areas should be fought.

NON-ATTACK AIR SUPPORT

Helicopter Airlift. Table 7 shows that the number of VNAF helicopter airlift sorties increased 2.5 times in the third quarter, from 2516 to 6465. Most of this increase came in IV Corps (from 1823 to 4846) and for the special units, particularly the rangers and marines (an increase from 292 sorties to 1243). These increases are the result of a tripling of requests in IV Corps and the special units.

Within IV Corps the 9th Division received the bulk (45%) of the Vietnamese VNAF sorties; this is a change from the second quarter when the 9th received none of the 1823 Vietnamese-flown helilift sorties and its support was all US. US support in IV CTZ shifted from the 9th to the 7th Division in the 3rd quarter.

Additional evidence of this increased Vietnamese helicopter airlift capability shows a near doubling of Vietnamese UH-1H's from a monthly average of 45 in the second quarter to 80 in the third. RVNAF improvement and modernization data show a turnover of about 74 UH-1H's to the Vietnamese in the second quarter of 1969. Given the time it takes to make the helicopters operational after the turnover, this could account for the increased Vietnamese capability showing up in the 3rd quarter. The vast increase in Vietnamese helicopter airlift capability for the 9th Division lends support to its commander's statement (Col. Di) that he can move a regiment anywhere in the Delta in 4 hours and the whole division in two days. ¹⁷

US helilift support was more evenly spread through the Corps areas. The US shift from II Corps to I Corps (an I Corps increase from 2730 to 3626

¹⁷ The 9th has begun operating a mobile reaction force in the Delta, marking the first time an ARVN division operated in regimental size outside its own area.

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sorties) compensated for the drop to zero (from 356 sorties) in VNAF sorties. In spite of the 33% increase in US sorties, the number of requests for US support in I CTZ dropped slightly. There was also some shift in US support from IV CTZ to III Corps in the third quarter, in spite of a near doubling of requests for US support in IV Corps. Together, III and IV Corps accounted for 60% of the US helo airlift sorties in both the second and third quarter.

TABLE 7

VNAF AND US HELO AIRLIFT SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN/VNMC^{a/b}

	1969					
	2nd Qtr		VNAF % of Total		3rd Qtr	
	US	VNAF		US	VNAF	VNAF % of Total
RVNAF Corps						
I CTZ	2730	356	11	3626	0	0
II CTZ	2641	14	.5	1879	35	2
III CTZ	6073	31	.5	7379	341	4
IV CTZ	9794	1823	16	7985	4846	38
Special Units	5206	292	5	4344	1243	22
Total Sorties	26444	2516	9	25213	6465	20

US AND VNAF ANSWER RATES FOR HELICOPTER AIRLIFT
REQUESTS BY ARVN AND VNMC

	2nd Qtr						3rd Qtr					
	US			VNAF			US			VNAF		
	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans
I	181	178	98%	29	16	55%	177	175	99%	3	0	0
II	422	429	102%	14	14	100%	325	311	96%	4	4	100%
III	272	274	101%	9	2	22%	471	462	98%	14	13	93%
IV	683	733	107%	151	151	100%	1255	1344	107%	467	456	98%
Special Units	356	357	100%	15	16	107%	358	300	84%	54	53	98%
Total	1914	1971	103%	213	199	91%	2586	2592	100%	542	526	97%

^{a/b} Source: SEER.

^b Includes Maneuver Battalions, Regimental Headquarters, and Division Headquarters in all figures.

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Medevac. Table 8 indicates that the number of US and VNAF helicopter medevac sorties remained about the same in the second and third quarters. The number of requests for US support was also the same, but requests for VNAF support dropped by 50%, as the number of VNAF answers remained about the same; this increased the VNAF answer rate from 37% to 69%.

Though the percentage of total sorties flown by the Vietnamese remained at 6%, there was a shift in VNAF support out of I CTZ (a drop from 39 to zero sorties) into support of special units (in this case, Marines, from 13 to 46 sorties). On the other hand, US support shifted from II and III Corps (drops of about 100 sorties in each Corps out of 361 and 522 sorties respectively) to IV Corps where there was a 34% increase from 579 to 774.

TABLE 8
VNAF AND US HELO MEDEVAC SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF RVNAF ^{a/b/}

	1969			3rd Qtr		
	2nd Qtr		VNAF % of Total	3rd Qtr		VNAF % of Total
	US	VNAF	US	VNAF	US	VNAF
<u>RVNAF Corps</u>						
I CTZ	494	39	7	505	0	0
II CTZ	361	1	.3	270	6	2
III CTZ	522	18	3	400	19	5
IV CTZ	579	62	9.7	774	71	8
Special Units	588	30	5	483	68	12
Total Sorties	2544	150	6	2432	164	6

US AND VNAF ANSWER RATES FOR HELO MEDEVAC
REQUESTS BY ARVN AND VNMC

	2nd Qtr						3rd Qtr					
	US			VNAF			US			VNAF		
	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans
I	472	478	101%	118	31	26%	489	492	101%	12	0	0
II	311	307	99%	1	1	100%	269	265	99%	7	6	86%
III	509	511	100%	65	16	25%	397	397	100%	35	19	54%
IV	566	558	99%	129	73	57%	757	740	98%	77	63	82%
Special Units	481	485	101%	97	30	31%	446	442	99%	70	51	73%
Total	2339	2339	100%	410	151	37%	2358	2336	99%	201	139	69%

^{a/} Source: SEER.

^{b/} Includes Maneuver Battalion, Regimental Headquarters and Division Headquarters in all figures.

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Air Resupply. As Table 9 shows, air resupply is the one area in which VNAF's share of total support sorties declined both in number (from 418 to 301) and percentage (12% to 7%). VNAF improved its answer rates, though this was due to a 56% drop in requests. There was a shift of Vietnamese support out of I Corps (a drop from 197 to zero sorties) and the special units (124 down to 38 sorties); VNAF support increased, however, in the other three Corps, mostly in III Corps where the number of sorties rose from 9 to 123. US support sorties overall increased by 30%. US sorties in I Corps increased to compensate for the drop in VNAF support. US support also increased in the other three Corps but the largest rise was, like VNAF, for the III CTZ (from 116 to 483). There was a five-fold increased in US and VNAF air resupply support for III Corps ARVN infantry divisions in the third quarter.

Fixed-Wing Airlift. There were so few fixed-wing airlift sorties run for ARVN and VNMC in the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1969, we have not devoted a separate table to them. Only 9 sorties out of a total of 93 were run in IV Corps in the second quarter and none in the third quarter. There were no sorties run in I Corps in either quarter. The percentage of fixed wing airlift sorties run by VNAF remained constant at 11%; however, the total number of US and VNAF sorties declined by 11%. Table 2 indicates a large drop, from 100% to 37%, in the US fixed wing airlift response rate. This results from an unusually high number of requests from the 18th and 25th Divisions (30 requests in July out of a quarterly countrywide total of 49), which were not fulfilled. However, this may have been an error in reporting. The Vietnamese response rate remained at 100% for both quarters, with only 5 requests in the 2nd and 2 request in the 3rd.

Summary of Non-attack Air Support. In every category of non-attack air support, VNAF support shifted out of the I CTZ in the third quarter of 1969; there were no non-attack air support sorties flown by the Vietnamese in I Corps in the third quarter. In the case of helo airlift and air resupply, US support has tended to shift to I Corps to compensate for decreased VNAF activity there. VNAF vastly increased its helo airlift capability in the third quarter, particularly for IV Corps and the 9th Division; VNAF ran two and a half times as many helo airlift sorties in the third quarter as in the second. VNAF has shown a decreased air resupply capability with the number of sorties flown dropping by 25% while US sorties went up 30%; this is the only category of noncombat air support in which the Vietnamese actually weakened in the 3rd quarter.

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TABLE 9

VNAF AND US AIR RESUPPLY SORTIES
IN SUPPORT OF RVNAF a/b/

	1969			3rd Qtr		
	2nd Qtr		VNAF % of Total	3rd Qtr		VNAF % of Total
	US	VNAF	US	VNAF	US	
<u>RVNAF Division</u>						
I CTZ	1202	197	14	1562	0	0
II CTZ	626	10	2	726	39	5
III CTZ	116	9	7	483	123	20
IV CTZ	243	78	24	397	101	20
Special Units	808	124	13	716	38	7
Total Sorties	2995	418	12	3884	301	7

US AND VNAF ANSWER RATES FOR AIR RESUPPLY
REQUESTS BY ARVN AND VNCM

	2nd Qtr						3rd Qtr					
	US			VNAF			US			VNAF		
	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans	Req	Ans	% Ans
I	400	411	103%	206	78	38%	442	442	100%	7	0	0
II	280	271	97%	8	8	100%	220	217	99%	9	9	100%
III	86	82	95%	17	7	41%	348	343	99%	28	28	100%
IV	95	97	102%	39	39	100%	151	150	99%	50	48	96%
Special Units	305	294	96%	32	53	166%	361	345	96%	41	14	34%
Total	1165	1155	99%	302	185	61%	1522	1497	98%	135	99	73%

a/ Source: SEER.

b/ Includes Maneuver Battalion, Regimental Headquarters and Division Headquarters in all figures.

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AIR SUPPORT FOR ARVN/VNMC UNITS: AIR STAFF COMMENTS

At our request, the Air Staff has provided some pertinent comments on our February article attempting to describe the air support furnished to ARVN/VNMC units:

"This responds to your request for informal comments on the analysis of air support for ARVN-VNMC units. Our basic concern is that such an analysis, developed as indicated from MACV SEER report data provided by US advisors serving with VN Army and Marine units on the ground and in isolation, presents a very misleading picture in regard to actual VNAF and USAF tactical air support activities.

"In our view, no matter how diligent and conscientious the US ground advisor may be, he is in no position to be aware of the full spectrum of tactical air support being provided to the ground forces. The shortcomings of the source are recognized by the author; however, the conclusions drawn from the discussion are represented as being valid.

"A more complete picture of RVN air support than that shown by TABLE 3, may be gained by an examination of Direct Air Support Center (DASC) logs, which report sorties by the service supported and by ten target types. The ten target types may be logically grouped as follows:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Arbitrary Description</u>	<u>DASC Log Target Types</u>
a	Sorties directly in support of ground forces	Troops in contact Known Enemy locations
b	Sorties indirectly in support of ground forces	Suspected enemy locations LZ Construction LZ Preparation Pre-strike Assembly Areas
c	Other DASC-controlled sorties	Infiltration routes Fording sites AAA

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"When OPREP-5 data and DASC log sorties recorded for 3rd Qtr 69 are examined in accordance with the above categories, the following results can be seen in regards to USAF tactical air sorties:

a. Total 3rd Qtr USAF in-country attack sorties (OPREP-5) - 23,586.

DASC-recorded USAF sorties in support of RVN - 6,969.

b. The 6,969 DASC-recorded USAF tactical air sorties in support of RVN forces are categorized as follows:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of OPREP-5 reported (total) in-country TAC AIR Sorties</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Target Type</u>
(1) 2,965	12.6%	directly in support of RVN ground forces	- troops in contact - known enemy locations
(2) 3,900	16.5%	indirectly in support of RVN ground forces	- LZ construction - suspected enemy location - assembly areas - pre-strike - LZ preparation
(3) 104	0.4%	Other DASC-recorded TAC AIR sorties	- infiltration routes - fording sites - AAA
(TOTALS) (4) 6,969	29.5%	USAF tactical air sorties flown in support of RVN	All

"Thus, while TABLE 3 of the subject article (pp 61) credits US tactical air (all service) with only 937 sorties during CY 3/69 in support of VNMC/ARVN, the above data shows that USAF, alone, flew 2,965 sorties directly in support of, and 3,900 sorties indirectly in support of RVN forces during this period. The explanation of this difference is that ground observers are seldom in a position to observe air support flown in other than the 'troops in contact' type.

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"When the same methodology is applied to VNAF tactical air sorties for CY 3/69, the following results are seen:

a. Sortie breakdown:

- (1) Total VNAF attack sorties (OPREP-5) - 8,900
- (2) DASC-recorded VNAF tactical air (attack) sorties in support of RVN - 5,955
- (3) Number directly supporting RVN ground forces - 1,613 (18.1% of total)
- (4) Number indirectly supporting RVN ground forces - 4,253 (47.8% of total)
- (5) Other VNAF tactical air sorties recorded by DASC - 89 (1.0% of total)

"Thus, while 'TABLE 3', of the CDASD(SA) article indicates that third quarter VNAF tactical air sorties in support of ARVN/VNMC units were only 4.5% of VNAF tactical air sorties flown, the above data shows that at least 18 per cent should be placed in this category.

"In 'Details of the Analysis,' para. 2, pp 62, CDASD (SA), states that in CY 3/69, the number of VNAF tactical air sorties declined by 57 per cent from the previous quarter. This is not in consonance with OPREP-5 data, which shows 7,851 VNAF TAC AIR sorties flown in the second quarter of 1969 and 8,900 flown in the third quarter, for an increase of 13 per cent.

"In 'Summary of Non-Attack Air Support,' pp 69, CDASD(SA) states that the 'VNAF has shown a decreased air resupply capability' because the number of resupply sorties flown in the third quarter dropped by 25%, and that 'the Vietnamese actually weakened' in this category. These are considered invalid statements because the fact that VNAF sorties in this category decreased from one quarter to the next does not necessarily mean that VNAF capability to perform this function decreased. On the contrary, capability could have actually increased, with sorties previously allocated to this category deliberately diverted to other tasks due to changing VNAF operational priorities."

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SA Comment

We appreciate the Air Force comments. Readers will find many of the suggestions incorporated in our most recent article on "Air Support for RVNAF" which appears elsewhere in this issue.

Our rationale for stating that VNAF showed a decreased resupply capability was as follows:

Though the number of requests for VNAF air resupply support dropped by over 50%, the number of answers for such support also dropped nearly 50%. Presumably, VNAF demonstrated in the 2nd quarter it was capable of answering 185 requests with 418 sorties, yet in the third quarter when there were only 135 requests, VNAF answered only 99 of them with 301 sorties. Perhaps the unanswered requests did not justify responses, but, at any rate, the unfilled requests led to our finding.

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AIR SUPPORT FOR RVNAF

Summary. SEER data published in the February Analysis Report showed an increase in VNAF sorties flown in support of RVNAF in the 3rd quarter of 1969 over 2nd. Comments on that article presented elsewhere in this issue indicate that SEER covers only direct support of RVNAF and in the case of fixed wing attack support, accounts for only a small percentage of the total of such sorties. SEER data on the 4th quarter presented in this paper show a decline from 17% to 15% in the percentage of RVNAF total direct air support coming from VNAF but a 5% increase in the number of VNAF sorties. Both SEER and the DASC-Log File (a U.S. Air Force source of data on fixed wing attack support) indicate gains in the number of tactical air and fixed wing gunship sorties. SEER data show a very large increase in the number of VNAF air resupply sorties and some increase in the VNAF fixed wing airlift category. There was a drop, however, in the number and proportion of VNAF helicopter airlift sorties.

An article in the February Analysis Report indicated through the use of SEER data that VNAF flew more sorties and a higher share of the total U.S. and VNAF sorties in 3rd quarter of 1969 than the 2nd quarter. Comments on the February article shown elsewhere in this issue point up the fact that SEER covers only direct support reported by ground advisors and recommend the substitution of the DASC-Log File for data on tactical air support. This article uses both sources to gain a more complete picture of air support for RVNAF.

While SEER data shows a slight decline in the percentage of VNAF total direct air support sorties flown for RVNAF, the number of such sorties increased between 3rd and 4th quarters of 1969. (See Table 1.) The decline in the VNAF percentage was due to a 27% increase in the number of U.S. direct air support sorties. This increase of U.S. support came mostly in the numerically large categories of helo gunship and helo airlift. Table 1 also shows a 17% drop in the number of VNAF helilift sorties.

TABLE 1
AIR SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN/VNMC a/

	1969 3rd Qtr			1969 4th Qtr		
	US	VNAF	VNAF % Of Total	US	VNAF	VNAF % Of Total
Tactical Air	937	402	30	935	770	45
Fixed Wing Gunship	203	45	18	187	85	31
Helo Gunship	4381	182	4	6501	233	3
Helicopter Air Lift	24913	6465	21	32157	5363	14
Helicopter Medevac	2433	165	6	2516	183	7
Air Resupply	3884	301	7	4147	1240	23
Fixed-Wing Airlift	82	9	10	130	47	27
Total	36833	7569	17	46573	7921	15

a/ Source: SEER AMFES.

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CONFIDENTIALIncreases in VNAF Tactical Air and Fixed Wing Gunship Sorties

The Vietnamese made significant gains in four to the seven support categories. The percentage of tactical air sorties flown by VNAF increased 30% to 45%, as the number of sorties almost doubled (up 92%). As Table 2 shows, the increase came mostly in support of the special units (air-borne, all in III CTZ) and the II CTZ (the 23rd Division).

TABLE 2

TACTICAL AIR SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN/VNMC a/
1969 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>VNAF</u>	<u>VNAF % of Total</u>		<u>U.S.</u>	<u>VNAF</u>	<u>VNAF % of Total</u>
I CTZ	477	73	13		166	68	29
II CTZ	81	7	8		366	42	10
III CTZ	141	57	29		82	52	39
IV CTZ	111	118	52		63	122	66
Special Units	127	147	54		258	486	65
Total Sorties	937	402	30		935	770	45

a/ Source: SEER AMFES

The percentage of fixed wing gunship sorties flown by VNAF also increased--from 18% in 3rd quarter to 31% in the fourth (the number of sorties doubled--from 45 to 85). Again, the increase came mostly in support of the special units, specifically the marines and rangers (see Table 3). SEER indicates no fixed wing gunship sorties were flown by VNAF for ARVN infantry in I or II Corps.

TABLE 3

FIXED WING GUNSHIP SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN/VNMC a/
1969 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>VNAF</u>	<u>VNAF % of Total</u>		<u>U.S.</u>	<u>VNAF</u>	<u>VNAF % of Total</u>
I CTZ	22	0	0		7	0	0
II CTZ	9	0	0		79	0	0
III CTZ	77	10	11		10	14	54
IV CTZ	43	25	37		56	30	35
Special Units	52	10	16		35	41	54
Total Sorties	203	45	18		187	85	31

a/ Source: SEER AMFES

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As mentioned above, another source of data on attack sorties is the Air Force's DASC-Log File. This system reports all fixed-wing attack sorties flown in support of both RVNAF and U.S. forces. It includes both tactical air and fixed-wing gunship support. The DASC-Log File (data on tactical and fixed-wing gunship support) is more extensive than SEER because it covers not only close support of troops (SEER) but also support that is not observed by advisors on the ground (suspected enemy locations, assembly areas, infiltration routes, anti-aircraft sites, etc.).

A comparison of the DASC and SEER figures on tactical and fixed wing gunship support of RVNAF shows that on the average SEER accounts for about 30% of the sorties in DASC "direct-support" categories (troops in contact and known enemy locations). The remaining unaccounted for 70% probably lies in the "Known Locations" category, i.e. sorties that are against known enemy positions but which are not observed or reported by advisors on the ground.

Data in Table 4 indicate that as the U.S. troop withdrawals and Vietnamization began, U.S. tactical and fixed wing gunship air support did not shift from U.S. to Vietnamese troops (29% of total U.S. support sorties were flown for RVNAF in the 2nd quarter and only 30% in the 4th quarter of 1969). Rather, U.S. sorties for both U.S. and RVNAF troops dropped about the same (40%) from the 2nd to the 4th quarter.

The data also indicate that the number of VNAF sorties flown in support of RVNAF increased 36% in the 4th quarter over the second quarter figure. The continued reduction of U.S. tactical and fixed wing gunship support with increases of the VNAF sorties raised the VNAF percentage from 28% in the second quarter to 47% in the fourth (SEER shows 43%). DASC data shows that VNAF support of U.S. troops (there are 350-800 sorties a quarter, 5-12% of total VNAF sorties) has shifted from "pre-attack" and "assembly area" sorties to known and suspected enemy locations.

TABLE 4

ATTACK AIR SUPPORT OF US AND RVNAF GROUND TROOPS a/

Supported Force	Supporting Air Force					
	US		VNAF		VNAF	
	2nd	3rd	4th	2nd	3rd	4th
US	29305	26450	16774	644	818	357
RVNAF	11958	6130	7058	4680	5933	5382
Total	41263	34589	23832	5324	6751	6739

a/ Source: DASC-Log file.

Table 5 shows that:

- For U.S. Support of RVNAF

1. The largest category of DASC-recorded U.S. support of RVNAF is "known location," which received about 40% of the U.S. support in the last three quarters of 1969.

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2. "Suspected locations" accounted for about 30% (other DASC data show this category accounts for only 17% of U.S. support to U.S. troops).

3. Troops in contact had only 7-14% of such support.

- For VNAF Support of RVNAF

4. The largest category of VNAF support of RVNAF is "suspected locations," which runs about 40%.

5. The second largest group is "known location" (this category has increased to 25% from a 2nd Qtr figure of 17%).

6. The third largest category is assembly area and has decreased from 19% to 10%.

7. Troops in contact account for only 7-11% of VNAF tactical air and fixed-wing gunship support to RVNAF.

TABLE 5
ATTACK AIR SUPPORT OF RVNAF a/

	2nd Qtr		3rd Qtr		4th Qtr	
	US	VNAF	US	VNAF	US	VNAF
Troops in Contact	1466 12%	314 7%	580 7%	461 8%	997 14%	702 11%
Known location	4450 37%	804 17%	3260 40%	1135 19%	2941 42%	1599 25%
Suspected location	3356 28%	1905 41%	2906 36%	2623 44%	1959 28%	2435 38%
Assembly area	1314 11%	881 19%	812 10%	905 15%	613 9%	627 10%
Pre-attack	845 7%	340 7%	277 3%	567 10%	250 4%	786 12%
Other b/	527 4%	436 9%	304 4%	242 4%	298 4%	233 4%
Total	11958	4680	8139	5933	7058	6382

a/ Source: DASC-Log file.

b/ "Other" includes: landing zone preparation and construction, infiltration, fording sites, and anti-aircraft sites.

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CONFIDENTIALChanges in Other Air Support Categories

The Vietnamese have also improved in the categories of air resupply and fixed-wing airlift. Table 5 shows a 400% increase in the 4th quarter over the 3rd in the number of air resupply sorties (and three times higher than the 2nd quarter). These increases came mostly in I Corps (69% of the I Corps sorties were run for the 1st Division, 28% for the 2nd Division) and for the special units (rangers in I and IV CTZ and airborne in III CTZ).

TABLE 6

AIR RESUPPLY SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN/VNMC a/
1969 3rd Qtr 1969 4th Qtr

	VNAF % of Total			VNAF % of Total		
	US	VNAF	of Total	US	VNAF	of Total
I CTZ	1562	0	0	922	751	45
II CTZ	726	39	5	731	88	11
III CTZ	483	123	20	385	6	2
IV CTZ	397	101	20	730	194	21
Special Units	716	38	5	1379	201	13
Total Sorties	3884	301	7	4147	1240	23

a/ Source: SEER AMFES.

Table 1 shows that fixed wing airlift sorties increased in the 4th quarter from 10% to 27% in the proportion flown by VNAF; however, the numerical increase in such sorties was small, from 9 to 47 (10 sorties were flown in the 2nd quarter). Virtually all the increase was due to support rendered the marines (25 sorties in III Corps and 13 in IV Corps).

VNAF helicopter airlift declined both in number of sorties and proportion of total sorties (after a 150% increase, in the third quarter). As seen in Table 7, though the decline in the percentage of the helilift sorties flown by the Vietnamese was partly due to an increase in U.S. sorties, the number of VNAF sorties also dropped - 17% (from 6465 to 5363). Most of this drop came in the IV Corps where the number of sorties flown for the 7th and 21st Division dropped 45% and 51% respectively but the number of sorties flown for the 9th Division increased 5%. There was also a shift of support to I CTZ where the 1st and 2nd Divisions each received about half the sorties.

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TABLE 7
HELICOPTER AIRLIFT SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF ARVN/VNMC a/

	1969 3rd Qtr			1969 4th Qtr		
	US	VNAF	VNAF % of Total	US	VNAF	VNAF % of Total
I CTZ	3626	0	0	2092	293	9
II CTZ	1879	35	2	2573	261	9
III CTZ	7079	341	5	9200	46	4
IV CTZ	7985	4846	38	9531	3610	27
Special Units	4344	1243	22	7961	1153	13
Total Sorties	24913	6465	21	32157	5363	14

a/ Source: SFER, AMFES.

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REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES - EFFECTIVENESSREGIONAL FORCES KILL RATIO BY PROVINCE

	<u>0-2.5:1</u>	<u>2.5-5.0:1</u>	<u>5.0+:1</u>	<u>No. of Provinces</u>
I	2	1	2	5
II	3	7	3	13
III	5	3	2	10
IV	2	8	6	16
TOTAL	12	19	13	44

	<u>0-1</u>	<u>1-2</u>	<u>2+</u>	<u>No. of Provinces</u>
I	1	2	2	5
II	7	5	1	13
III	7	1	2	10
IV	3	8	5	16
TOTAL	18	16	10	44

The Regional and Popular Forces had different margins of effectiveness in the Corps areas. III Corps (ten provinces) had proportionally the most provinces with the lowest kill ratios.

Logistically, the RF/PF forces were inadequately supplied in both arms and vehicles during 1966, although some improvement was evident.

RF/PF ARMS AND VEHICLES SHORTAGES

	<u>Feb 66</u>	<u>Nov 66</u>
Carbines, M-2	65695	44968
Rifles, M-1	45331	24639
BAR's	8436	6738
Grenade launches	2472	2118
1 Ton Trucks	521	127
3/4 Ton Trucks	1051	583
2 1/2 Ton Trucks	781	504

CONCLUSION

RF, and PF effectiveness (like ARVN) appears to be greater in I and IV Corps than II and III Corps. Low ARVN effectiveness may be attributed to the U.S. Army units in II and III Corps bearing the brunt of the main force war. However, the Popular Forces who are the least affected by enemy main force units and the Regional Forces (which engage main force troops more often) had substantially lower kill ratios in II and III Corps than I and IV Corps.

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July 68

THE FLIGHT OF THE VIETNAMESE POPULAR FORCES

Summary

The PF have severe leadership, firepower, supply, and attitudinal difficulties. MACV is addressing combat deficiencies revealed by TFES and has reduced the number of PF platoons with no operational radio from 61% in March to 8% in May. The modest full weapons modernization program will take at least 1½ years to complete. Available data indicates that PF in contact are reinforced by ground support or fire only 35% of the time. The PF by themselves cannot increase territorial security significantly or regain the Tet population losses in the near future. The recent improvement in PF radio capability is a first step towards providing timely reinforcement for the PF when they get into a fight.

The Vietnamese Popular Forces (PF) consist of 163,000 men organized in 4407 lightly armed infantry platoons. Only 514 platoons have 1 or more serviceable crew served weapons. PF soldiers are volunteers who generally perform local security missions; 64% (2827) protect villages and hamlets, 14% (613) secure district and province towns, 12% (519) secure roads and other lines of communication, and 10% (448) perform other missions.

Under current strategy, the PF's primary mission is to provide territorial and population security in conjunction with other Vietnamese forces. But the small number of PF in any given area and their lack of transport and effective support usually prevent them from conducting an active mobile defense. They generally defend static small unit outposts located to provide warning of enemy presence in force. Under sustained attack, PF outposts must depend on timely, decisive ground reinforcement and/or fire support for survival.

PF Problems

Comprehensive data is not available on the support and reinforcement of PF units under attack. However, a recent RAND study* presents data on reinforcement of both RF/PF in III Corps (Table 1). When attacked, RF/PF received outside support in only 45% of the actions and ground force reinforcements arrived only 11% of the time. The other side of the picture is even worse. When their offensive operations contacted the enemy, the RF/PF received outside help in only 17% of the actions and ground reinforcements in only 3% of them. These figures, though old, are probably representative. They clearly indicate that the RF/PF fight alone and that their offensive contacts are rarely exploited by larger friendly forces.

* J.W. Ellis, Jr. and M.B. Schaffer, "Improving Tactical Air Support to Regional and Popular Forces in South Vietnam," RM-5483-PF, May 1968.

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TABLE 1

FRIENDLY REINFORCEMENTS FOR RF AND PF ENGAGEMENTS --
TYPE AND FREQUENCY a/
(III Corps, October 1966 through March 1967)

Item	Outpost Attack		Ambush		Skirmish		Total
	Day	Night	Day	Night	Day	Night	
Total VC-initiated Incidents	47	238	19	19	45	53	421
Number Reinforced a/	23	125	7	6	11	17	189
Reinforced by a/							
Artillery	14	90	4	5	4	12	129
Ground Force	5	28	4	1	6	3	47
Light Fire Team	5	21	3	0	1	3	33
AC-47	2	35	0	0	0	5	42
O-1	5	15	3	0	1	2	26
Air Strike	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total Friendly-initiated Actions --	---	---	22	64	95	53	234
Number Reinforced a/	--	---	2	8	16	14	40
Reinforced by a/							
Artillery			2	5	11	13	31
Ground Force			0	3	3	1	7
Light Fire Team			0	0	2	1	3
AC-47			0	0	0	0	0
O-1			0	0	4	0	4
Air Strike			0	0	0	0	0

a/ The number of reinforced incidents shown in each category is smaller than the sum of the various reinforcements because of reinforcements of two or more.

Source: RAND, op.cit.

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As a result, the PF seek protection in their static outposts and tend to become preoccupied with defending themselves and their families. This tendency, and their poor weapons, make them inviting targets for enemy actions. The PF absorbed about half of all VC actions against RVNAF forces from 1964 through March 1968. On a per capita basis, the PF suffered twice as many incidents (per 1000 strength) as Regular and Regional Forces in 1965 and 1966, and 1.5 times as many in 1967.* The high incidence of actions against them encourages the PF to retreat even further into their outposts, thereby uncovering additional area and population.

The PF themselves are apologetic about their defensive posture. They know that they need better equipment, a change in tactics and other measures to improve their performance. A Simulmatics Corporation study** indicates that few of the needs and aspirations of the PF have been met. The researchers found that the PF lack commitment, leadership and recognition. Most (70%) of the PF interviewed felt more poorly equipped than ARVN and expressed a desire for modern weapons. When asked, the PF stated that their primary mission was defense, but commented that they themselves believe that the GVN must go on the offensive to achieve victory and "to win the confidence of the people."

MACV's excellent new Territorial Evaluation System (TFES) confirms that PF shortcomings greatly hamper their ability even to carry out their present limited defensive mission: (1) The number of NCO leaders present for duty in the field is only 60% of those authorized, and only 75% of the PF platoons had platoon leaders present for duty during May 1968, (2) 55% of the PF units had firepower inferior to nearby enemy units, (3) 62% had slow or undependable resupply, (4) For at least 20%, artillery support is unresponsive or unavailable, (5) 14% had inadequate stocks of ammunition, (6) only 44% (1918) of the units were rated good or excellent in performing their mission while 9% were marginal or completely unsatisfactory; and (7) 52% seldom seek engagement with the enemy.

The enemy/friendly kill ratio statistics succinctly describe the plight of the PF; they have the lowest kill ratio of any military force in Vietnam. The Regular Vietnamese forces reportedly average more than 6 enemy KIA for every regular KIA. The RF ratio for May 1968 was 3.6 to 1. The PF ratio was 2.4, less than half of the Regular Forces' ratio.

The current condition of the PF is partially a product of past neglect. They are an inexpensively equipped force upon whom little US or Vietnamese effort has been spent. Table 2 shows that the per capita cost of a PF soldier averaged \$550 for FY 66 and 67; about 25% as much

* See Southeast Asia Analysis Report for June 1968, p. 1 and the article elsewhere in this report.

** Philip Worchsel, Douglas C. Braithwaite, Joseph P. Jackson, Richard M. McWhirter, Jr., and Samuel Popkin, A Socio-Psychological Study of Regional and Popular Forces in Vietnam, the Simulmatics Corporation, September 1967.

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as a Regular and 60% as much as an PF soldier. The total cost * of the PF for FY 67 was \$82 million, of which we provided \$29.4 million (36%). In comparison, the Regular Army cost \$535 million. Finally, only 4% of all the US advisors in SVN were assigned to help the RF and PF during FY 66 and FY 67.

TABLE 2

	<u>ANNUAL PER CAPITA COSTS a/</u>	<u>FY 65</u>	<u>FY 66</u>	<u>FY 67</u>
ARVN		\$2147	\$2073	\$1893
RF		600	919	892
PF		258	534	571

a/ Source: I. Heymont, "Resource Allocations for the RVN, Army, Regional Forces, Popular Forces and the US Army Advisory Program: FY 1965-1967", Draft. RAC Study 078:191, May 1968. Excludes ammunition.

Measures Underway to Improve the FF

MACV and the GVN recognize the shortcomings of the PF and are moving to make them more effective in performing pacification functions. Four efforts are currently underway:

1. To overcome the firepower inferiority, M16 rifles will be issued to PF in two increments. The first phase is scheduled to provide 9 M16s per PF platoon by March 1969. Phase 2 will then equip the rest of the PF. In the meantime, M2 carbines are being provided to the PF to give them more automatic weapons.

2. To overcome training deficiencies (only 25% of the PF platoons took refresher training in 1967 and the May TFES shows that 69% had less than two hours in-place training per week), MACV is (a) helping the JGS improve the PF training centers and (b) by 30 April 1968 had formed 114 new US mobile advisory teams (MATs) to train RF and PF units on their home ground. This raised the proportion of RF/PF advisors to about 11% of the total US advisors in South Vietnam. The MATs program is still too new for evaluation of its effectiveness.

3. To raise PF morale and esprit, MACV is encouraging the JGS to present more awards and decorations to deserving PF. In the second half of 1967 the RF/PF together** received 39% of all Vietnamese military awards and decorations, up from 23% during the first half of the year.

* Costs do not include ammunition costs.

** Separate PF figures are not available.

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4. The fourth program is designed to train 1000 PF platoons to have a dual capability to fight and to perform limited RD work when the security situation permits. Two classes of PF Vietnamese mobile training teams have graduated from Vung Tau and are preparing to provide this training at PF training centers. MACV (CORDS) is giving this program priority attention.

In addition to the formal programs above, the TFES data (Table 3) show that other MACV and Vietnamese efforts to improve PF effectiveness are showing some favorable results already. For example, the number of PF platoons without a radio dropped dramatically (from 61% to 8%) between March and May, and the number of PF platoons with inadequate munitions declined slightly. PF firepower has not shown improvement yet, but the results of issuing the M16 rifles and M2 carbines should be evident soon. Little progress is being made in solving the resupply problem.

TABLE 3
SELECTED PF PROBLEM AREAS

PF Units With:	1968		Mar		May	
	Feb Nr	%	Mar Nr	%	May Nr	%
Firepower Inferior to Enemy	2128	51	2201	52	2402	55
Inadequate Munitions	689	17	711	17	611	14
No Operational Radio	NA	NA	2582	61	357	8
Often Slow or Undependable						
Resupply	2661	64	2604	61	2731	62
Total PF Platoons	4172		4248		4407	

Source: TFES Summaries.

It is clear that none of the MACV-GVN programs will remedy the serious PF combat deficiencies quickly. The Phase I increase in firepower will not be complete until March 1969. Even if additional crash programs are generated, progress will be slow. Full PF equipment modernization will probably take at least 1½ years to complete. Moreover, the Simul-matics Study revealed PF attitudes of inferiority that will take time, training, and successful combat experience to eradicate. Present programs are reversing the long history of US/GVN inattention to PF, but not the concept of PF as a low cost force.

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The PF by themselves cannot increase territorial security significantly, or regain the Tet population losses in the near future. Security for the population requires skillful integration of all forces (ARVN, RF/PF and US/FWMAF). The principal contribution the PF can make is to provide early warning and then hold long enough to enable better equipped, mobile forces to exploit the PF contact or intelligence report. The Simulmatics Study indicates that the PF units provide better information where they have good rapport with hamlet residents. Hopefully, the current program to train PF in RD techniques will help them improve their rapport. More important, the recent improvement in the PF capability to radio for help should be considered as only the first step in developing a highly reliable means of reinforcing PF units effectively when they spot the enemy or get into a fight.

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July 68

RF/PF ADVISORY PROGRAM

Summary

MACV had 2442 less advisors assigned than authorized on 30 April 1968. Most of the recognized shortages fall in the civil-military and RF/PF advisory areas. MACV has formed (30 April 1968) 114 RF/PF Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs) from in-country resources towards a planned goal of 354. We suggest three sources of advisory personnel which might be considered to accelerate the RF/PF MATs build-up.

Since 1961, the number of US advisors to the RVNAF forces has increased in three major steps. In 1961, US advisors were assigned to ARVN battalions and to GVN provinces. In 1964, advisors were authorized at district level, and, in 1967 we began to provide advisors to RF/PF units. Each increase created a gap between field advisor authorizations and assigned strength which took months to close.

Table 1 shows that about 2500 new field advisors have been authorized in 1968, primarily to provide more advisors to the GVN Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF). As a result, MACV had 2442 less advisors (29%) assigned than were authorized on 30 April 1968. This is the largest deficit in recent years: the field advisory effort fluctuated from 5 to 12 percent understrength in 1966. The deficit was eliminated in mid-1967. The new 1968 increase in authorization again created a deficit since slightly fewer advisors were assigned in April than in January 1968.

COMUSMACV provides detailed justification for new personnel authorizations but has authority to manage in-country and unallocated spaces. In mid-1967, MACV planned for 824 2-man RF company advisory teams and 119 5-man RF company training teams (total 2243 spaces). In late 1967, MACV revised this plan to provide 354 5-man (1770 spaces) Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs) for RF and PF to train and advise the RF/PF on operations, and to provide liaison with US forces. The reason for the decrease of 473 spaces from the earlier plan is unknown.

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TABLE 1
MACV FIELD ADVISORY ELEMENTS*

1966	AUTHORIZED			ACTUAL			% of Authorized
	Officer	EM	Total	Officer	EM	Total	
30 April	2076	3371	5447	1891	3302	5193	95
30 June	2076	3370	5446	1939	3015	4954	91
30 Sept	2076	3360	5436	1946	2939	4885	90
31 Dec	2076	3370	5446	2038	2749	4787	88
<u>1967</u>							
30 April	2213	3451	5664	2079	3128	5207	92
30 Sept	2218	3662	5880	2000	3862	5862	100
31 Dec	2207	3662	5869	2200	3847	6047	103
<u>1968</u>							
31 Jan	3218	5296	8514	2133	3811	5944	70
30 April	3271	5077	8348	2293	3613	5906	71

* Does not include AF or Naval Advisory Group - 990 spaces..

Source: MACV Review and Analysis Report 1966 and MACV J1 Strength Report.

Table 2 shows MACV target dates for deployment of 253 of the MATs (MACV expects this month to set a target date for organization of all 354 teams). To deploy the teams rapidly, MACV used in-country assets. In its "pre-Phase I" part of the program, MACV reorganized existing RF/PF advisory personnel into 67 MATs. The next step (Phase I) took personnel from US units and trained them in-country for the next 100 teams. As a result of these efforts, 114 MATs were in place by 30 April 1968 (70% of the 25 May goal).

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TABLE 2

MOBILE ADVISORY TEAM PLANNED DEPLOYMENT
(As of 4 May 1968)

	<u>End Date</u>	<u>CTZ</u>				<u>Totals</u>
		<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	
Pre-Phase I	1 Mar 68	0	24	24	19	67
Phase I	25 May 68	23	16	20	41	100
Phase II	30 Sep 68	6	20	22	38	86
Totals		29	60	66	98	253

Source: MACMA

However, Table 3 shows that while on 30 April there were only 744 RF/PF advisors assigned of 1124 authorized (34% short), this was still a good record since the authorization had been increased 925 advisory slots between January and April. Table 4 shows the impact of the shift on the advisory mix; authorized RF/PF advisors increased from 3% to 13% of the total. Available data are not sufficient to: (1) relate the deficit of 380 advisors to the MATs' goals, (2) to predict whether MACV can meet its Table 2 schedule, or (3) estimate when the RF/PF advisory build-up will be complete.

Table 3 also shows that advisory teams to Regular units have been maintained at nearly full strength (98%) in 1968 while civil-military teams were 24% understrength and RF/PF advisory teams 34% understrength on 30 April 1968. Advisors were also unavailable to fill the 1277 unallocated advisory spaces on 30 April. Hopefully, MACV will assign most of the unallotted spaces to RF/PF advisory teams, since they need at least 600 more spaces for the planned MATs.

TABLE 4

% ADVISORS BY ASSIGNMENT

	<u>30 Nov 67</u>		<u>30 April 68</u>	
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>
Regular Units	48	50	30	41
Civil-Military	35	38	35	38
RF/PF	3	3	13	12
Other	14	9	7	9
Unallotted	-	-	15	-
Total	100	100	100	100

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Table 3

FIELD ADVISORY TEAM DISTRIBUTION

Advisors	30 Nov 67				31 Jan 68				30 Apr 68			
	Auth Off	Total	Asgn Off	Total	Auth Off	Total	Asgn Off	Total	Auth Off	Total	Asgn Off	Total
I CORPS												
Unit	195	463	1	492	207	488	202	471	200	417	194	441
Civil-Military	115	308	110	304	184	462	128	333	157	393	119	319
RF/PF	7	11	4	10	7	11	5	15	61	149	49	109
Other	32	61	32	67	33	34	12	34	13	34	13	32
Subtotal	349	843	341	873	411	995	347	853	431	993	375	901
II CORPS												
Unit	216	693	212	761	214	659	212	762	219	613	185	607
Civil-Military	191	515	210	587	330	897	214	593	264	712	198	530
RF/PF	12	24	6	21	20	44	18	46	98	277	59	151
Other	73	130	68	133	42	79	40	82	43	79	40	75
Subtotal	492	1362	496	1507	606	1679	484	1483	624	1681	482	1363
III CORPS												
Unit	296	798	295	892	297	785	301	883	308	747	297	753
Civil-Military	196	524	203	582	377	986	197	572	295	782	204	589
RF/PF	43	92	35	100	43	92	32	91	123	315	54	163
Other	221	555	117	293	100	204	90	238	103	250	98	231
Subtotal	756	1969	650	1867	617	2067	620	1784	829	2094	653	1736
IV CORPS												
Unit	276	853	286	890	272	807	293	851	231	692	233	621
Civil-Military	287	733	319	803	482	1282	349	862	393	1034	335	784
RF/PF	29	52	22	58	29	52	23	60	167	383	142	321
Other	35	82	32	70	22	71	17	51	74	194	73	180
Subtotal	627	1720	659	1821	805	2212	682	1824	865	2303	783	1906
COUNTRYWIDE												
Unit	983	2807	988	3035	990	2739	1008	2967	958	2469	909	2422
Civil-Military	789	2080	842	2276	1373	3627	888	2360	1109	2921	856	2222
RF/PF	91	179	67	189	99	199	78	212	449	1124	304	744
Other	361	828	249	563	177	388	159	405	233	557	224	518
Allotted					579	1561			522	1277		
Total	2224	5894	2146	6065	3218	8514	2133	5944	3271	8348	2293	5906

Source: MACV J1 strength report.

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Increasing the number of US RF/PF advisors quickly can play an important part in raising the effectiveness of the RF/PF units, key forces in protecting the SVN population. Past experience indicates that the normal processes for filling authorized advisor slots are too slow to make a quick impact. Our analysis indicates three measures which might be considered to accelerate the process:

1. A thorough review of the personnel overhead throughout the advisory structure might reveal personnel who could be profitably shifted to the RF/PF advisory program. Table 5 shows that over half (about 1850 personnel) of the people in advisory teams at sector, division, and corps level were classified as overhead on 30 June 1967. We recognize that many of these personnel, such as radio operators who operate 24 hour-a-day tactical operations centers, are absolutely essential for performance of the advisory mission. However, battalion, regiment, subsector and MAT teams have much lower overhead ratios.

TABLE 5

ADVISORY OVERHEAD a/
(30 June 1967)

Sample Units b/	Advisors	Overhead	Total	% Overhead of Total
I CTZ c/	60	84	144	58
7th ARVN Division c/	50	82	133	62
9th Regiment - Binh Long	2	1	3	33
2nd Bn, 9th Regiment	4	-	4	-
3rd Armor Squadron	11	-	11	-
Airborne Infantry Bn	3	-	3	-
33rd Ranger Battalion	4	1	5	20
53rd RF Bn (Ton Son Nhut)	15	4	19	21
Mobile Advisory Teams for RF/PF d/	5	-	5	-
Binh Duong Sector c/	14	19	33	58
Buon Ho Sub-Sector (Darlac)	4	2	6	33

a/ Source: MACV DPU Project #3095

b/ One representative unit of each type selected at random.

c/ Includes headquarters and/or security detachments.

d/ Authorized organization as of 24 May 1968.

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2. It might be feasible to withdraw some of the US advisors from regular RVNAF units who consistently perform well. Encouraging qualified RVNAF units to operate on their own would recognize the effectiveness of their past actions, create an elite status, and free experienced advisors to work with the RF/PF. This might not make sense with the equipment modernization program getting underway, but perhaps mobile training teams could be used to help the good units adopt the new equipment.

3. Some RF/PF advisors might be made available by holding the MACV staff slightly below its authorization. Despite significant increases in its authorized strength, the MACV headquarters has often been overstrength while there is a shortage of field advisors (Table 6).

TABLE 6

MACV OVERALL STRENGTH

	MACV HEADQUARTERS				FIELD ADVISORY GROUP		
	Authorized	Actual	TDY	Over-strength	Authorized	Actual	Under-strength
<u>1966</u>							
Jul	2547	2397	0	(150)	5436	4820	616
Sep	2563	2593	0	30	5476	4772	704
Dec	2571	2909	273	65	5436	4618	818
<u>1967</u>							
Jan	2560	3033	276	197	5436	4838	598
30 Sep	3021	3153	292	(160)	5880	5862	18
31 Dec	3067	3268	7	194	5869	6047	(178)
<u>1968</u>							
31 Jan	3044	3330	7	279	8514	5944	2570
30 Apr	3395	3426	0	31	8348	5906	2442

Source: MACV J1 Strength Report

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August 68

THE VIETNAMESE REGIONAL FORCES

Summary

The Vietnamese Regional Forces presently outperform the Popular Forces by 80% in number of enemy killed per 1000 friendly troops and by 44% in the enemy/friendly kill-ratio; nevertheless, RF have serious leadership, fire-power, resupply and friendly support deficiencies which we estimate will take at least 18 months to correct. Only 42% of available RF officers are assigned to field units.

RF Units and Missions

Vietnamese Province Chiefs rely heavily upon Regional Forces (RF) to control their provinces. The 1,037 RF rifle companies are the backbone of provincial forces; 989 of them operate independently and the other 48 are organized into RF battalions. About 80% of the RF companies perform security missions,* 9% conduct offensive operations, 5% provide reserve reaction forces, and the rest (6%) are mostly in training. The RF occasionally conduct battalion sized operations, particularly in the Delta, and often participate in operations with the Regular Forces and the PF.

In addition to the 1,037 RF rifle companies, there are 23 boat companies, 47 mechanized platoons and 225 intelligence units, for a total of 1,332 RF field units with a strength of 128,000 troops. Total RF assigned strength reached 197,900 by June 30, 1968, indicating that there are about 70,000 RF personnel in addition to those in the field. During the first six months the RF expanded by 47,000 (31%) personnel while the PF grew only 15,000. This probably indicates the greater popularity of service in the RF since both forces rely on volunteers instead of conscripts for recruitment.

The RF are much better equipped than the PF for conducting active security operations.** Although the primary mission of most RF companies is defensive, 30% of them conduct offensive operations as a secondary mission and 12% more are to serve as reaction forces when needed. One factor enabling the RF to take the offensive more than the PF is their light machine guns and mortars (70% of RF companies reported 3 or more serviceable crew served weapons on hand on 31 May 1968) which most PF do not have. An

* 30% for hamlets and villages, 22% for district and province capitals, and 28% for key military/economic installations and lines of communications.

** See "Flight of the Vietnamese Popular Forces, Southeast Asia Analysis Report, July 1968, P. 21, for posture of the PF.

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RF company reportedly has three times the firepower of an equivalent PF force (3 platoons). Another RF advantage over the PF is better command and control of its forces. The province staff plans RF operations in more detail and the RF company headquarters provides continuous field supervision of its platoons. Thus, an RF company which has a platoon make contact is usually in a position to reinforce it.

RF Status and Problems

The status of the 1,332 RF units as reported by the MACV Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) is shown in Table 1. The RF score higher than the PF in all the categories except that (1) a higher proportion of PF units gain active cooperation from the populace and (2) the responsiveness of their artillery support is about the same. The table indicates major RF deficiencies in the areas of resupply, training, firepower, relations with the civilian population, and leadership.

As shown in Table 1, only 43% of the RF units have adequate leadership and promotion opportunities. Table 2 shows that RF leaders are short in every officer and NCO grade except E7. The shortage is concentrated in the captain through colonel ranks (26% of authorized on hand) and in the senior NCO ranks (75% on hand). Moreover, only 42% of the officers assigned to the RF forces are in the field. The June TFES reports 4,160 officers assigned to field units, of 10,009 on hand. The other 5,849 are presumably assigned to headquarters, support and training activities.

Performance

Table 3 shows that in May and June 1968 the RF outperformed the PF by 44% in terms of the enemy/friendly kill ratio. RF and PF performance was highest in I and IV Corps; the kill ratios in II and III Corps were significantly lower. The PF clearly outperformed the RF in I CTZ, perhaps because of the USMC/PF CAP units there. There are indications that the enemy KIA figures reported in TFES may be higher than those reported to the JGS and used in the official body count figures. If so, the kill ratios in Table 3 are too high. We have not been able to validate the data one way or the other yet.

Table 4 shows that the number of RF KIA per 1000 RF is 28% higher than the comparable PF figures for May and June. The highest RF loss rates occurred in the 23rd, 25th, and 7th Division Tactical Areas (DTA) with PF experiencing its highest rates in the 25th DTA, 1st DTA and the QDSZ (Danang area). Table 5 shows that the RF killed 82% more enemy per 1000 friendly troops than did PF in May and June. The RF did best in IV Corps, followed by I, III and II CTZ in that order.

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CONFIDENTIALProspects

There are unconfirmed indications that MACV and the JGS are planning to replace ARVN battalions in direct support of Revolutionary Development with RF battalions. This would require forming about 120 more RF companies into the 40 battalions required to replace the ARVN RD battalions. How the change would affect RF performance is not known.

MACV reports that little progress has been made in solving RF major deficiencies in the January through June 1968 period. It seems clear that progress will be slow in the future. Equipping RF/FF units with M16 rifles and M79 grenade launchers will not be completed for at least 18 months, even if everything goes according to plan. The expansion of RF forces and forming more RF battalions will exacerbate rather than alleviate the leadership, resupply, training and other major problems. Improving the RF's poor relations with the populace also will take time. All in all, we would guess that it will take at least 18 months or 2 years to correct the current RF deficiencies, even if all of the measures needed to remedy them started tomorrow. But there is little or no indication that the RF leadership problem will be solved on schedule.

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CONFIDENTIALTABLE 1STATUS OF RF a/RF Units With:

	<u>Nr</u>	<u>%</u>
75% or more individual clothing & equipment	1016	76
3 or more servicable crew served weapons	877 b/	69 b/
Responsive artillery support	628 b/	50 b/
Firepower superior to or equivalent to local VC	648	49
6 or more operational radios	598	45
Good or emphasized leadership and promotion	579	43
Conduct continuous or frequent civic action	410	31
Always coordinate local defenses	255	19
Active cooperation from populace	217	16
6 or more hours training per week	176	13
Dependable and prompt resupply	122 b/	10 b/
Tactical unit assigned personnel strength (Vs Authorized) c/		
Officers	66	
NCO	77	
EM	95	
Total Number of RF Units On June 30, 1968	1332	

a/ Source: May and June 1968 TFES Reports.

b/ As of 31 May with 1264 units.

c/ COMUSMACV Message 22773, 060050Z August 1968, subject: Pacification
in SVN During January - June 1968.

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TABLE 2

LEADERSHIP SHORTAGE IN THE REGIONAL FORCES a/
(As of 30 June 1968)

	Officers		
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>% On Hand</u>
Major General	1	0	0
Brigadier General	1	0	0
Colonel	24	1	4
Lieutenant Colonel	72	17	24
Major	448	131	29
Captain	2443	618	25
Sub-Total	2989	767	26
Lieutenant & Aspirant	9557	9242	97
Total	12546	10009	80

	NCO		
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>% On Hand</u>
E8	2131	796	37
E7	1931	2114	109
E6	8936	6831	76
Sub-Total	12998	9741	75
E5	21153	19962	94
Total	34151	29703	87

a/ Source: MACV Briefing for Secretary of Defense, 15 July 1968, P. 38.

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TABLE 1

ENEMY/FRIENDLY KILL PATTERNS FOR PF AND RF a/

	PF			RF		
	May	June	Total	May	June	Total
<u>I CTZ</u>						
Enemy KIA	553	376	929	293	236	529
Friendly KIA	142	63	205	62	65	127
Kill Ratio	3.9	6.0	4.5	4.7	3.6	4.2
<u>II CTZ</u>						
Enemy KIA	102	53	155	434	319	753
Friendly KIA	116	60	176	192	139	331
Kill Ratio	.9	.9	.9	2.3	2.3	2.3
<u>III CTZ</u>						
Enemy KIA	199	104	303	531	335	866
Friendly KIA	149	62	211	153	92	245
Kill Ratio	1.3	1.7	1.4	3.5	3.6	3.5
<u>IV CTZ</u>						
Enemy KIA	785	376	1161	972	617	1589
Friendly KIA	271	152	423	195	141	336
Kill Ratio	2.9	2.5	2.7	5.0	4.4	4.7
<u>COUNTRYWIDE</u>						
Enemy KIA	1639	909	2548	2230	1507	3737
Friendly KIA	678	337	1015	602	437	1039
Kill Ratio	2.4	2.7	2.5	3.7	3.4	3.6

a/ Source: MACV TFES Reports for May and June 1968.

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TABLE 4

RF and PF KIA PER 1000 RF AND PF STRENGTH a/
TFES (May-June 68)

	PF		RF	
	May	June	May	June
I CTZ				
1 DTA	6.5	4.5	2.5	3.6
2 DTA	3.1	1.1	4.4	4.1
QDSZ	<u>10.1</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>3.6</u>
Total	<u>5.8</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>3.8</u>
II CTZ				
22 DTA	4.9	3.2	4.2	1.3
23 DTA	2.3	.9	9.2	7.6
24 SZ	<u>1.6</u>	<u>.4</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Total	<u>3.1</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>4.3</u>
III CTZ				
5 DTA	5.6	1.5	5.3	2.5
18 DTA	4.3	3.0	4.4	2.8
25 DTA	8.8	3.6	6.8	5.5
CMD + RSSZ	<u>4.3</u>	<u>.7</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>1.5</u>
Total	<u>4.9</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>3.2</u>
IV CTZ				
7 DTA	3.5	2.2	7.0	2.9
9 DTA	4.0	2.6	4.5	3.4
21 DTA	<u>6.7</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.5</u>
Total	<u>4.5</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>3.2</u>
Countrywide	4.6	2.3	5.2	3.6

a/ Using field strengths and KIA reported in the TFES reports.
 DTA stands for Division Tactical Area, SZ for Special Zone,
 CMD for Capital Military District, and RSSZ for Rung Sat
 Special Zone.

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TABLE 5

F/NEMY KIA PER 1000 RF/PF STRENGTH
TFES (May - June 68)

	PF		RF	
	May	June	May	June
<u>I CTZ</u>				
1 DTA	34.7	23.2	18.5	23.7
2 DTA	21.6	12.3	19.6	12.7
QDSZ	7.0	11.2	16.2	5.3
Total	22.8	15.8	18.3	13.8
<u>II CTZ</u>				
22 DTA	5.2	2.3	11.2	5.0
23 DTA	1.6	1.0	10.7	16.1
24 SZ	.6	1.1	30.5	1.3
Total	2.8	1.5	14.0	9.9
<u>III CTZ</u>				
5 DTA	7.8	3.4	19.0	19.0
18 DTA	2.8	4.1	6.7	3.1
25 DTA	10.7	5.5	18.1	13.0
CMD + RSSZ	11.2	2.5	37.9	17.1
Total	7.8	4.0	19.2	11.7
<u>IV CTZ</u>				
7 DTA	10.4	8.3	23.3	11.6
9 DTA	12.1	4.7	25.5	17.6
21 DTA	18.0	7.3	21.1	15.2
Total	13.1	6.1	23.8	14.2
Countrywide	11.2	6.2	19.3	12.4

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RF/PF AND TERRITORIAL SECURITY IN VIETNAM

Summary. This article presents some preliminary findings from our larger study of the Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces, based on 1968 Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) data. Additional analysis of other portions of the study and refinements of the findings presented here will appear in future reports. Thus, the findings in this article should be considered tentative. Comments are welcomed.

1. MACV considers that 96% of the SVN Popular Forces (PF) and 83% of the Regional Forces (RF) contribute to pacification by providing territorial security; 78% of the PF and 48% of the RF are specifically assigned to population security missions and probably provide direct protection to somewhat more than 35% of SVN's hamlet population.

2. In terms of Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) security scores, the unprotected population ^{1/} improved about as often as the population protected by RF/PF units (11% of the unprotected population improved versus 12% of the protected), and the total unprotected population improving was higher (877,900 versus 655,400).

3. RF/PF operating together had the best effect on HES scores, followed by PF operating alone. RF alone tended to be associated with HES regressions, except in IV CTZ.

4. Some types of enemy incidents declined more rapidly near PF posts in I, III, and IV CTZ, and near RF in III CTZ, than they did elsewhere in the same CTZ, but the pattern is inconclusive at the present stage of analysis. If the RF/PF could eliminate all enemy initiated incidents near their bases, the incident rate would fall about 30-40%.

MACV Concept for Employment of RF/PF

The mission of both RF and PF is to provide territorial security from VC attacks, harassment, and terrorism. TFES and other data show that in practice, the RF and PF use different methods to perform their mission:

(a) Difference in recruitment. When the advisor rating on recruitment was discontinued in May, TFES showed that 80% of PF units were recruited primarily from their own or adjacent villages, while only 24% of RF units were serving so close to their homes. Thus, PF under district control, are really local militia forces, while RF are a provincial force.

(b) Difference in employment. MACV sees RF as flexible, mobile forces which can take part in large unit operations with ARVN regular forces, replace the ARVN battalions currently providing territorial security, and provide a security umbrella for PF, Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre, and People's Self

^{1/} We considered population in hamlets nearest to RF/PF units protected, all other hamlet population unprotected. See full article for complete discussion.

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Defense forces (PSDF) which are tied down in hamlets. PF, on the other hand, are not supposed to be employed in offensive operations, but are stationed in or just outside hamlets to provide the primary local defense against overt enemy actions. Under present conditions, neither the lightly-armed RD teams, nor the PSDF, which have few arms (no M-16's) and no statutory basis, can provide much local security.

(c) Different contribution to pacification. While MACV considers virtually all (83% of RF and 95% of PF) RF/FF activities as "pacification" (see Table 1), only 46% of RF and 78% of PF are specifically assigned population security missions, i.e., defending population centers (cities, towns, villages, hamlets). We cannot tell how many RF/FF units participate in offensive operations, but TFES reports that 21% of the RF (240 out of 1119 rifle companies) are assigned as offensive or reaction forces, versus 4% of the PF (188 out of 4731 platoons). While such activities contribute to pacification in the long run, we do not have any evidence on how they affect local population security. TFES does not measure the RF/FF contribution to pacification other than security; we do know, however, that RF/FF participate in the Phoenix anti-VC infrastructure (VCI) program (RF/FF produced 110 out of 1459, or 7.5% of October 1968 Phoenix VCI eliminations), and some PF are trained for RD activities in their hamlets.

TABLE 1

RF/FF TACTICAL UNIT ASSIGNMENTS a/ b/
(As of December 31, 1968)

	RF		PF	
	Number of Rifle Cos.	%	Number of Platoons	%
<u>Pacification Missions c/</u>				
Pop Security	518	46%	3,682	78%
Other Security	176	16%	615	13%
Offensive & Reaction Forces	240	21%	188	4%
Sub-Total	934	83%	4,485	95%
<u>Other Missions:</u>				
Security for Military Installations	96	9%	80	2%
Training/Admin.	25	2%	107	2%
Undesignated	64	6%	59	1%
Sub-Total	185	17%	246	5%
Total	1,119	100%	4,731	100%

a/ Source: TFES

b/ Based on primary mission of unit's prime base.

c/ MACV definition: All RF/FF activities except units in training, and those securing military installations. We further exclude administrative units and those without mission designations.

1/ MACV says that "RF/FF units assigned missions of LOC security, reserve and reaction forces, and offensive operations make major contributions to population security."

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CONFIDENTIALDeployment of RF/FF

US district advisors are supposed to report the location and nearest hamlet name for each RF/FF stationary operating base. If GVN offensive operations are moving into contested areas, we would expect the RF to have a greater percentage of units in contested areas than PF, since RF conduct more offensive operations. Table 2 shows the locations of RF and PF prime bases according to Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) security ratings of the nearest hamlets. About one-third of the RF and 10% of the PF units do not have nearest hamlets designated, possibly because the units are mobile.

Based only on units with known locations, RF had a slightly greater percentage of units (32%) near D-E ("contested") or VC hamlets than the PF (28%) in September. Table 3 shows that this relationship was true for all corps areas except IV CTZ, where 29-30% of both RF and PF were near D-E-VC hamlets.

TABLE 2

RF/FF DEPLOYMENT

	March	June	Sept	Change	Units Which Moved b/ Nr. Units
	Nr. Units (%) ^{d/}	Nr. Units (%) ^{d/}	Nr. Units (%) ^{d/}	Nr. Units (%) ^{d/}	
RF Rifle Cos.					
Near A-B-C Hamlet c/	440 (62)	451 (65)	509 (68)	+ 69 (+6)	
Near D-E-VC Hamlet a/	269 (38)	246 (35)	235 (32)	- 34 (-6)	
Unknown Location	215	340	348	+133	
Total	924	1037	1092	+168	201
PF Platoons					
Near A-B-C Hamlet c/	2662 (66)	2859 (69)	3024 (72)	+362 (+6)	
Near D-E-VC Hamlet c/	1399 (34)	1288 (31)	1164 (28)	-235 (-6)	
Unknown Location d/	187	270	427	+240	
Total	4248	4425	4615	+367	1295

a/ Percent of units with known locations.

b/ Nearest hamlet in September not the same as nearest hamlet in March.

c/ HES security score of hamlet nearest to unit's prime base.

d/ Nearest hamlet not specified, or no such hamlet listed in HES.

Table 2 also shows that between March and September, the number of RF rifle companies and PF platoons near D-E-VC hamlets decreased (RF down 34 companies, PF down 235 platoons), while the number near A-B-C hamlets increased (RF up 69 companies, PF up 362 platoons). All four corps areas showed a similar shift.

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TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF RF/PF UNITS IN CONTESTED AREAS a/
 (By Corps Tactical Zone)

	<u>March</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Change</u>
<u>I CTZ</u>				
RF Cos.	47	45	33	-14
PF Plts.	41	34	31	-10
<u>II CTZ</u>				
RF Cos.	27	25	27	0
PF Plts.	23	21	21	-2
<u>III CTZ</u>				
RF Cos.	49	45	39	-10
PF Plts.	36	32	29	-7
<u>IV CTZ</u>				
RF Cos.	35	33	29	-6
PF Plts.	38	35	30	-8
<u>SVN</u>				
RF Cos.	38	35	32	-6
PF Plts.	34	31	28	-6

a/ Percent of RF Rifle Cos. and PF Platoons with known locations which are near D-E-VC hamlets (HES security scores).

This shift may have occurred because RF/PF upgraded hamlets from D-E-VC to A-B-C ratings, or because RF/PF moved from contested to relatively secure areas. Both explanations are possible. On the one hand we know (Table 2) that 201 RF companies and 1295 PF platoons moved from one hamlet to another between March and September -- enough to account for the shift. On the other hand we know from data in a later section (see Table 6) that about 655,000 population improved while RF/PF were nearby; if half of these went from D-E-VC ratings to A-B-C, and if 1,000 people live in the average hamlet, then 325 hamlets improved -- also enough to account for the shift. We are planning more detailed analysis to determine which explanation, or mixture of the two, is correct.

Table 4 suggests that RF personnel on population security missions may be spread too thin in the D-E-VC areas: there were 82 men per operating base (prime base or outpost) near A-B-C hamlets, but only 63 RF per base near D-E-VC hamlets. Despite strength increases during 1968, the 19-20 man gap between A-B-C and D-E-VC bases did not close between March and September. Table 4 also shows that the PF had about the same number of men per A-B-C base (24) as for D-E-VC bases.

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TABLE 4

RF/PP PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

No. Prime Bases	No. Outposts	No. Operating Bases	Pers. PPD b/ by Prime Base	Oper. Bases Per Location	Pers. PPD b/ Per Unit	Pers. PPD b/ Per Unit	Pers. PPD b/ Per Oper. Base
<u>RF Rifle Cos. on Pop. Sec Mission a/</u>							
<u>March 1968</u>							
Near A-B-C Hamlets	280	108	388	26,650	1.39	95.2	68.7
Near D-E-VC Hamlets	170	134	304	14,815	1.79	87.1	48.7
Total	450	242	692	41,465	1.54	92.1	59.9
<u>September 1968</u>							
Near A-B-C Hamlets	280	99	379	31,111	1.35	111.1	82.1
Near D-E-VC Hamlets	142	97	239	15,105	1.68	106.4	63.2
Total	422	196	618	46,216	1.46	109.5	74.8
<u>Difference</u>							
<u>March-September</u>							
Near A-B-C Hamlets	0	- 9	- 9	+4,461	-.04	+15.9	+13.4
Near D-E-VC Hamlets	- 28	- 37	- 65	+ 290	-.11	+19.3	+14.5
Total	- 28	- 46	- 74	+4,751	-.08	+17.4	+14.9
<u>PP Platoons on Pop. Sec Mission a/</u>							
<u>March 1968</u>							
Near A-B-C Hamlets	2,163	667	2,830	67,232	1.31	31.1	23.8
Near D-E-VC Hamlets	1,066	335	1,401	31,137	1.31	29.2	22.2
Total	3,229	1,002	4,231	98,369	1.31	30.5	23.2
<u>September 1968</u>							
Near A-B-C Hamlets	2,401	691	3,092	75,691	1.29	31.5	24.5
Near D-E-VC Hamlets	886	243	1,129	27,202	1.27	30.7	24.1
Total	3,287	934	4,221	102,893	1.28	31.3	24.4
<u>Difference</u>							
<u>March-September</u>							
Near A-B-C Hamlets	+238	+24	+262	+8,459	-.02	+.4	+.7
Near D-E-VC Hamlets	-180	-92	-272	-3,935	-.04	+1.5	+1.9
Total	+58	-68	-10	+4,524	-.03	+.8	+1.2

a/ RF/PP population security units with known locations only.
 b/ PPD means Present for Duty.

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Population Protected by RF/PF

Until the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) began on November 1, 1968, the GVN did not assign RF/PF to protect specific hamlets or villages. Thus, there was no way to hold RF/PF directly responsible for their territorial security mission. Since we do not have detailed APC data yet, we have to make indirect estimates of how many people the RF/PF protect.

We had to make assumptions about which RF/PF units were directly responsible for population security, and how much territory each unit can protect. Table 5 shows population protected by RF/PF computed for August 1968 under two sets of assumptions. Assumption A (Minimum Protection) assumes only those units with the assignment of population security actually protect population, and each unit protects only the hamlet(s) nearest its prime base and outposts. Under this assumptions, RF/PF protect 4.8 million people (35% of SVN's 13.9 million population in hamlets), including .5 million people in hamlets which both RF and PF protect.

Assumption B (Maximum Protection) assumes all RF/PF units protect population, regardless of their mission assignments, and that each unit protects not only the closest hamlet, but all other hamlets in the closest village. Under these assumption, RF/PF protect 11.8 million people (35% of the hamlet population), including 6.2 million in villages protected by both RF and PF.

TABLE 5

POPULATION PROTECTED BY RF/PF (Population in Thousands) As of August 31, 1968

	Protected by RF Alone	Protected By FF Alone	Protected by Both RF/PF	Total Protected By RF/PF
<u>Assumption A^{a/}</u>				
I CTZ	48.7	637.0	86.7	772.4
II CTZ	82.2	756.7	159.2	998.1
III CTZ	113.7	925.2	138.6	1177.5
IV CTZ	84.8	1598.3	136.4	1819.5
SVN	329.4	3917.2	520.9	4767.5
<u>Assumption B^{b/}</u>				
I CTZ	60.6	956.6	750.0	1767.2
II CTZ	115.7	866.5	1231.5	2213.7
III CTZ	82.9	982.0	1739.7	2804.6
IV CTZ	134.4	2366.5	2475.7	4976.6
SVN	393.6	5174.6	6196.9	11762.1

^{a/} Assumes RF/PF protect nearest hamlet only; uses RF/PF on population security missions only.

^{b/} Assumes RF/PF protect nearest village; uses all RF/PF regardless of mission.

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Assumption A (Minimum Protection) gives a reasonable estimate for PF, since one PF platoon could conceivably protect a relatively secure hamlet, but may underestimate RF protection, since an RF company could affect security in more than one hamlet. Assumption B (Maximum Protection) probably overstates both RF and PF protection, since neither an RF company nor a PF platoon is likely to be able to protect an entire village without help.

To study how RF/PF affect HES scores (next section), we used Assumption A (Minimum Protection) to determine which hamlets RF/PF protected, and observed HES security scores only during those months RF/PF were present. In addition we observed HES scores in hamlets near RF/PF with other missions. We assumed all other hamlets were unprotected, even though RF/PF or other friendly forces may have been close enough to affect their security. At this stage of analysis, we have not been able to take the pacification effects of other forces into account.

RF/PF Effect on HES Scores

We studied the fluctuation of HES security scores in the hamlets most likely to be influenced by RF/PF -- those hamlets closest to RF/PF bases with a population security mission. We found (Table 6) that for the six months of April-September 1968:

(a) Countrywide, unprotected population improved about as often as population near RF/PF (11% of the population improved versus 12%) and more unprotected population improved (887,900) than protected population (655,400). The CTZ patterns varied. In I CTZ, security for the unprotected population declined while the protected population's security rose. In II and III CTZ the percentage gain (16%-10%) of the unprotected population was higher than for the protected population (12%-5.5%); in IV CTZ protected population did better (16.6% versus 12%). In all but I CTZ, more unprotected people progressed.

(b) HES scores improved most often (for 19% of the protected population) when both RF and PF were close to the hamlet, except in I CTZ, where PF alone did better.

(c) HES scores in I, II and III CTZ showed significant net improvement only when PF were present.

(d) In I CTZ and III CTZ, HES scores showed substantial net regressions (I-36%, III-14%) near RF acting alone; IV CTZ showed a 16% gain and II CTZ remained about the same.

The findings indicate, at the minimum, that PF have much more impact on HES scores than the RF, which seem to have a beneficial impact only when combined with the PF.

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TABLE 6

PERCENT OF POPULATION SHOWING NET HES SECURITY
SCORE IMPROVEMENT (+) OR REGRESSION (-)
 (By Corps Tactical Zone)

	April - September 1968				
	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>SVN</u>
<u>Protected Population</u>					
Pop Prot by RF Only (000) ^{a/}	42.2	76.0	98.4	104.5	321.1
Net (000)	-15.2	+.9	-14.2	+16.6	-11.9
%	-36.0	+1.2	-14.4	+15.9	- 3.7
Pop Prot by PF Only (000) ^{a/}	613.8	703.0	826.2	1517.9	3660.9
Net (000)	+100.4	+66.3	+63.4	+252.3	+482.4
%	+16.4	+9.4	+7.7	+15.6	+13.2
Pop Prot by Both (000) ^{a/}	106.8	163.7	182.4	194.1	647.0
Net (000)	-5.7	+53.2	+37.1	+35.5	+120.1
%	-5.3	+32.5	+20.3	+18.3	+18.6
Pop Near Other RF/PF (000) ^{b/}	89.4	117.8	165.4	563.0	935.6
Net (000)	-16.8	+7.6	-16.1	+90.1	+64.8
%	-18.8	+6.5	- 9.7	+16.0	+ 6.9
Total Protected Pop (000)	852.2	1060.5	1272.4	2379.5	5564.6
Net (000)	+62.7	+128.0	+70.2	+394.5	+655.4
%	+ 7.4	+12.1	+ 5.5	+ 16.6	+ 11.8
<u>Unprotected Population</u>					
Unprotected Pop (000)	1644.6	1437.4	1706.0	3360.7	8148.7
Net (000)	-13.6	+269.2	+220.1	+403.2	+977.9
%	- .8	+ 18.7	+ 12.9	+ 12.0	+ 10.8
<u>Total Population</u>					
Total Population (000)	2496.8	2497.9	2978.4	5740.2	13713.3
Net (000)	+49.1	+396.2	+290.3	+757.7	+1533.3
%	+ 2.0	+ 15.9	+ 9.7	+ 13.9	+ 11.2

a/ Population in hamlets nearest RF/PF on population security missions.
 b/ Population in hamlets nearest RF/PF having missions other than population security. Excludes hamlets nearest RF/PF on population security missions.

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RF/PF Effect on Local Enemy-Initiated Incidents

The only available quantitative measure of enemy disruption of territorial security is the local rate of enemy-initiated incidents -- attacks, harassments, terrorism, etc. We studied incident rates in areas around RF/PF population security bases and outposts^{1/} and found that:

- (a) Although Table 7 shows that incidents of all kinds (attacks, harassments, other) declined 43-77% between the first and third quarters of 1968, "other incidents" (including terrorism) fell off much more near PF bases in I, III and IV CTZ (60-65%) and near RF in III CTZ (32%) than they did elsewhere in the same CTZ. The fluctuation of attacks and harassments near RF and PF bases shows no clear pattern.
- (b) During the average month of high enemy activity (e.g., first quarter 1968), about one RF/PF base in three had 1-2 incidents occur nearby (Table 8); the other two-thirds had no incidents occur nearby. During the average month of low enemy activity (e.g. third quarter 1968), less than one RF/PF base in five had one incident occur nearby. With reasonable effort and good intelligence, RF/PF units should be able to contain this level of enemy activity. If so, the countrywide incident rate would fall about 30-40%.

^{1/} Specifically, we included any 1-kilometer UTM grid square occupied by an RF/PF population security base/outpost, plus the eight adjacent 1-km. squares -- a total of nine square kilometers. We counted incidents only once, even if there were more than one RF/PF base within the nine square kilometers.

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TABLE 7

VC-INITIATED INCIDENTS NEAR RF/PF
(By Corps Tactical Zone)

	Incidents Near RF ^{a/}				Incidents Near PF ^{b/}				Total Incidents in All of SVN			
	1Q	2Q	3Q	1Q-3Q % Chg	1Q	2Q	3Q	1Q-3Q % Chg	1Q	2Q	3Q	1Q-3Q % Chg
I CTZ												
Attacks	41	34	17	-59	221	153	44	-80	363	305	91	-75
Harassments	204	177	107	-48	770	647	311	-60	1561	1306	715	-54
Other ^{c/}	204	152	116	-43	1035	568	360	-65	3560	3312	2192	-38
Total	449	363	240	-47	2026	1368	715	-65	5484	4923	2998	-45
II CTZ												
Attacks	47	29	5	-89	129	69	21	-84	276	197	42	-85
Harassments	81	70	46	-43	231	219	143	-38	547	504	323	-41
Other	56	26	24	-57	213	127	95	-55	786	517	355	-55
Total	184	125	75	-59	573	415	259	-55	1609	1218	720	-55
III CTZ												
Attacks	90	100	33	-63	213	201	70	-68	450	431	145	-68
Harassments	192	261	102	-47	509	607	213	-58	997	1075	532	-47
Other	110	147	53	-52	260	239	103	-60	1013	952	567	-44
Total	392	508	188	-52	900	1047	386	-61	2460	2458	1244	-49
IV CTZ												
Attacks	62	22	16	-74	242	142	51	-79	549	272	95	-83
Harassments	215	137	57	-73	952	752	235	-75	1936	1359	488	-75
Other	67	47	32	-52	318	256	119	-63	1118	849	554	-50
Total	344	206	105	-69	1512	1150	405	-73	3603	2480	1137	-68
SVN												
Attacks	240	185	71	-70	811	565	186	-77	1638	1205	373	-77
Harassments	692	645	312	-55	2462	2225	902	-63	5041	4244	2058	-59
Other	437	372	225	-49	1826	1190	677	-63	6477	5630	3668	-43
Total	1369	1202	608	-56	5099	3980	1765	-65	13156	11079	6099	-54

a/ In the same or neighboring 1-km UTM squares as RF rifle companies on population security missions.
 b/ In the same or neighboring 1-km UTM squares as PF platoons on population security missions.
 c/ Including terrorism.

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TABLE 8

ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS NEAR
RF/PF ON POPULATION SECURITY MISSIONS
(Monthly Averages)

	RF (Rifle Cos. Only)				PF				
	1968	Thru Sep	1Q	2Q	3Q	1968	Thru Sep	1Q	2Q
Number of Units	520	522	522	515		3405	3302	3422	3490
Number of Operating Bases With Valid Coordinates	777	799	786	747		4452	4402	4475	4479
Number of Operating Bases Near D-E-VC Hamlets	277	304	283	246		1300	1401	1335	1165
<u>Total VC Incidents:</u>									
Near Units	353	456	401	203		1205	1700	1327	588
Not Near Units a/	3017	3929	3292	1830		2165	2685	2366	1445
Total	3370	4385	3693	2033		3370	4385	3693	2033
% Near Units	10%	10%	11%	10%		36%	39%	36%	29%
<u>Operating Bases With Inci-</u> <u>dents Nearby:</u>									
Number	181	212	197	134		1158	1470	1238	765
%	23%	27%	25%	18%		26%	33%	28%	17%
Number of Incidents Per Base "Hit"	2.0	2.2	2.0	1.5		1.0	1.2	1.1	.8

a/ Residual of total minus incidents near units.

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RF/PF MODERNIZATION VERSUS COMBAT PERFORMANCE

Summary. RF/PF modernization programs have made impressive progress in 1968. However, the relationship between the modernization programs and improvements in RF/PF combat performance indicates that high quality leadership, esprit and good training are more important to combat performance than personnel increases, more and better weapons and equipment, and more officers and NCO's. Moreover, RF/PF operate well in I and IV CTZ, which have good ARVN divisions, and poorly in II and III CTZ in which four out of the five divisions have poor records. Thus, training good leaders and improving the poor ARVN divisions may be the best keys to improving RF/PF performance.

In 1968 MACV and the GVN began a large program to increase the effectiveness of the Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces as part of the overall RVNAF modernization and improvement effort. The program called for increasing RF/PF strength, providing more and better weapons and training, and improving leadership. This paper examines the results of the program in 1968, using data from the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES). It looks at quantitative increases in such things as strength, weapons and hours of training per week and qualitative progress in terms of advisor evaluations of units and combat performance. (Our work to date on the RF/PF contribution to pacification and territorial security was covered last month - SEA Analysis Report, February 1969, page 1).

Strength and Leadership

RF. The GVN goal for Regional Forces is 252,900 men by June 1969. Between March and December 1968, RF assigned strength rose from 157,600 to 219,000 bringing the assigned strength up to 87% of authorized. Rifle companies comprise about 62% of the total RF force; their assigned strength is about 98% of authorized, and 87% of the authorized personnel were present for duty in December. RF present for duty officers (in combat units) increased from 3.4 per company in March to 4 per company by the end of December, but still remained short of the 6 officers authorized.

The RF are short of senior officers. Only 20% of the authorized captains through colonels were assigned on June 30; by September 30, 28% of the slots were filled. Senior NCO's are also in short supply (66% of authorized in September), partly because the number of authorized slots increased. We shall be surprised if the JGS promotion program fills these officer and NCO spaces in timely fashion.

NOTE: First quarter 1968 data are not used widely in the analysis since the TFES system was new and the data are of questionable validity.

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As noted last month, another imbalance shows up in the disposition of RF companies. In September the average base or outpost in the contested and VC areas was 23% smaller (63 men) than those in relatively secure areas (82 men) because the companies in the VC contested areas were smaller and had to cover more outposts per company.

The quality of RF leadership is also evaluated by advisors. In the 4th quarter, 61% of the RF units were rated good or outstanding in leadership and esprit, an increase from 49% in the 2nd quarter. III CTZ ranked lowest of all CTZ with 55% and showed little improvement during the year.

PF. The goal for the Popular Forces is 178,100 personnel by June 1969. The assigned strength rose to 174,000 (98% of authorized) by December, a rise of about 21,000 (14%) since the previous March. About 88% of the authorized PF are present for duty. The overhead decreased to 8% in the 4th quarter.

By December the PF present-for-duty platoon leaders slightly exceeded the authorized spaces, a substantial gain since June, when only 77% of the authorized platoon leaders were present for duty. There is some imbalance among the CTZ, however; I CTZ had only 91% of their authorized platoon leaders while II CTZ had 112%. Squad leader billets were 74% filled by December, compared to 56% in March.

At the end of 1968, advisors judged 45% of all PF units as good or outstanding in leadership and esprit; in the 2nd quarter 39% were so rated. III CTZ ranked lowest with 41% in the 4th quarter and showed almost no improvement during 1968. I CTZ showed the most improvement.

Equipment and Training

During the second quarter of 1968, US advisors estimated that only 531, or 53%, of all RF rifle companies had firepower equal or superior to the VC units they faced. To remedy this, MACV began issuing automatic weapons, including M-16s, to RF units in July.

By 31 December, the total number of M-2 carbines, BARs and M-16 rifles in the hands of RF rifle companies had increased by 61% (from 57,100 to 83,100) and the average number per company had increased 44%. As a result, advisors reported a 41% gain in the number of companies (748) with firepower equal or superior to VC units during the fourth quarter. About 85% of all the weapons and virtually all of the M-16s for RF went to units in III and IV CTZ. As a result, the average automatic weapons per company rose to 81 (from 49) there, while I and II CTZ units averaged 55 per company.

Only 44% of the PF units had firepower rated equal or superior to VC units in the second quarter. By December, the PF platoons had 60% more automatic weapons (from 64,600 to 103,400) and the number per platoon increased 51%. M-16s accounted for 98% of the increase, and 88% of them went

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to IV CTZ; III CTZ received the rest. As a result of the new weapons, 47% (906) more PF units received good firepower ratings, bringing 60% of the PF units up to this standard. Thus, issuance of automatic weapons to RF and PF has generated corresponding increases in RF/PF firepower, particularly in III and IV CTZ.

Almost two-thirds of the RF units (65%) have an adequate number of radios (6) to conduct their missions. In contrast, two-thirds (61%) of the PF are seriously hampered in their mission performance because they only have one radio, or no radio. The great variation between CTZ in the percentage of units with adequate radios also needs examination. For example, in December only 17% of the PF platoons in I CTZ had two or more operational radios, compared to 62% in III CTZ. This may be a problem of priority assignment, maintenance and repair service, or supply distribution.

The resupply problem hit the PF a little harder than the RF in May; 62% of PF and 59% of RF units reported slow or undependable supply. Because PF are scattered and sometimes located in remote areas their supply problem can be acute. (We have heard reports that ammunition for PF was rationed in I CTZ.) Uncertainties in the supply system can cause hoarding of ammunition which in turn inhibits mission performance. In December, 7% of the RF units and 9% of the PF units still had inadequate ammunition, but progress was evident in remedying this deficiency during 1968.

RF has a higher percentage of units receiving four or more hours of training each week than the PF (55% versus 41%). However, PF platoons are smaller than RF companies and there are about four times as many PF platoons as RF companies. Thus, training teams have a tougher job to train the many PF units which are more scattered than RF and often are in insecure areas.

RF also rates higher in the percentage of units rated excellent or good in weapons proficiency. About 52% of the RF units received this rating in the 4th quarter versus about 38% for PF. A 47% increase in the number of RF units getting four or more hours training per week increased advisor's weapons proficiency 35%; a 95% increase in PF training increased PF weapons proficiency 20%. Finally, the MACV training goal for RF/PF appears to be six hours a week; we suspect that not even six hours a week is enough to do the job that needs to be done.

RF/PF Combat Performance

We looked at combat results and advisors' evaluations of mission performance to determine RF/PF progress or regression. To structure our findings, we used measures of effort, effectiveness, and efficiency to establish trends and compare RF/PF performance in the various CTZ.

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Effort. Advisor ratings suggest that both RF and PF increased their effort during 1968. Moreover, TTES reports that RF increased their small unit operations by 61% while PF increased theirs by 73% (4th quarter over 2nd quarter). We suspect that these increases are inflated because total RF/PF small unit operations exceed those reported elsewhere for all Vietnamese units (includes the Army) in two of the months under consideration. Also, RF and PF may have been holed up and not conducting or reporting operations during the VC offensive in the second quarter. Nevertheless, RF and PF operations seem to have increased significantly.

Effectiveness. The 61% increase in RF operations generated 80% more contacts in the 4th quarter; the PF's 73% increase yielded 90% more contacts. Thus not only total contacts, but the rate of contact per operation increased. RF conducted 75% of its operations at night (July-September) but achieved only 45% of its contacts then; the PF also conducted about 75% of its operations at night to obtain 60% of its contacts. Unless all enemy small units operating in the daytime are already being contacted, the data suggests that more contacts may be obtained if daytime small unit operations are increased in III and IV Corps.

Running counter to the increases in RF/PF contacts are declines in the number of enemy killed per contact, weapons captured per contact and in total enemy killed per 1000 friendly forces. The number of enemy killed per contact decreased from 2.7 to .6 for RF and from 1.1 to .4 for PF during 1968. Enemy weapons captured per contact decreased from .7 to .4 for RF and from .5 to .1 for PF. Effectiveness in terms of enemy KIA per 1000 friendly forces declined from 17.3 in the 2nd quarter to 12.7 in the 4th quarter for RF and from 9.3 to 8.0 for PF. The down trends are probably due to the decrease in combat intensity each quarter. In addition, the new emphasis on RF/PF reporting may have introduced some exaggeration of the operations and contact data.

Efficiency. RF and PF kill ratios generally moved upward in 1968, primarily due to losing fewer RF/PF rather than increasing enemy KIA. The kill ratio for RF went from 3.5 in the second quarter to 5.1 in the fourth; the PF ratio went from 2.0 in the 1st quarter to 3.9 in the fourth.

The countrywide figures mask important differences among the corps in levels of effort, contact, effectiveness and efficiency. I and IV Corps are consistently the high performers. Advisors' ratings for III Corps indicate that we should expect poorest operational performance there, but II Corps achieves the lowest results (possibly due to low enemy activity levels there). Both II and III Corps seem to require the most improvement.

Factors Affecting RF/PF Combat Performance

Table 1 indicates that increasing RF/PF strength, officer and NCO density, and furnishing weapons may not be the key to improving RF/PF performance. For example, the I CTZ RF and PF had the lowest strength, fewest officers and NCOs, virtually no M-16s and few automatic weapons, the worst ammunition resupply problems, and few radios. However, they had the best leadership and esprit, fairly good firepower, trained the most, had the highest weapons proficiency, responded to orders well, and had the best

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plans for supporting fires. These units had the most contacts per unit, the best contact rate per operation, the most night contacts, the most enemy KIA per 1000 RF/PF forces and the best kill ratio. On the whole, they fought well.

The presence of large and active enemy forces undoubtedly contributed to the outstanding I CTZ performance, but it is clear that furnishing more and better equipment probably had little to do with it, since almost all of the M-16s, radios, and other items went to III and IV CTZ.

In contrast to I CTZ, III CTZ ranked high in RF/PF officers and NCO's per unit, received substantial quantities of M-16s and radios, had adequate munitions, a high density of weapons per unit, and relatively high strength per unit. Conversely, it had the lowest rating on leadership and esprit, firepower, and responsiveness to orders, and poor plans for supporting fire. The III CTZ units had low rates of contacts per unit and contacts per operation, low enemy KIA, and the next to lowest kill ratio, despite the presence of very active enemy forces and high US KIA rates there.

Another factor that might help account for RF/PF performance is the quality of the ARVN regular forces in the RF/PF area. It is likely that the division commanders retain a large share of control in their tactical zones and this would affect the RF/PF. It may be significant that I and IV CTZ, which have the best RF/PF combat performances also had the ARVN divisions with the highest enemy kill rates and the best kill ratios in 1968. II and III CTZ, with four inactive ARVN divisions and one active one, have poor RF/PF performances. In contrast, the US 1st Division, located in III CTZ, inflicted and took a high rate of casualties in 1968, indicating the enemy was present in III CTZ and willing to fight.

Thus, it appears that strength increases, more and better weapons and equipment, and more leaders are not necessarily the key factors in performance although they certainly contribute to it. There seems to be a more positive correlation between good performance and high quality leadership, esprit and training. Other factors may play significant roles, including performance of ARVN and US forces in the same areas as well as the type and activity of the enemy forces in those areas.

Annexes 1 and 2 contain the detailed analysis.

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TABLE 1

RF/PF CTZ RANKING FOR STRENGTH, LEADERSHIP, EQUIPMENT,
TRAINING, COMBAT PERFORMANCE

	<u>Strength</u>		<u>Leadership</u>			<u>Equipment</u>							
	Strength	Strength per unit	Officers	Officers per unit	Officers/1,000 men	ECOS	ECOS per unit	ECOS/1,000 men	Leadership & esprit de corps	Weapons	Weapons per unit	Firepower ^{a/}	Adequate munitions ^{b/}
Regional Forces													
I CTZ	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 2	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4
II CTZ	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 2	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3
III CTZ	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4
IV CTZ	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4
Popular Forces													
I CTZ	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4
II CTZ	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 2	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 2	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 3
III CTZ	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4
IV CTZ	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 3	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4	1 2 2 4

Note: Duplicate numbers indicate a tie in ranking.

a/ % of units in area in top two TES rating categories.
b/ Almost no M16s were issued to RF/PF in I & II CTZ in 1968.

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		4 hrs training/wk		Training		Combat Performance	
3		1		Weapons proficiency 2/			
3	4	1	2	Responsiveness to orders 3/			
1	2	3	4	Plans for support fires 3/			
2	3	4	1	Small unit ops.			
1	4	2	3	Contacts			
1	2	3	4	Night Ops.			
1	3	4	2	Night contacts			
2	1	4	3	% contacts of ops.			
3	2	1	4	Contacts per unit			
4	1	3	2	Enemy KIA per contact			
2	3	1	4	Weapons captured/ contact			
3	1	2	4	Enemy KIA per 1,000 men			
4	2	1	3	Enemy KIA			
1	3	2	4	Friendly KIA			
2	4	1	3	Enemy/Friendly KIA Ratio			

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REGIONAL FORCES. Total RF assigned strength increased by 39% (61,400) in 1968. TFES reports only on RF rifle companies or about 62% of the total RF strength. The 38% not reported in TFES is overhead (both field and regular overhead). Table 1 shows that there was little change in the overhead percentage during 1968. If we add to the assigned overhead, troops who are assigned to the field but not yet present for duty (in training, TDY, etc.), the proportion of RF strength in the overhead rises to 45%. Despite the fact that RF provides support to the PF (which has only about 10% in overhead), this seems excessive particularly when compared with ARVN's 30% overhead.

TABLE 1

RF ASSIGNED STRENGTH
(000 - end of quarter)

	<u>1968</u>				<u>%</u>
	<u>1 Qtr</u>	<u>2 Qtr</u>	<u>3 Qtr</u>	<u>4 Qtr</u>	<u>Change</u>
Combat Strength (TFES Rifle Co's)	97.8	114.7	134.5	135.4	38
Overhead:					
Field Overhead (Other TFES Units)	4.7	6.8	7.5	N/A	N/A
Residual Sub-total	55.1	76.4	74.6	N/A	N/A
	59.8	83.2	82.1	83.6	40
Total	157.6	197.9	216.6	219.0	39
% Combat	62	58	62	62	0
% Overhead	38	42	38	38	0

Both assigned and present for duty RF personnel are approaching their authorized ceilings. Assigned strength rose from 86% of authorized in the first quarter to 98% in the fourth, and present for duty (PFD) strength rose from 76% to 87% in the same period (Table 2). The authorized strength per RF company is 123 men. Despite improvement through the third quarter when 109 men per company was the average present for duty, this dropped in the fourth quarter to 107, still 16 short of the authorized strength. All CTZ had about the same average PFD strength per unit and all showed the decline in the fourth quarter.

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TABLE 2

	<u>RF COMBAT STRENGTH/UNIT</u> (End of quarter)				<u>Change</u>
	<u>1968</u>	<u>1 Qtr</u>	<u>2 Qtr</u>	<u>3 Qtr</u>	
Authorized (000)	113.7	127.6	134.3	137.6	23.9
Assigned (000)	97.8	114.7	134.5	135.4	37.6
%	86	90	100	98	12
PFD (000)	86.2	102.8	119.3	119.9	33.7
%	76	81	89	87	11
No. of Units	924	1037	1092	1119	195
PFD/Unit	93	99	109	107	14

POPULAR FORCES. Assigned strength for the PF rose by 20,900 (14%) between March and December. The overhead ranged from 9-10% in 1968 until it decreased to 8% in the fourth quarter.

TABLE 3

	<u>PF ASSIGNED STRENGTH</u> (000)				<u>% Change</u>
	<u>1968</u>	<u>1 Qtr</u>	<u>2 Qtr</u>	<u>3 Qtr</u>	
Combat Strength	139.7	147.2	154.4	160.2	15
Overhead	13.4	17.1	17.4	13.8	3
Total	153.1	164.3	171.8	174.0	14
% Combat	91	90	90	92	1
% Overhead	9	10	10	8	-1

a/ End of Quarter.

b/ TES.

PF assigned and present for duty strength numbers are also approaching authorized totals with 97% of authorized strength already assigned and 90% PFD. This is up slightly from the end of first quarter (94% and 86% respectively). The authorized strength of a PF platoon is 35 men. Actual or PFD strength was 30-31 per unit throughout the year.

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TABLE 4

PF COMBAT STRENGTH/UNIT

	1968 1 Qtr	a/ 2 Qtr	a/ 3 Qtr	a/ 4 Qtr	a/ Change
Authorized (000)	148.7	154.9	161.5	165.6	16.9
Assigned (000)	139.7	147.2	154.4	160.2	20.5
%	94	95	96	97	3
PFD (000)	128.2	136.5	142.8	148.5	20.3
%	86	88	88	90	4
No. of Units	4248	4425	4615	4731	483
PFD/Units	30	31	31	31	1

a/ End of quarter.

Most PF strength increases were in III and IV CTZ. In December both had 98% assigned of authorized (vs. 95-96% in I and II CTZ) and 90-93% PFD of authorized (vs. 86-87% in I and II CTZ). IV CTZ was always best in strength per unit with 33 PFD in December. I and II CTZ had 30 and III CTZ had 31. III and IV CTZ improved during the year; I and II CTZ did not.

Comparison. Although the RF had greater strength increases in 1968, the PF still maintained a greater percentage of personnel present for duty than RF (90% vs. 87%). The PF also did better in filling combat spaces (89% filled vs 87% for RF). PF are better off in III and IV CTZ in getting spaces filled and in the percent present for duty than in I and II CTZ, but RF does about the same in every CTZ.

LEADERSHIP

REGIONAL FORCES. Only 38% of the RF officers were assigned to combat posts throughout 1968, despite a 4500 increase in total officers assigned between March and December. About 67% of the officers assigned to combat posts were present for duty by the end of the year, compared to only 51% present for duty in June.

TABLE 5

ASSIGNED RF OFFICERS
(000)

	1968			
	Mar	%	Jun	%
Combat (TFES)	3.7	(38)	4.0	(38)
Other	6.0	(62)	6.5	(62)
Total a/	9.7		10.5	
			12.3	
				14.2

a/ Source: Selected HVNAF Personnel Data.

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TABLE 6

	RF OFFICER STRENGTH (End of Quarter)				Change
	1968 1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	
Authorized	5544	6222	6552	6714	1170
Assigned	3734	3964	4624	5437	1703
%	67	64	71	81	14
PFD	3107	3165	3793	4513	1406
%	56	51	58	67	11
No. of Units	924	1037	1092	1119	195
PFD Off./Company	3.4	3.1	3.5	4.0	.6
Total PFD (000)	86.2	102.8	119.3	119.9	33.7
PFD Off./1000 PFD	36	31	32	38	2

Table 6 shows the number of officers present for duty per company. The authorized number is six officers per company but the average company had only four in December, up from 3.1 since June. The number of officers per 1000 RF also increased from 31 to 38. III CTZ is consistently high in the percent of officers present for duty (79% in December versus a countrywide average of 67%), officers per company (4.7 versus a countrywide average of 4.0), and officers per 1000 RF (44 versus a countrywide average of 38).

The percent of RF NCOs assigned to the field in combat units declined during 1968 (47-43%); the percentage, however, is higher than officers (38%) and lower than total RF strength (62%) assigned to the field. Table 7 shows that the percent of NCOs present for duty in combat units rose from June to December (63-72%) to exceed the officers PFD in the field (67%) but still less than total RF strength PFD (87%).

The number of authorized NCO spaces per unit for RF is 18. The average present for duty in December was 13, up from 11.4 in June. However, strength increases appeared to outpace NCO increases through the third quarter since the number of NCOs per 1000 RF declined from 132 to 110 from March to September. By December, however, it was up to 121 per 1000, primarily due to a slowing down of total strength increases in the last quarter. As with officers, III CTZ had the highest percentage NCOs present for duty (77% versus a countrywide average of 72%), NCOs per unit (13.8 versus a countrywide average of 13) and NCOs per 1000 RF (129 versus a countrywide average of 121).

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TABLE 7

	RF NCO STRENGTH (End of Quarter)				<u>Change</u>
	<u>1 Qtr</u>	<u>2 Qtr</u>	<u>3 Qtr</u>	<u>4 Qtr</u>	
Authorized	16,632	18,666	19,656	20,142	3510
Assigned	13,078	13,767	15,371	16,657	3579
%	79	74	78	83	4
PFD	11,337	11,824	13,162	14,509	3172
%	68	63	67	72	4
No. of Units	924	1037	1092	1119	195
NCO/Unit	12.3	11.4	12.1	13.0	.7
RF PFD (000)	86.2	102.8	119.3	119.9	33.7
NCO/1000 RF	132	115	110	121	-11

Up to this point we have discussed quantity of leadership. Quality is more difficult to assess. Since senior grade military personnel are considered to have extensive experience and high professional expertise, we have used the percentage of senior leaders assigned against those authorized for RF as an indicator of the quality of leadership. MACV revised numbers show that RF had only 20% of its authorized captains through colonels assigned on 30 June 1968. Assigned strength in these grades increased to 28% by 30 September. Further, we found that authorization increased resulted in a decrease of the senior NCOs (E6-E9) assigned relative to authorized, 75% on 30 June to 66% on 30 September.

The quality of leadership is also evaluated by advisors. In the 4th quarter 61% of RF units were rated good or outstanding in leadership and esprit, an increase from 49% in the 2nd quarter. III CTZ ranked lowest of all CTZ with 55% and showed little increase over time.

TABLE 8

RF LEADERSHIP AND ESPRIT
(Monthly Average)

<u>Units w/good or outstanding rating</u>	1968			
	<u>1 Qtr</u>	<u>2 Qtr</u>	<u>3 Qtr</u>	<u>4 Qtr</u>
I CTZ	64	67	82	98
% a/	52	48	55	64
II CTZ	128	134	164	178
% a/	52	50	58	61
III CTZ	124	128	118	151
% a/	56	54	47	55
IV CTZ	149	161	213	251
% a/	47	46	56	64
SVN	465	490	577	678
% a/	52	49	55	61

a/ % of units in the area.

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POPULAR FORCES. A comparison of TFES and total RVNAF data indicates that almost all (99%) PF platoon leaders are in the field in combat units. By December 1968 present for duty platoon leaders exceeded the authorized spaces. In June only 77% of the authorized platoon leaders were present for duty. (Table 9). Since each platoon is authorized one platoon leader, theoretically all platoons now have a platoon leader assigned and present for duty, according to TFES. However, I CTZ had only 91% of their authorized platoon leaders while II CTZ had 112%. The average number of platoon leaders per 1000 PF was 32 as of December.

TABLE 9

<u>PF PLATOON LEADER STRENGTH</u> (End of Quarter)					
1968					Change
	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	
Authorized	4248	4425	4615	4731	483
Assigned	3680	3601	4574	5089	1409
%	87	81	99	108	21
PFD	3477	3404	4381	4803	1326
%	82	77	95	102	20
No. of Units	4248	4425	4615	4731	483
Pltn Ldrs PFD/Unit	.82	.77	.95	1.02	.20
Total PFD (000)	128.2	136.5	142.8	148.5	20.3
Pltn. Ldrs/1000 PF	27	25	31	32	5

About 90% of all assigned squad leaders were in the field at the end of the year (versus 99% of the platoon leaders and 92% of total PF). This reversed a downward trend in the first three quarters of the year. The present for duty rate of squad leaders in the field rose from 56% in June to 74% in December. (Table 10) PF units are authorized four squad leaders per unit and they averaged about 2.9 at the end of the year versus 2.3 in June. The number of squad leaders per 1000 PF also increased (from 73 to 94). III CTZ had: (1) the highest percentage of squad leaders present for duty in December (81% versus a countrywide average of 74%), (2) the best ratio of squad leaders to platoons (3.2 versus an average of 2.9) and (3) the most squad leaders per 1000 PF (103 versus an average of 94).

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TABLE 10

	<u>PF SQUAD LEADER STRENGTH</u> (End of Quarter)				<u>Change</u>
	<u>1968</u>	<u>1 Qtr</u>	<u>2 Qtr</u>	<u>3 Qtr</u>	
Authorized	16,992	17,700	18,460	18,924	1932
Assigned	10,356	10,974	13,322	15,187	4831
%	61	62	72	80	19
PFD	9,531	9,954	12,357	13,934	4403
%	56	56	67	74	18
No. of Units	4,248	4,425	4,615	4,731	483
Sq. Ldrs PFD/Unit	2.2	2.3	2.7	2.9	.7
Total PFD (000)	128.2	136.5	142.8	148.5	20.3
Sq. Ldrs/1000 PFD	74	73	87	94	20

In the 4th quarter advisors judged 45% of all PF units good or outstanding in leadership and esprit; in the 2nd quarter 39% were so rated. III CTZ ranked lowest with 41% in the 4th quarter and showed almost no improvement during 1968. I CTZ showed the most improvement.

TABLE 11

<u>Units w/good or outstanding rating</u>	<u>1968</u>			
	<u>1 Qtr</u>	<u>2 Qtr</u>	<u>3 Qtr</u>	<u>4 Qtr</u>
I CTZ	268	261	335	385
% a/	38	36	45	51
II CTZ	391	431	503	524
% a/	37	39	44	45
III CTZ	300	317	291	346
% a/	40	40	35	41
IV CTZ	639	716	785	875
% a/	38	41	42	45
SVN	1598	1725	1914	2130
% a/	38	39	42	45

a/ % of units in the area.

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Comparison. PF did much better than RF in getting its officers in the field. PF had all officer spaces filled versus two-thirds for RF, and 99% of the PF officers were actually in the field versus about 38% for RF. RF and PF filled about the same percentage of NCO slots (72-74%), but only 43% of the RF NCOs were assigned to the field versus 90% of PF. Although 62% of the RF strength is in the field, only 38% of the officers and 43% of the NCOs are there.

EQUIPMENT

REGIONAL FORCES. The MACV program to improve RF equipment concentrates primarily on weapons. This infusion of more and better arms to the RF together with adequate training should show improvement in advisor ratings of relative enemy-friendly firepower.

In the second half of the year, US district advisors reported through TFES that the individual automatic weapons (M2 carbines, BAR's and M16's) in the hands of RF rifle companies increased 61% (52,000 in July to 83,000 in December), and the average number per company increased 44% (49.1 in July and 71 in December). Even with this increase RF companies are short an average of 35 automatic weapons from the authorized goal of 106. In III and IV CTZ, which are receiving the bulk of new M16's, there were only 58 (III CTZ) and 61 (IV CTZ) M16 rifles in the hands of each 123-man RF rifle company by December 31. Almost no M16's are being issued to RF companies in I and II CTZ and the average of all automatic weapons per company in those areas is 53.9 in I CTZ and 56.1 in II CTZ compared to 82 and 81 in III and IV CTZ.

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TABLE 13

RF FIREPOWER
(Monthly Average)

	1968			
	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr
<u>Units rated equivalent or better than VC</u>				
I CTZ	84	77	98	105
% a/	68	62	65	70
II CTZ	175	148	173	182
% a/	71	55	61	63
III CTZ	113	93	107	153
% a/	51	39	42	57
IV CTZ	217	213	241	308
% a/	69	61	63	78
SVN	589	531	619	748
% a/	65	53	58	68

a/ % of units in area.

In the second quarter 1968 an average of 130 RF companies reported inadequate ammunition (13%) to perform their mission. By the fourth quarter 78 companies still had inadequate ammunition (7%). (Table 14).

TABLE 14

RF UNITS WITH INADEQUATE MUNITIONS
(Monthly Average)

	1968			
	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr
<u>I CTZ</u>				
% a/	26	19	21	14
II CTZ	21	14	14	9
% a/	18	27	29	25
III CTZ	7	10	10	9
% a/	20	30	18	12
IV CTZ	9	13	7	5
% a/	63	54	38	27
SVN	20	16	10	7
% a/	127	130	106	78
	14	13	10	7

a/ % of units in area.

Radios. RF units are authorized six radios each and by the end of 1968, 65% of all RF companies had at least this many. (Table 15). I and II CTZ had the lowest percentage of companies with adequate radios (55 and 53%) and III and IV CTZ had the highest (74 and 73%).

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TABLE 15

RF RADIO EQUIPMENT

c/ Units w/adequate radios	1968 Jun	b/	
		3 Qtr	4 Qtr
I CTZ	48	70	83
% a/	33	47	55
II CTZ	106	151	154
% a/	38	54	53
III CTZ	160	175	199
% a/	65	69	74
IV CTZ	219	265	285
% a/	59	69	73
SVN	533	661	721
%	52	62	65

a/ % of units in area.

b/ Monthly average.

c/ 6 or more operational.

Resupply. During the months for which we have advisor evaluation ratings on resupply (January through May) the trend was down; in May 59% of all RF units had slow or undependable resupply ratings. Those units with good ratings fell from 42% in January to 35% in May. I CTZ fared worst in this rating and IV CTZ showed some improvement during the time period.

POPULAR FORCES. As with RF, MACV is improving the quality and quantity of PF weapons. From July 31 through December 31, 1968, US district advisors reported through TFES that the number of M2 carbines, BAR's and M16's increased 60% (64,600 in July to 103,400 in December), and the number per platoon increased 51% (14.4 in July to 21.7 in December). M16's accounted for most of the increase (98% or 38,018 out of 38,832). Even with the increase, PF have only 21.7 automatic weapons per platoon against the authorized goal of 34. In III and IV CTZ, which received all of the new M16's, there were only 6 (III CTZ) and 19.4 (IV CTZ) M16 rifles in the hands of each platoon as of December 1968 (Table 16).

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TABLE 16

PF INDIVIDUAL AUTOMATIC WEAPONS

		1968				Change No. No./Pltn
		Jul No.	No./Pltn	Dec No.	No./Pltn	
<u>I CTZ</u>						
M16s	0	0	34	0	34	0
Other	12,275	16.8	13,363	17.6	1,088	.8
Total	12,275	16.8	13,397	17.6	1,122	.8
<u>II CTZ</u>						
M16s	0	0	28	0	28	0
Other	16,589	14.7	19,840	16.6	3,251	1.9
Total	16,589	14.7	19,868	16.6	3,279	1.9
<u>III CTZ</u>						
M16s	5,088	6.3	5,170	6.0	82	-.3
Other	9,224	11.3	12,734	14.9	3,510	3.6
Total	14,312	17.6	17,904	20.9	3,592	3.3
<u>IV CTZ</u>						
M16s	170	.1	38,044	19.4	37,874	19.3
Other	21,268	11.7	14,233	7.2	-7,035	-4.5
Total	21,438	11.8	52,277	26.6	30,839	14.8
<u>All SVN</u>						
M16s	5,258	1.2	43,276	9.1	38,018	7.9
Other	59,356	13.2	60,170	12.6	814	-.6
Total	64,614	14.4	103,446	21.7	38,832	7.3

The increased number of automatic weapons seems to have helped raise district advisor evaluations of PF platoon firepower relative to small-size VC units operating in their areas. The results in terms of firepower ratings were that 906 more units received good firepower ratings between 2nd and 4th quarters. By the end of the year the proportion of units receiving poor firepower ratings was down to 37%. In III CTZ, where the need for increased firepower was greatest (III CTZ rated only 19% of PF units good in firepower in the 2nd quarter versus a countrywide average of 44%), the PF firepower ratings improved substantially but were still the lowest of the four CTZ. IV CTZ, which received the bulk of the new M16s had 76% of its units rated equal to or superior to the VC in firepower (Table 17).

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TABLE 17

PF FIREPOWER
(Monthly Average)

<u>Units rated equivalent or better than VC</u>	1968			
	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr
I CTZ	351	323	392	430
% a/	49	45	53	57
II CTZ	551	532	526	553
% a/	52	48	46	47
III CTZ	227	155	282	370
% a/	30	19	34	44
IV CTZ	927	904	1134	1467
% a/	55	52	61	76
SVN	2056	1914	2331	2820
% a/	49	44	51	60

a/ % of units in area.

At least 9% (441) of all PF units do not have enough munitions to perform their job. This is an improvement since the second quarter when 14% (634) lacked enough ammunition. The worst area was I CTZ with 16% lacking sufficient ammunition while the best supplied were III and IV CTZ. III and IV CTZ also showed the most improvement during 1968. (Table 18).

TABLE 18

PF UNITS WITH INADEQUATE MUNITIONS
(Monthly Average)

	1968			
	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr
I CTZ	146	127	142	123
% a/	21	18	19	16
II CTZ	99	110	113	122
% a/	9	10	10	10
III CTZ	121	115	76	61
% a/	16	14	9	7
IV CTZ	333	282	206	135
% a/	20	16	11	7
SVN	699	634	537	441
% a/	17	14	12	9

a/ % of units in area.

Radios -- PF platoons are authorized two radios each. With one radio, PF can maintain radio contact with higher headquarters (usually district) to get artillery support, reinforcement and resupply. With two radios,

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PF platoons can communicate with their outposts, get timely information about enemy activities, and pass on fire support requests from their night patrols. If three radios are not available, one of the two radios can maintain contact with higher headquarters by switching from the platoon operations frequency to the higher headquarters frequency according to a prearranged time schedule.

The majority of PF platoons do not have enough radios to allow them to operate effectively and get support when they need it. All platoons reportedly conduct patrols, but 59% of them had only one radio or none at all. This shortage meant they had to conduct night operations with no communication between patrols and their base, and could not talk to their outposts or find out when outposts needed timely fire support.

Although there has been some improvement in the proportion of total units with adequate radios since June (36 to 39%), this is a real problem area. There is a very uneven distribution among the CTZ. III CTZ had the highest percentage of units sufficiently supplied (528 or 62%) and IV CTZ was next (45%). I CTZ, however, had only 17% of its units sufficiently supplied and II CTZ only 24%. The distribution has changed little since June.

TABLE 19

PF RADIO EQUIPMENT

Units w/adequate radios ^{c/}	1968 Jun	b/	
		3 Qtr	4 Qtr
I CTZ	70	107	131
% a/	10	15	17
II CTZ	299	277	284
% a/	27	24	24
III CTZ	480	488	528
% a/	60	59	62
IV CTZ	741	811	865
% a/	42	44	45
SVN	1590	1683	1808
% a/	36	37	39

a/ % of total units in area.

b/ Monthly average.

c/ 2 or more operational.

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Resupply. The advisor evaluation of resupply was discontinued in May, but for the months we have ratings (January through May) the trend was down for units reporting dependable resupply. February was a particularly bad month, probably due to the disruptions caused by the Tet offensive. In May, 62% of all PF units had slow or undependable resupply ratings. The units with good ratings fell from 38% to 35% between January and May. The supply system's continued inability to liquidate the ammunition shortage or rapidly improve and maintain the number of operational radios indicates that resupply has probably not improved nearly enough yet.

Comparison

RF did slightly better than PF in gaining items critical for mission performance. RF had 67% of its authorized individual automatic weapons and PF had 64% at the end of the year. About 93% of RF units had adequate munitions versus 91% of the PF. RF stood better in firepower ratings at the end of the year with 68% rated equivalent or superior to the VC while 60% of the PF units were rated high in firepower. RF and PF gained about the same in the proportion of units with good ratings. The largest equipment discrepancy was in the percentage of units with adequate radios. RF had about 65% of their units with sufficient radios but PF had only 39%. Despite the fact that PF are much worse off than the RF when they do not have adequate radio equipment, the RF gained faster in the proportion of units adequately equipped with radios (52-65% between June and December, versus a PF gain of 36-39% in the same period). The uneven distribution of radios among the CTZ continued throughout the period. The slight improvement in the distribution of critical items such as munitions and radios indicates that resupply continues to be a problem.

TRAINING

In-place training is a prerequisite for PF and RF to learn how to use the new weapons being distributed to them. We estimate that 20-40 hours are required to develop individual proficiency with a new automatic weapon for a soldier already trained with a semi-automatic or similar weapon. The current goal of MACV, judging from the rating categories indicates that 4 to 6 hours of training a week is acceptable for a unit. At this rate it would take 4-10 weeks for a unit to become proficient with their new weapons. MACV's Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs) provide much of this training, but little data on their goals or methods is available.

REGIONAL FORCES. The number of RF units getting 4 or more hours per week of in-place training increased 47% in the last half of 1968. Still, only 55% of the units were getting this much training by the end of the year (31% received six or more hours a week). The increase was unevenly distributed among the CTZ; IV CTZ gained the most, while UI CTZ actually declined.

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TABLE 20

RF IN-PLACE TRAINING

<u>Units w/4 or more hrs training per week</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>b/</u> <u>3 qtr</u>	<u>b/</u> <u>4 qtr</u>
I CTZ	55	77	81
% a/	38	51	56
II CTZ	130	123	126
% a/	47	44	43
III CTZ	118	121	153
% a/	48	48	56
IV CTZ	104	197	238
% a/	28	51	61
SVN	407	518	598
% a/	40	48	55

a/ % of units in the area.

b/ Monthly average.

The 47% increase in the number of units getting four or more hours per week training produced a 35% increase in units with good or excellent weapons proficiency. Advisors rated about 52% of the units good or excellent in the fourth quarter, up from 43% in the second. The remainder of the units were rated satisfactory, marginal or completely inadequate. The increase in training apparently helped boost weapon proficiency ratings in IV CTZ from 35% of all units in the second quarter to 50% in the fourth. However, III CTZ which gained in training, actually showed a decrease in the percentage of total units with good weapons proficiency ratings. Conversely, II CTZ, with a poor training record, had an increase in the percentage of total units with good weapons proficiency ratings (42% to 54%).

TABLE 21

RF WEAPONS PROFICIENCY
(Monthly Average)

<u>Units w/ good or excellent ratings</u>	<u>1 Qtr</u>	<u>2 Qtr</u>	<u>3 Qtr</u>	<u>4 Qtr</u>
I CTZ	65	60	70	82
% a/	52	43	47	54
II CTZ	108	113	153	157
% a/	44	42	54	54
III CTZ	123	132	126	140
% a/	55	55	50	52
IV CTZ	126	122	161	197
% a/	40	35	42	50
SVN	422	427	518	578
% a/	47	43	48	52

a/ % of units in area.

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POPULAR FORCES. PF units receiving 4 or more hours of training a week doubled in the last half of 1968 and the number of units receiving six or more hours weekly tripled. Still, only 41% of the units were receiving 4 hours or more of training at the end of 1968; 22% received 6 hours or more. I CTZ rated highest with 52% of its units receiving 4 or more hours weekly training (and 32% with 6 or more hours). III CTZ rated lowest with only 34% of its units with 4 or more hours a week. All CTZ, however, showed significant improvement since June; IV CTZ more than tripled its units with 4 hours or more per week.

TABLE 22

<u>Units w/4 or more hours training per week</u>	<u>PF IN-PLACE TRAINING</u>		
	<u>Jun</u>	<u>3 Qtr b/</u>	<u>4 Qtr b/</u>
I CTZ	199	296	388
% a/	28	40	52
II CTZ	336	379	407
% a/	30	33	35
III CTZ	206	203	286
% a/	26	25	34
IV CTZ	249	650	847
% a/	14	35	43
SVN	990	1528	1928
% a/	23	34	41

a/ % of units in area.

b/ Monthly average.

The 95% improvement in units training 4 or more hours per week produced only 20% more units rated good or excellent in weapons proficiency between June and the fourth quarter. At the end of 1968, 38% of all units received such ratings. All CTZ except III CTZ improved between second and fourth quarters with I CTZ ranking highest with 42% in the good and above category; weapons proficiency in III CTZ declined.

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TABLE 23
PF WEAPONS PROFICIENCY
(Monthly Average)

<u>Units w/good or excellent rating</u>	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr
I CTZ	283	268	268	317
% a/	43	37	37	42
II CTZ	349	397	480	439
% a/	33	35	42	37
III CTZ	279	336	306	318
% a/	37	42	37	37
IV CTZ	437	477	535	693
% a/	26	28	29	36
SVN	1348	1478	1589	1767
% a/	32	34	35	38

a/ % of units in area.

Comparison. Despite the greater increase in units having four or more hours of training a week for PF, RF continue to have a higher percentage of units receiving this amount of training each week (55% versus 41%). However, PF units are smaller than RF units (platoons rather than companies) and there are about four times as many PF platoons as RF companies so that MATS teams have a tougher and longer job to train the greater number of PF units which are more scattered than RF and often are in insecure areas. RF also rates higher in the percent of units rated good or excellent in weapons proficiency. About 52% of the RF units received these ratings in the fourth quarter versus 38% of the PF units.

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ANNEX 2

RF/PF IMPROVEMENT: COMBAT PERFORMANCE

This section attempts to assess the trends in Regional Force and Popular Force combat performance during 1968. We looked at combat results and advisors' evaluations of mission performance to determine RF/PF progress or regression. To structure our findings, we used measures of effort, effectiveness and efficiency to establish trends and compare performance in the various CTZ. ^{1/}

REGIONAL FORCES

Effort. Advisor ratings in the last half of 1968 indicate that the Regional Forces increased their operational effort. Table 24 shows the percentage of units in the top two ratings increased for every indicator. Table 25 supports the advisors' subjective ratings, because it shows that RF small unit operations increased 61% during the same time period.

TABLE 24

INDICATORS OF RF EFFORT
(% of Rifle Cos. in Top Two Rating Categories)
(Monthly Average)

	1968				
	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	Change
Responsiveness to Orders	67	65	70	71	4
Aggressiveness	57	53	60	65	8
Coordination of Local Defense			63	68	5
Plan Use of Supporting Fires	52	50	54	59	7
Artillery Support	77	77 ^{a/}			0

^{a/} April and May only; discontinued indicator.

Effectiveness. With the increase in the number of operations the number of contacts rose by 80% since the 2nd quarter. However, the contact rate per operation decreased for all CTZ in the third quarter. In the 4th quarter, on the other hand, contacts per operation rose in I and IV CTZ. The 4th quarter increase in contacts per operation does not seem to correlate with the enemy activity rate which dropped in I CTZ and increased in IV CTZ (3346 vs. 2837 incidents in I CTZ and 1529 vs. 1776 in IV CTZ).

^{1/} TFES data on RF/PF KIA during 1968 differs from final verified numbers (see article on RVNAF casualties elsewhere in this report). The trends are the same, however.

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TABLE 25
RF SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS

	1968 Year	1Qtr		2Qtr		3Qtr		4Qtr	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<u>I CTZ</u>									
Total	73428			10064		12532		21575	
Total w/Con	5688	8		806	8	833	7	1502	7
Night	49082	67		4184	42	9048	72	15157	70
Night w/Con	3063	6		271	6	512	6	796	5
<u>II CTZ</u>									
Total	143215			24224		29354		41198	
Total w/Con	2426	2		637	3	547	2	641	2
Night	101821	71		16291	67	20763	71	30328	74
Night w/Con	1249	1		331	2	227	1	361	1
<u>III CTZ</u>									
Total	174470			29381		37601		48148	
Total w/Con	3400	2		747	3	791	2	867	2
Night	130832	75		22212	76	27474	73	36877	77
Night w/Con	1737	1		387	2	367	1	434	1
<u>IV CTZ</u>									
Total	200315			29618		46519		58373	
Total w/Con	8299	4		1482	5	1778	4	2063	4
Night	151002	75		22346	75	36617	79	44455	76
Night w/Con	2437	2		530	2	414	1	674	2
<u>ALL SVN</u>									
Total	591428			93287		126006		169294	
Total w/Con	19813	3		3672	4	3949	3	5073	3
Night	432737	73		65033	70	93902	75	126817	75
Night w/Con	8486	2		1519	2	1520	2	2265	2

The percent of night operations ranged from 70-75%, but the percent of contacts at night of total contacts was only 45% in the last half of the year. I CTZ had the greatest increases in operations and contacts (133% and 206%) and maintained the highest ratio of contacts to operations (9% versus 1-2% in II and III CTZ and 5% in IV CTZ) in the 4th quarter.

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IV CTZ has consistently had the most contacts (41-45%) and I CTZ next (21-36%). This may be a partial reflection of enemy incident activity because IV CTZ and I CTZ had the highest number of enemy incidents throughout the year.

The average number of contacts per company increased in the last half of 1968 in I and IV CTZ, but II and III CTZ did not change (Table 26). I CTZ had the highest monthly rate with 5.6 contacts per company and II CTZ the lowest with .7 contacts per company.

TABLE 26

CONTACTS PER RF RIFLE COMPANY
(Monthly Average)

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
I	3.3	2.2	2.0	3.3	5.6
II	0.7	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.7
III	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2
IV	1.9	1.6	1.4	1.8	2.5
SVN	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.6	2.1

Table 27 indicates that enemy KIA per contact declined in every CTZ during 1968. Enemy KIA by RF is probably more a function of enemy initiative than of RF operations because enemy activity was down in the second half of the year. Most enemy KIA per RF company came during the first quarter when enemy activity was high (the Tet offensive). Weapons captured per contact also declined except for IV CTZ in the 4th quarter.

The number of enemy killed per 1000 RF (Table 28) indicates poor III CTZ performance even in the first quarter when enemy activity was high. Except for I CTZ, all CTZ were low in the second half of the year. Again, this probably reflects the low enemy activity rate.

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CONFIDENTIALTABLE 27AVERAGE RESULTS PER RF CONTACT

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
<u>Enemy KIA</u>					
I CTZ	.9	2.2	.9	.9	.5
II CTZ	2.7	7.1	1.7	.9	.9
III CTZ	1.1	1.3	1.4	1.1	.7
IV CTZ	1.1	1.8	1.3	1.0	.7
SVN	1.2	2.7	1.3	1.0	.6
<u>Enemy Weapons Captured</u>					
I CTZ	.4	.9	.5	.3	.1
II CTZ	.6	.9	.6	.4	.4
III CTZ	.7	.6	.9	.7	.6
IV CTZ	.5	.5	.5	.5	.7
SVN	.5	.7	.6	.5	.4

TABLE 28ENEMY KIA PER 1000 RF TROOPS
(Monthly Average)

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
<u>CTZ</u>					
I	28.5	52.0	18.0	28.1	23.5
II	19.3	66.4	11.8	6.3	5.8
III	12.1	16.3	15.8	12.2	7.9
IV	19.8	31.1	38.8	15.8	16.9
SVN	19.0	40.3	17.3	14.2	12.7

Efficiency. Total enemy KIA and total RF KIA declined each quarter. IV CTZ was the only area to increase enemy KIA in the 4th quarter and III CTZ was the only CTZ to have an increase in RF KIA in the 4th quarter. Although RF had a better KIA ratio (5.4) in the 4th quarter, this was due more to fewer RF KIA than an increase in enemy KIA.

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TABLE 29
ENEMY/RF KIA

	1968	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr
<u>I CTZ</u>					
Enemy KIA	5065	1795	736	1356	1178
RF KIA	866	237	180	303	146
Ratio	5.8	7.6	4.1	4.5	8.1
<u>II CTZ</u>					
Enemy KIA	6588	4545	930	563	550
RF KIA	1337	509	426	238	164
Ratio	4.9	8.9	2.2	2.4	3.4
<u>III CTZ</u>					
Enemy KIA	3731	944	1107	990	690
RF KIA	1136	384	367	186	199
Ratio	3.3	2.5	3.0	5.3	3.5
<u>IV CTZ</u>					
Enemy KIA	9140	2726	2270	1987	2157
RF KIA	2020	724	462	438	396
Ratio	4.5	3.8	4.9	4.5	5.4
<u>ALL SVN</u>					
Enemy KIA	24524	10010	5043	4896	4575
RF KIA	5359	1854	1435	1165	905
Ratio	4.6	5.4	3.5	4.2	5.1

POPULAR FORCES

Effort. Advisor evaluations of PF units for responsiveness to orders, aggressiveness, coordination of local defenses and artillery support all showed slight improvement in the percentage of units in the top two rating categories (Table 30). Table 31 shows that the total number of PF small units actions increased 73% since the 2nd quarter.

TABLE 30
INDICATORS OF PF EFFORT
(% of Platoons in Top Two Rating Categories)
(Monthly Average)

	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	Change
Responsiveness to Orders	62	64	65	65	3
Aggressiveness	44	45	46	48	4
Coordination of Local Defense			60	62	2
Plan Use of Supporting Fires	43	42	39	43	0
Artillery Support	75	77 ^{a/}			2

a/ April and May only;

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 TABLE 31
 PF SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS

	Year	1Qtr		2Qtr		3Qtr		4Qtr	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
I CTZ									
Total	173933	17796		44573		49446		62118	
Total w/Con	8580	5		1345	8	1749	4	3556	6
Night	121189	70		11674	66	33438	75	41174	66
Night w/Con	5213	4		702	6	1186	4	2190	5
II CTZ									
Total	247500	42171		49035		65897		90397	
Total w/Con	2889	1		746	2	652	1	787	1
Night	189115	76		31910	76	38692	79	65554	73
Night w/Con	2040	1		466	1	424	1	605	1
III CTZ									
Total	157586	23149		31479		46297		56661	
Total w/Con	2590	2		719	3	553	2	670	1
Night	119677	76		18833	81	24415	78	41131	73
Night w/Con	1540	1		360	2	340	1	447	1
IV CTZ									
Total	409023	61224		82570		114636		150593	
Total w/Con	9775	2		1925	3	1648	2	3753	2
Night	307707	75		41815	68	67976	82	106464	71
Night w/Con	4934	2		930	2	762	1	1971	2
ALL SVN									
Total	988042	144340		207657		276276		359769	
Total w/Con	23834	2		4735	3	4602	2	8766	2
Night	737688	75		104232	72	164521	79	254323	71
Night w/Con	13727	2		2458	2	2712	2	5213	2

Effectiveness. The 73% increase in PF small unit operations generated 90% more contacts in the 4th quarter. However, the number of contacts per operation declined in the third quarter for all areas and rose significantly in the fourth quarter for I CTZ only. The proportion of contacts at night declined in the fourth quarter (78 to 71%). Although about three-fourths of the operations occur at night, only 58-59% of the contacts are night contacts. I and IV CTZ have 83% of all contacts in South Vietnam, up from 74% in the second quarter. Although 18% of total Popular Forces are assigned to III CTZ, and about 20-23% of enemy incidents occur there, only 8% of all PF contacts were in III CTZ.

Contacts per PF platoon increased in the second half of the year, particularly in I and IV CTZ. I CTZ consistently had the highest rate, peaking at 1.6 in the fourth quarter versus a countrywide average of .6 (Table 32).

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CONFIDENTIALTABLE 32CONTACTS PER PF PLATOON
(Monthly Average)

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
<u>CTZ</u>					
I	.1.0	.6	.8	.9	1.6
II	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2
III	.3	.3	.2	.3	.3
IV	.5	.4	.3	.4	.6
SVN	.4	.4	.3	.4	.6

Enemy KIA per contact fell off during the year (particularly in III and IV CTZ). All areas were low in the fourth quarter. This may be due in part to the decline in enemy activity in the second half of the year. Weapons captured per contact were also down in the fourth quarter for all areas.

TABLE 33AVERAGE RESULTS PER PF CONTACT

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
<u>Enemy KIA</u>					
I CTZ	.7	1.1	.7	.9	.5
II CTZ	.6	1.2	.4	.5	.2
III CTZ	.6	.8	.7	.5	.3
IV CTZ	.7	1.3	1.1	.6	.3
SVN	.7	1.1	.8	.7	.4

Enemy Weapons Captured

I CTZ	.3	.5	.4	.5	.2
II CTZ	.2	.4	.1	.2	.1
III CTZ	.5	.5	.6	.5	.3
IV CTZ	.2	.5	.3	.2	.1
SVN	.3	.5	.4	.3	.1

In comparing results (enemy KIA) to PF strength in an area, we found that PF in I CTZ in the fourth quarter killed three times more enemy per 1000 PF than next highest IV CTZ. I CTZ did better in the second half of the year while all other CTZ were down.

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CONFIDENTIAL**TABLE 34****ENEMY KIA PER 1000 PF**
(Monthly Average)

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
I	23.9	23.3	20.2	26.5	25.5
II	4.1	9.1	2.6	3.5	1.8
III	5.4	9.2	5.6	4.5	3.0
IV	10.1	15.7	10.8	7.7	7.0
SVN	10.0	14.2	9.3	9.0	8.0

Efficiency. Total enemy KIA was down every quarter for all but I CTZ, which showed an increase in the second half of 1968. PF KIA declined each quarter for all areas. I CTZ consistently had the highest KIA ratio, peaking in the fourth quarter at 8.5. All CTZ except II CTZ increased their enemy/PF KIA ratio in the fourth quarter.

TABLE 35**ENEMY/PF KIA**

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
<u>I CTZ</u>					
Enemy KIA	6281	1487	1298	1746	1750
PF KIA	1176	411	284	275	206
Ratio	5.3	3.6	4.6	6.3	8.5
<u>II CTZ</u>					
Enemy KIA	1662	860	255	356	191
PF KIA	1011	407	227	220	157
Ratio	11.6	2.1	1.1	1.6	1.2
<u>III CTZ</u>					
Enemy KIA	1573	607	399	338	229
PF KIA	1022	467	275	177	103
Ratio	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.9	2.2
<u>IV CTZ</u>					
Enemy CTZ	6978	2466	1806	1393	1313
PF KIA	2953	1392	583	547	431
Ratio	2.4	1.8	3.1	2.5	3.0
<u>SVN</u>					
Enemy KIA	16494	5420	3758	3833	3483
PF KIA	6162	2677	1369	1219	897
Ratio	2.7	2.0	2.7	3.1	3.9

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COMPARISON

Effort. Advisor ratings suggest that both RF and PF increased their effort during 1968. RF, however, maintains a higher level of units with good ratings, particularly in aggressiveness. This may be due to differing roles and missions of the two forces, with PF having the more static defensive role. Both forces substantially increased their level of operations during the year with PF increasing the number of small unit operations by 73% and RF by 61% between 2nd and 4th quarters. These increases may be inflated because total RF/FF small unit operations exceed those reported elsewhere for all RVNAF in two of the months. Also, RF and PF may have been holed up and not conducting or reporting operations during the VC offensive in the second quarter. All the same, RF and PF operations seem to have increased significantly.

Effectiveness. The increased number of operations brought increases in contacts with the enemy as well. RF and PF had about 70-79% of their total contacts at night, both declining in the fourth quarter. PF had a higher proportion of night contacts than RF (50-59% versus 38-45%) but RF had a higher overall contact rate per operation (percent of operations with contact) ranging 3-4% of total operations versus 2-3% for PF.

In comparing the number of contacts per unit we took into account the difference in the size of RF units (123 men) and PF units (35 men). On the adjusted basis, RF and PF had about the same ratio of contacts per unit during the year. This ratio increased between 2nd and 4th quarters and, for both forces, I CTZ had the highest contact rate.

The number of enemy killed per contact and the weapons captured per contact declined throughout the year for both forces. This may be the result of declining enemy activity during the year. The number of enemy KIA per 1000 RF and PF also declined during the year, but RF had a higher ratio of enemy KIA per contact than PF. This may be partially due to the more aggressive role of the RF versus a static PF role.

Efficiency. RF killed more enemy than PF in 1968 (24,524 versus 16,494) and more PF were killed than RF (6,162 versus 5,359). The result was a higher enemy/friendly KIA ratio for RF (4.6 versus 2.7). During the year the total number of enemy killed and friendly killed for both forces declined each quarter (except for enemy killed by PF in the third quarter). The improvement in the KIA ratio for both forces during 1968 was a result of decreasing friendly KIA rather than increasing enemy KIA.

The relationship of strength, leadership density and equipment to combat performance does not appear to be as significant as might be supposed. For example, despite the fact that I CTZ was lowest among the corps in RF and PF strength and leadership (particularly officers and NCO's per unit), received no M16 weapons, had the lowest number of weapons per unit and ranked low in the percent of units with adequate radios, it had the best results in terms of the enemy/friendly KIA ratio and enemy KIA per 1000 troops (Table 1 in summary).

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I CTZ also ranked highest in night operations, contacts per operation and contacts per company, but this may be attributable to the high level of enemy activity in the area and the large number of enemy troops there, particularly main force and NVA troops. The key to RF/PF success in I CTZ may be training (ranking first for PF and second for RF) weapons proficiency and leadership and esprit (I CTZ had the highest percentage of RF/PF units with good or excellent ratings in leadership and esprit.)

The IV CTZ pattern strengthens the hypothesis that quantity of strength and leadership and weapons and radios are not so much a factor in performance as are training and quality of leadership and esprit. PF leadership numbers (officer and NCO's per unit in particular) were almost as bad as I CTZ and RF leadership numbers while not as bad I CTZ were second to III CTZ (discussed below). In the results categories reflecting performance (KIA ratios and enemy KIA per 1000 men), and activity categories (night contacts, percent contacts of total operations and contacts per company) IV CTZ was second only to I CTZ. IV CTZ success may be attributable to the high percentage of units in the area with good training and high quality leadership and esprit.

To take a reverse example, III CTZ was first or second for both forces in leadership density per unit, received half of the distributed M16's, ranked high in weapons per unit and was first in the proportion of its units with adequate radios. Yet, III CTZ was third in KIA ratio and enemy KIA per 1000 troops. It also had the lowest number of contacts despite an enemy activity rate almost equal to IV CTZ, which had the highest number of contacts for both RF and PF. III CTZ ranked last in the percentage of units with good leadership and esprit and last in training for PF.

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RF/PF EFFECTIVENESS

In an earlier study^{1/} we found that despite improvements in weapons and equipment, the Regional and Popular Forces still had significant problems in leadership and training which adversely affected combat performance. This analysis examines progress of the RF/PF in 1969 through June.

Our findings show that the infusion of new weapons continues to be associated with increased firepower ratings and slight combat performance improvements. More than 50% of RF/PF personnel are equipped with the M-16, and firepower equivalency ratings have increased from less than 50% rated equivalent or better than VC in June 1968 to current ratings in excess of 75%. On the other hand, modest improvements in leadership and training have been submerged by the recent increases in strength and number of units. Indicators based on percentage of total strength or number of units have shown marked declines in 1969, particularly in the 2nd quarter. Fewer than 25 percent of RF/PF units receive the desired minimum of 6 hours in-place training per week. The number of RF units rated good or outstanding in leadership and esprit have increased steadily but the percentage of units with this rating has decreased 3-4% during 1969; PF unit ratings have shown slight increases in both numbers and percentage.

Strength

Current strength goals for the Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) will bring these forces to over a half million by mid-1971. By mid-1969 the RF had 91% of its goal assigned (or 249.6 of 275.6 thousand) and the PF had 73% assigned (175.1 of 239.4 thousand).

Table 1 shows that more than one-third of the total Regional Forces personnel are assigned to non-combat jobs. Even those who are assigned to the field and reported in the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) are not all combat units; field overhead and support units add another 3% to the overhead. Finally, another 10% of those assigned to the field are not actually present for duty but are in training, TDY, deserters, etc. Thus about 45-50% of assigned RF over the period between March 1968 and June 1969 were not actually present in combat jobs in the field. This contrasts with 30% overhead for ARVN and 8-10% overhead for PF (the RF provides some logistic and other support for PF).

^{1/} "RF/PF Modernization Versus Combat Performance," SEA Analysis Report, March 1969, pp. 21-54.

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TABLE 1

RF AND PF ASSIGNED STRENGTH
(000 - end of qtr)

	1968			1969		
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>
RF						
Total Strength a/	157.6	197.6	216.6	219.8	237.8	249.6
Combat Strength b/	102.5	121.5	142.0	143.3	148.7	161.9
Overhead c/	55.1	76.1	74.6	76.5	89.1	87.7
% Overhead	35	39	34	35	37	35
PF						
Total Strength a/	153.1	164.3	171.8	174.0	174.4	175.1
Combat Strength b/	139.7	147.2	154.4	160.2	160.8	160.4
Overhead c/	13.4	17.1	17.4	13.8	13.6	14.7
% Overhead	9	10	10	8	8	8

a/ Source: OSD(C) Statistical Summary, Table 2.

b/ Source: Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES).

c/ Derived by subtracting combat strength from total strength.

New RF units were formed faster than total strength increased during the first six months of 1969 (23% versus 12%), resulting in a decline of the average strength per unit, from 90 in 3rd quarter 1968 to 80 in 2nd quarter 1969. Table 2 shows this declining trend. Authorized strength for an RF rifle company is 123 men, but by April these units averaged only 98 (80%) men per unit, down from a peak of 109 (89%) in 3rd quarter 1968.

PF platoons, on the other hand, have maintained a steady average strength of 31 men present for duty per platoon since mid-1968. The authorized strength is 35. However, 31 men per platoon is the average and some units have been chronically below strength. Nonetheless, the GVN is urging an expansion of PF units beyond the present goal of 6531 platoons in 1970.

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TABLE 2

RF/PP PRESENT FOR DUTY STRENGTH PER UNIT
(End of Qtr)

	<u>1968</u>		<u>1969</u>	
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
<u>RF</u>				
Total Units	1136	1334	1403	1445
PPD Strength (000)	90.7	109.2	126.4	127.4
PPD/Unit	80	82	90	88
Rifle Co's.	924	1037	1092	1119
Combat PPD Strength (000)	86.2	102.8	119.3	119.9
PPD/Rifle Co.	93	99	109	107
<u>PP</u>				
Platoons	4248	4425	4615	4731
PPD Strength (000)	128.2	136.5	142.8	148.5
PPD/Platoon	30	31	31	31

a/ April data. March, May and June data on RF rifle company strength are not yet available.

Leadership

Rifle companies appear to be getting the bulk of new RF officers, averaging 4.2 officers per company in April (up from 4.0 in 4th quarter 1968) versus an authorized 6 per company. Rifle companies are still seriously short of non-commissioned officers (NCO's) and the problem worsened in 1969, going from 13 per company in December to 12 in April against an authorization of 18 NCO's per rifle company.

TABLE 3

RF OFFICER AND NCO STRENGTH
(End of Qtr)

	<u>1968</u>		<u>1969</u>	
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
PPD Officers	3244	3354	4003	4725
Off/Unit	2.9	2.5	2.9	3.3
Off/Rifle Co.	3.4	3.1	3.5	4.0
PPD NCO's	12287	13248	14791	16284
NCO's/Unit	10.8	9.9	10.5	11.3
NCO's/Rifle Co.	12.3	11.4	12.1	13.0

a/ April data.

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The PF now have their authorized platoon leaders present for duty (one per platoon), and they increased the average number of squad leaders per platoon (4 are authorized) to 3.3, up from 2.9 in the 4th quarter 1968.

TABLE 4

PF PLATOON AND SQUAD LEADER STRENGTH
(End of Qtr)

	<u>1968</u>				<u>1969</u>	
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>
PFD Pltn Leaders	3477	3404	4381	4803	5070	5071
Pltn Leaders/Unit	.8	.8	.9	1.0	1.1	1.0
PFD Squad Leaders	9531	9994	12357	13934	15788	16148
Squad Leaders/Unit	2.2	2.3	2.7	2.9	3.3	3.3

The number of RF units with good quality leadership and esprit ratings continued to increase in 1969, as shown by Table 5. The increase in the number of RF units during the second quarter, however, lowered the percentage of all RF receiving such ratings. The proportion of rifle companies with a good rating has been consistently lower than the proportion for all RF units, peaking at 61% with good or better ratings in December 1968 and then declining to 57% in April 1969, as the number of companies increased. The proportion of PF with good or outstanding leadership and esprit ratings has improved slowly but steadily since early 1968, rising from 38% to 49%.

TABLE 5

RF/PF LEADERSHIP AND ESPRIT
(End of Qtr)

	<u>1968</u>				<u>1969</u>	
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>
<u>RF</u>						
Units with good or outstanding ratings						
% of Total Units	598	662	836	912	1010	1077
53	50	60	63	64	61	
Rifle Cos. with good or outstanding ratings						
% of Total Rifle Cos.	473	488	628	685	760a/	NA
51	47	57	61	57a/	NA	
<u>PF</u>						
Pltns with good or outstanding ratings						
% of Total Pltns	161	1741	2019	2170	2323	2377
38	40	44	46	48	49	

a/ April data.

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Equipment

The MACV program to improve RF/PF equipment concentrates primarily on weapons, particularly M-16 rifles. This infusion of more and better arms plus adequate training should improve significantly the relative friendly-to-enemy firepower. RF/PF units in the field received a total of 145,757 M-16s between June 1968 and April 1969. Thus, approximately 56% of RF combat troops and 52% of PF were equipped with M-16s in April 1968. All CTZ had received substantial amounts of M-16s by April although II CTZ had the least with only 35% of RF and 27% of PF so equipped.

Table 6 shows that both RF and PF firepower ratings have steadily improved since distribution of M-16s began in mid-1968. By June 1969, 84% of total RF units and 77% of PF units were rated equivalent to or better than the VC in firepower.

TABLE 6

RF/PF FIREPOWER
PERCENT OF UNITS RATED EQUIVALENT OR BETTER THAN VC
(End of Qtr)

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>			
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>
RF Rifle Cos.	63	48	59	71	76a/
Total RF Units	62	48	59	71	80
PF Platoons	46	43	53	63	72
					77

a/ April data.

Steady improvement in the supply of munitions to RF and PF units had decreased units with inadequate munitions to 5% of the total.

One-third of RF rifle companies and nearly one-half of PF platoons are short radios. This situation is far more serious for the PF since each platoon is authorized only two radios. If a unit has fewer than two radios, internal communication among platoon members is impossible. Moreover, if the only radio is inoperative during an operation or an attack, the unit would be unable to call for aid when needed. Nevertheless, the number of PF units with adequate radios has increased by 767 since the end of 1968, raising the percentage of units with two or more from 40% to 55%. The RF showed an improvement but with fewer than the authorized six radios per company, a unit can still perform its job.

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TABLE 7

RF/PF RADIO EQUIPMENT
PERCENT OF UNITS WITH ADEQUATE RADIOS a/
(End of Qtr)

	1968				1969	
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>
<u>RF</u>						
Total Units	NA	45	54	56	57	58
Rifle Cos.	NA	51	62	65	62b/	NA
<u>PF</u>	36	36	37	40	51	55

a/ RF: 6 radios per company; PF: 2 radios per platoon.

b/ April data.

Training

The lack of sufficient in-place training for RF/PF units remains a serious problem. Progress has been hampered by a shortage of training teams (MATS), the increasing number of new units and the distribution of M-16 rifles which the RF/PF must be trained to use.

The goal is to provide six hours of in-place training a week to each unit. However, less than one-fourth of RF and PF units receive this much, as shown by Table 8. In addition, the absolute number of PF units receiving adequate training declined between December and June (1060 to 970) and only six more RF units moved into this category. This, plus the increase in the number of units in the first half of 1969, caused a decline in the proportion of units receiving adequate training. Also, the proportion of units receiving almost no training each week (less than two hours) showed little improvement, ranging from 17 to 19% of the total for RF and from 26 to 28% for PF.

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TABLE 8

RF/PP IN-PLACE TRAINING
PERCENT OF UNITS RECEIVING SIX OR MORE
HOURS OF TRAINING PER WEEK
(End of Qtr)

	<u>1968</u>		<u>1969</u>	
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
<u>RF</u>				
Total Units	NA	13	25	27
Rifle Cos.	NA	15	27	30
<u>PP</u>	NA	8	21	22
	<u>21</u>			

a/ April data.

The lack of adequate training is reflected in the low ratings given to units in weapon proficiency; only 56% of RF units and 45% of PP units were rated good or excellent in June 1969, as shown in Table 9.

TABLE 9

RF/PP WEAPONS PROFICIENCY
(End of Qtr)

	<u>1968</u>		<u>1969</u>	
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>
<u>Units with Good or Excellent</u>				
<u>Ratings</u>				
RF total units	47	43	53	55
RF rifle cos.	46	42	50	52
PP	33	34	36	38
	<u>43</u>			

a/ April data.

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Combat Performance

In terms of responsiveness to orders and aggressiveness, RF have made steady progress this year. RF units in the two top ratings in responsiveness increased from 1097 to 1326 (+21%) in 1969. RF units with good aggressiveness ratings increased from 972 to 1147 (+18%). By the end of June 1969, 74% of the RF had good responsiveness ratings and 64% had good aggressiveness ratings.

PF showed less progress than the RF in responsiveness to orders and aggressiveness, making good progress in 1st quarter 1969 and then losing some ground by the end of June. PF units with good responsiveness ratings rose from 3090 to 3347 in 1st quarter, and then declined slightly to 3325 by the end of June, for an 8% total gain in 1969. The same pattern occurred for aggressiveness ratings: a rise from 2296 to 2457 units in 1st quarter, with a subsequent drop to 2374 units, for a total 1969 gain of only 3%. At the end of June, 69% of all PF units were rated as responsive to orders, but only 49% had good aggressiveness ratings.

TABLE 10

INDICATORS OF RF/PF EFFORT						
	(Units in top two rating categories)					
	(End of Qtr)					
	1968				1969	
	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr
<u>RF</u>						
Responsiveness to Orders	782	890	1029	1097	1209	1326
% of total units	68	67	73	76	76	74
Aggressiveness	658	708	884	972	1059	1147
% of total units	58	53	63	67	66	64
<u>PF</u>						
Responsiveness to Orders	2589	2827	2999	3090	3347	3325
% of total units	61	64	65	66	70	69
Aggressiveness	1824	2012	2181	2296	2457	2374
% of total units	43	45	48	49	51	49

The average number of RF and PF operations increased 67% in 1969, and the number of operations per unit also increased, as shown in Table 11. More important, contacts with the enemy increased at comparable rates.

However, Tables 12 and 13 indicate that the results, in terms of enemy KIA, weapons captured, and kill ratios have not increased as much. If we exclude the 1st quarter 1968 because of the Tet offensive, enemy KIA by RF increased 19% in 1969 and PF performance increased only 6%. The enemy/PF kill ratio increased from 3.2 to 3.4 and the comparable ratio for RF went from 4.1 to 4.4 (Table 12).

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TABLE 11

RF/PF SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS
(Monthly Avg.)

	1968		1969		1968		1969	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
RF								
Total Ops	49286		82459		31096		42002	
Contacts	1651	3.3	2605	3.2	1224	3.9	1316	3.1
Night Ops	36061	73	59199	72	21678	70	31301	75
Nite Contacts	707	2.0	1105	1.9	506	2.3	507	1.6
Ops/Rifle Co.	48		66		34		42	
Contacts/Rifle Co.	1.6		2.1		1.3		1.3	
PF								
Total Ops	82336		150025		48113		69219	
Contacts	1987	2.4	3226	2.2	1579	3.3	1533	2.2
Night Ops	61474	75	105404	70	34744	72	54840	79
Nite Contacts	1143	1.9	1750	1.7	819	2.4	903	1.6
Ops/Pltn	18		32		11		16	
Contacts/Pltn	.4		.7		.4		.3	

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3Q		4Q		1969		2Q	
No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
56431		67614		80472		84446	
1691	3.0	2373	3.5	2781	3.5	2428	2.9
42272	75	48995	72	56877	71	61519	73
755	1.8	1061	2.2	1125	2.0	1083	1.8
53		61		67		64	
1.6		2.1		2.3		1.8	
92092		119923		146326		153721	
10	2.1	2921	2.4	3166	2.2	3288	2.1
7	78	87695	71	103075	70	107732	70
15	1.6	1738	2.0	1796	1.7	1704	1.6
20		26		31		32	
.4		.6		.7		.8	

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TABLE 12

	Qtr	ENEMY/RF/FF KIA								
		Avg	1968	1969	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr
<u>RF</u>										
Enemy KIA		6131	5754		10010	5043	4896	4575	5934	5573
RF KIA		1340	1311		1854	1435	1165	905	1355	1267
Ratio		4.6	4.4		5.4	3.5	4.2	5.1	4.4	4.4
<u>PF</u>										
Enemy KIA		4124	3914		5420	3758	3833	3483	4179	3648
PF KIA		1541	1154		2677	1369	1219	897	1228	1080
Ratio		2.7	3.4		2.0	2.7	3.1	3.9	3.4	3.4

TABLE 13

	AVERAGE RESULTS PER CONTACT								
	1968	1969	1968	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1969	2Qtr
<u>RF</u>									
Enemy KIA	1.2	.8		2.7	1.3	1.0	.6	.8	.8
Friendly KIA	.9	.5		1.5	1.1	.7	.4	.5	.5
Enemy Weapons Captured	.5	.4		.7	.6	.5	.4	.3	.4
<u>PF</u>									
Enemy KIA	.7	.4		1.1	.8	.7	.4	.4	.4
Friendly KIA	.9	.4		1.7	.9	.6	.3	.4	.3
Enemy Weapons Captured	.3	.2		.5	.4	.3	.1	.2	.1

Eliminating first quarter 1968, enemy KIA per 1000 RF combat troops increased from 14.9 in 1968 to 15.7 in 1969, as shown in Table 14. It also shows a decline in enemy KIA per 1000 RF combat troops present for duty in 2nd quarter 1969 for all except III CTZ. (The 2nd quarter decline will probably be greater when May and June combat strength data is available). I CTZ continues to perform best and II CTZ worst.

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TABLE 14

ENEMY KIA PER 1000 RF COMBAT TROOPS PFD
(Monthly Avg)

CTZ	1968		1969		1968		1969	
	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr
I	30.6	28.2	52.0	18.0	28.1	24.2	32.0	24.4
II	22.7	5.7	66.4	11.8	6.3	6.1	6.3	5.1
III	13.1	11.7	16.2	15.8	12.2	8.2	10.1	13.3
IV	21.7	21.0	31.1	22.2	15.8	17.5	22.1	19.8
SVN	21.3	15.7	40.3	17.3	14.2	13.2	16.3	15.0

a/ Based on April strength data.

On the same basis, enemy KIA per 1000 PF remained at 8.8 in 1969, as shown in Table 15. In the 2nd quarter 1969 enemy KIA per 1000 PF present for duty dropped to 8.2. All but III CTZ declined and I CTZ reached its lowest level in six quarters.

TABLE 15

ENEMY KIA PER 1000 PF PFD
(Monthly Average)

CTZ	1968		1969		1968		1969	
	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr
I	23.9	21.1	23.3	20.2	26.5	25.5	24.1	18.2
II	4.1	2.5	9.1	2.6	3.5	1.8	2.5	2.4
III	5.4	4.7	9.2	5.6	4.5	3.0	4.4	5.0
IV	10.1	9.5	15.7	10.8	7.7	7.0	9.7	9.2
SVN	10.0	8.8	14.2	9.3	9.0	8.0	9.3	8.2

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TERRITORIALS AND THE OFFENSIVE

Summary

- The introduction of large scale, main force action into the Vietnam conflict has resulted in a requirement for the RF/PF to support main force units in battle and, in many cases, to engage enemy main force units on their own.

- A countrywide operational summary for the territorials shows that both RF and PF missions have changed since March 1972 from security oriented to offensive operations.

- A review of RF/PF operations during the period April through July reveals that the RF/PF have made a substantial contribution to the total effort by RVNAF. Specifically:

-- Of the more than 29,000 RVNAF KIA during that period, RF/PF suffered 38% of the total (11,208).

-- The RF/PF claimed a total of 23,732 (37%) enemy KIA of the total enemy KIA (63,496).

-- The KIA ratio (enemy to friendly) for RF/PF equates to 2.1 as opposed to 2.2 for Regulars.

OASD/SA/REPRO
December 8, 1972

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TERRITORIALS AND THE OFFENSIVE

General

The enemy offensive, initiated on March 30, marked the beginning of a new phase of the Vietnam conflict - direct main force confrontation. For the first time the enemy massed his formations, attacked in force, and then defended the ground he had won. The offensive was also characterized by two other aspects - a decrease of VC and local guerrilla forces participation in the conflict and increased participation of the GVN territorial forces (RF/PF).

The purpose of this paper is to compare RF/PF participation with that of friendly main force units. The comparison provides insight to the proper mix of regular and territorial units in a post-war environment.

Discussion

The introduction of large scale, main force action into the Vietnam conflict caused RVNAF to resort to new measures. These included:

- Committing the general reserve (airborne and marines) to prolonged combat in MR 1.
- Shifting main force units out of traditional areas of operation to meet tactical emergencies (e.g., moving the 21st ARVN Division from MR 4 to MR 3 to participate in the battle for An Loc).
- Requiring the RF/PF to directly support main force units in battle and, in many cases, to engage enemy main force units on their own.

It is this final point that should theoretically contribute significantly to decisions on the future of the RF/PF. Just how useful are territorials in a main force conflict environment?

Tables 1 and 2 show the breakout of RF companies and PF platoons by MR. In terms of numbers, MR 4 accounts for about 40% of the total number of RF companies in SVN and about 45% of the PF platoons.

There is some variance in the manner in which territorials have been employed. In MR 1, for instance, the RF/PF have essentially been under the control of regular units, whereas in MR 4 they have operated basically as they were intended -- under sector control. It is difficult to state which manner of employment is better. The trend seems to be, however, towards giving greater control over RFs to the Province Chief as evidenced by the ongoing RF Control Headquarters Upgrade Program. Briefly this program is designed to organize territorials into larger, more mobile combat units to counter the conventional ground threat posed by the NVA (a brief description of the program is attached as Enclosure 1).

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TABLE 1

RF COMPANIES a/

2nd Half 1971 Avg	1972						
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul
MR 1	235	235	235	235	237	237	237
MR 2	412	412	409	397	399	298	405
MR 3	413	412	412	411	411	403	415
MR 4	623	615	614	615	615	625	647

a/ Information extracted from the TFES report for July 1972.

TABLE 2

PF PLATOONS a/

2nd Half 1971 Avg	1972						
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul
MR 1	1211	1255	1285	1292	1291	1301	1300
MR 2	1818	1841	1847	1844	1841	1830	1778
MR 3	1243	1290	1352	1369	1384	1400	1352
MR 4	3732	3755	3719	3711	3706	3639	3442
							3337

a/ Information extracted from the TFES report for July 1972.

A countrywide operational summary for the territorials is listed in Tables 3 and 4.^{1/} Taken together these tables show a shift in type RF/PF missions since March 1972 from security oriented to offensive operations. This indicates increased territorial participation against enemy main force units. Points of interest include:

- RF companies devoted to security missions decreased about 10% the first quarter of 1972 from the last half of 1971 (922 vs 1015) and dropped almost 50% in July from first quarter 1972 (472 vs 922).

- Correspondingly, RF companies conducting offensive operations increased 25% first quarter 1972 compared to last half 1971 (420 vs 335) and steadily increased to a total of 497 in July.

- RF operations with contact jumped over 100% from 1st quarter 1972 to April (2033 to 4235) and remained relatively high in May and June before dropping to 2312 in July.

1/ Supplemental Tables 3a-3b and 4a-4b present an operational summary break-out by MR.

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" PF platoons conducting security missions showed a steady decrease from a first quarter 1972 average of 6937 to 6391 in July.

- PF platoons on offensive operations reached a high of 415 in May (a 35% increase over first quarter 1972) falling about 20% to 338 in July.

- PF operations with contact increased sharply (80%) in April over first quarter 1972 (3706 vs 2060), remained fairly steady in May and June, before dropping to 2632 in July.

• TABLE 3

RF OPERATIONAL SUMMARY - SVN a/

<u>Missions</u>	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>1972</u>				
		<u>Jan-Mar Avg</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
Security	1015	922	836	820	833	472
Offensive Ops	335	420	456	477	448	497
Reaction Force	110	146	202	203	206	265
Other	221	185	166	162	177	170
Opsn with Contact	2536	2033	4235	3184	3397	2312
Opsn/unit	119.4	104.4	101.5	92.5	104.7	81.4

a/ Information extracted from the TES report for July 1972.

• TABLE 4

PF OPERATIONAL SUMMARY - SVN a/

<u>Missions</u>	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>1972</u>				
		<u>Jan-Mar Avg</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>
Security	6754	6937	6676	6675	6476	6391
Offensive Ops	193	307	413	415	365	338
Reaction Force	119	155	347	340	338	345
Other	938	739	786	740	692	621
Opsn with Contact	2433	2060	3706	3021	3631	2632
Opsn/Unit	43.6	40.6	37.7	37.7	43.9	36.3

a/ Information extracted from the TES report for July 1972.

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Table 5 provides a countrywide comparison of RF/PF and Regular KIA

- Of the more than 29,000 RVNAF KIA during April through July, RF/PF suffered 38% of the total (11,208).

- The RF/PF claimed a total of 23,732 (37%) enemy KIA of the total enemy KIA (63,496) during the same time frame.

- The KIA ratio (enemy to friendly) for RF/PF equates to 2:1 as opposed to 2.2 for Regulars.

Table 5

RVNAF AND ENEMY KIA - SVN a/
(April through July)

<u>Friendly KIA</u>	<u>Enemy KIA</u>	<u>KIA Ratio (En/Fr)</u>
RF/PF 11208	By RF/PF 23732	RF/PF: 2.1
Regulars 18274	By Regulars 39764	Regulars: 2.2
Total 29482	Total 63496	

a/ Information extracted from OPREP-5, The Measurement of Progress (Apr-Jul) and TFES (Jul).

Table 6 1/ is a breakout by percentage of friendly and enemy KIA in each MR:

- The RF/PF have suffered their lowest percentage of total KIA in MR 1 (18%) and their highest in MR 4 (71%).

- The RF/PF have accounted for a high of 76% of the total enemy KIA in MR 4 and a low of 20% in MR 1.

- In contrast, the RF/PF had a favorable KIA ratio of 4.5 in MR 1 as opposed to 1.2 in MR 4.

The contrast in numbers of enemy KIA (high in MR 4, low in MR 1) and KIA ratio (low in MR 4, high in MR 1) can probably be accounted for by the manner of employment of the RF/PF in these two MRs. In MR 4, the territorials have essentially operated independently of regular units with considerably more personnel involved than in MR 1 which enhances

1/ Supplemental Table 6a provides a detailed breakout, by MR, of enemy and friendly KIA since the start of the offensive.

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Table 4

KIA BY REGULARS
(April-June)

	Friendly KIA (%)		Enemy KIA (%)		KIA Ratio (En/Fr)	
	RF/PT	Regulars	By RF/EP	Ex Regulars	RF/RF	Regular
MR 1.	18	82	20	80	4.5	4.0
MR 2	30	70	38	62	3.1	2.2
MR 3	21	79	39	61	3.0	1.3
MR 4	71	29	76	34	1.2	1.0

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the opportunity to both inflict and take casualties. In MR 1, though, the territorials have not engaged the enemy on their own but rather as directed by the regulars. Quite often this has been accomplished from a position of strength -- for instance, attacks on specific targets with little danger of ambush. This has enabled them to inflict high casualties while suffering relatively few themselves.

Wrap-Up

This data tends to confirm what has been appearing in field reports since the beginning of the offensive -- the RF/PF have, on the whole, given a good account of themselves. As tables 5 and 6 illustrate, the number of enemy KIA (37% of the total) attributable to the territorials is not insignificant. In addition, the countrywide KIA ratio obtained by the RF/PF is virtually the same as that of the regulars.

But what then, as a ceasefire draws near, is to be the fate of the territorials? There seems to be a tendency to want to eliminate them -- particularly the PFs. This is evidenced by the RF Control Headquarters Upgrade Program, previously mentioned, in which spaces for the program are created by eliminating existing PF spaces. In addition, spaces required to implement Project Enhance were primarily obtained at the expense of the PF. There are indications from the field that the GVN is or was thinking of subordinating the PF on the national level to the Ministry of the Interior for administration after the ceasefire. Operationally the PF would be controlled by the police at the village level. Also the GVN would convert the PF to a civilian organization to avoid the image of a military force (Note: While Deputy Ambassador Whitehouse indicated that this idea has been rejected, we have received no official word that a final decision on this has been made).

It seems that while the PFs are losing their place in RVNAF, the RF are gradually approaching the regulars in terms of capabilities (RF Control Headquarters Upgrade Program). This would appear to be desirable assuming that the sector retains control of the RF and therefore does not lose its capability to provide security for the province. Then the Province Chief retains the means to control activity in his province while RVNAF retains a backup to the regulars that has the capability to operate against enemy main force units.

In any event, it is evident that some mix of territorials and regulars must be retained in RVNAF. The ultimate mix will depend on operational considerations, the economic capability of the GVN (and U.S.) to support the military, and any pertinent implications that the ceasefire terms may have. As a final point, careful consideration should be given to any further upgrading of the RF at the expense of the PF. There is not only a possibility of losing the means for maintaining adequate local security, but the expense involved in maintaining the upgraded RF may approach that of the regulars. In this case, the cost benefits for retaining a territorial force that has proven adequate in a main force conflict are lost.

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TABLE 3a

RF MISSIONS - MR 1

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>1972</u>						
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Security	174	170	167	160	133	129	133	84
Offensive								
Opsns	4	8	8	7	12	20	15	79
Reaction								
Force	15	15	17	22	49	46	47	40
Other	43	42	4	47	42	42	34	

TABLE 3b

RF MISSIONS - MR 2

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>1972</u>						
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Security	317	290	283	269	257	255	260	160
Offensive								
Opsns	50	72	71	88	83	78	73	144
Reaction								
Force	14	27	28	28	33	36	35	64
Other	33	23	25	24	24	30	30	37

TABLE 3c

RF MISSIONS - MR 3

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>1972</u>						
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Security	209	175	178	167	153	154	158	96
Offensive								
Opsns	133	171	174	182	195	199	195	246
Reaction								
Force	33	36	35	39	47	45	42	52
Other	38	30	25	24	16	13	13	21

TABLE 3d

RF MISSIONS - MR 4

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>1972</u>						
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Security	325	301	303	292	293	282	287	132
Offensive								
Opsns	142	157	159	162	166	180	165	328
Reaction								
Force	47	64	59	68	73	76	82	109
Other	108	93	87	88	82	77	91	78

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TABLE 3e

PF MISSIONS - MR 1

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Security	1109	1100	1127	1142	989	1019	1036	1035
Offensive								
Ops	15	18	19	23	25	18	13	9
Reaction								
Force	3	2	8	8	167	164	162	164
Other	85	135	131	119	110	100	89	90

TABLE 3f

PF MISSIONS - MR 2

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Security	1588	1671	1675	1641	1523	1530	1458	1449
Offensive								
Ops	37	32	54	88	82	73	107	77
Reaction								
Force	6	7	3	2	8	14	17	17
Other	188	131	115	113	228	213	196	195

TABLE 3g

PF MISSIONS - MR 3

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Security	1028	1066	1076	1105	1112	1126	1128	1114
Offensive								
Ops	59	59	73	87	132	145	129	127
Reaction								
Force	8	17	23	31	39	35	37	34
Other	148	148	180	146	101	94	58	47

TABLE 3h

PF MISSIONS - MR 4

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Security	3029	3055	3094	3058	3052	3000	2854	2793
Offensive								
Ops	83	158	147	162	174	179	117	125
Reaction								
Force	103	118	116	129	133	127	122	120
Other	518	484	362	352	317	339	349	280

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TABLE 4a

RF OPERATIONS - MR 1

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>1972</u>						
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Total Ops	16590	12843	13683	10302	10199	12667	12755	9147
Total Ops with Contact	557	540	358	329	637	607	506	267
<u>Ops w/Contact</u>	<u>1/30</u>	<u>1/24</u>	<u>1/38</u>	<u>1/31</u>	<u>1/16</u>	<u>1/21</u>	<u>1/25</u>	<u>1/34</u>
<u>Total Ops</u>								

TABLE 4b

RF OPERATIONS - MR 2

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>1972</u>						
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Total Ops	70842	50507	60939	77910	51286	37317	60564	47704
Total Ops with Contact	538	297	266	610	325	381	739	351
<u>Ops w/Contact</u>	<u>1/132</u>	<u>1/170</u>	<u>1/223</u>	<u>1/128</u>	<u>1/158</u>	<u>1/98</u>	<u>1/82</u>	<u>1/136</u>
<u>Total Ops</u>								

TABLE 4c

RF OPERATIONS - MR 3

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>1972</u>						
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Total Ops	59945	50905	46348	51692	48006	55965	46268	49119
Total Ops with Contact	246	293	143	188	312	491	450	228
<u>Ops w/Contact</u>	<u>1/244</u>	<u>1/174</u>	<u>1/324</u>	<u>1/330</u>	<u>1/154</u>	<u>1/114</u>	<u>1/103</u>	<u>1/215</u>
<u>Total Ops</u>								

TABLE 4d

RF OPERATIONS - MR 4

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	<u>1972</u>						
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Total Ops	56024	26364	39711	31524	42226	35211	41462	32742
Total Ops with Contact	1255	1035	1105	936	2961	1705	1702	1466
<u>Ops w/Contact</u>	<u>1/15</u>	<u>1/25</u>	<u>1/36</u>	<u>1/34</u>	<u>1/14</u>	<u>1/21</u>	<u>1/24</u>	<u>1/22</u>
<u>Total Ops</u>								

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TABLE 4e

PF OPERATIONS - MR 1

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	1972						
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Total Ops	31325	39965	33989	24562	16346	27795	35164	21556
Total Ops with Contact	617	869	540	543	880	896	823	283
<u>Ops w/Contact</u>	<u>1/51</u>	<u>1/38</u>	<u>1/63</u>	<u>1/45</u>	<u>1/19</u>	<u>1/31</u>	<u>1/43</u>	<u>1/74</u>
Total Ops								

TABLE 4f

PF OPERATIONS - MR 2

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	1972						
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Total Ops	102961	67020	104198	113774	78888	56272	104844	63363
Total Ops with Contact	394	349	272	353	344	371	808	416
<u>Ops w/Contact</u>	<u>1/261</u>	<u>1/192</u>	<u>1/383</u>	<u>1/322</u>	<u>1/229</u>	<u>1/152</u>	<u>1/130</u>	<u>1/152</u>
Total Ops								

TABLE 4g

PF OPERATIONS - MR 3

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	1972						
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Total Ops	88318	87765	78450	87990	82737	93966	76207	77544
Total Ops with Contact	150	121	97	98	198	239	239	134
<u>Ops w/Contact</u>	<u>1/589</u>	<u>1/725</u>	<u>1/808</u>	<u>1/898</u>	<u>1/418</u>	<u>1/393</u>	<u>1/319</u>	<u>1/579</u>
Total Ops								

TABLE 4h

PF OPERATIONS - MR 4

	<u>2nd Half 1971 Avg</u>	1972						
		<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>
Total Ops	125754	121343	119476	125275	131614	126677	129166	116580
Total Ops with Contact	1271	1053	979	907	2234	1525	1761	1793
<u>Ops w/Contact</u>	<u>1/99</u>	<u>1/115</u>	<u>1/122</u>	<u>1/138</u>	<u>1/58</u>	<u>1/83</u>	<u>1/73</u>	<u>1/65</u>
Total Ops								

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KIA - RVNAF AND ENEMY a/

	1972	April	May	June	July	Total
<u>MR 1 - Friendly</u>						
RF/FF	280	353	326	123	1082	
Regulars	775	475	1825	1913	5051	
Total	1055	831	2211	2036	6133	
<u>MR 1 - Enemy</u>						
By RF/FF	1327	1608	1441	593	4969	
By Regulars	7446	4104	4341	3988	19974	
Total	8773	5807	5782	4581	24943	
<u>MR 2 - Friendly</u>						
RF/FF	570	303	570	280	1723	
Regulars	765	535	1601	1053	3955	
Total	1335	839	2171	1333	5678	
<u>MR 2 - Enemy</u>						
By RF/FF	1807	673	1781	860	5321	
By Regulars	1818	2152	2901	1856	8734	
Total	3625	3932	4632	2716	14055	
<u>MR 3 - Friendly</u>						
RF/FF	457	503	508	300	1773	
Regulars	760	1342	2966	1548	6616	
Total	1217	1850	3474	1848	8369	
<u>MR 3 - Enemy</u>						
By RF/FF	1223	1687	1770	698	5378	
By Regulars	2927	2053	3001	461	8452	
Total	4150	3750	4771	1159	13830	
<u>MR 4 - Friendly</u>						
RF/FF	2021	1371	1750	1488	6630	
Regulars	622	263	1078	689	2652	
Total	2643	1634	2828	2177	9282	
<u>MR 4 - Enemy</u>						
By RF/FF	2253	1622	2555	1434	8064	
By Regulars	670	205	479	550	2604	
Total	2923	2727	3034	1984	10668	

a/ Information extracted from OPREP-5, The Measurement of Progress (April-July) and TFES (July).

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RF CONTROL HEADQUARTERS UPGRADE PROGRAM

Background

As a result of heavy ARVN losses incurred during the March-April NVA invasion, President Thieu directed that the Joint General Staff (JGS) convert all Lien Doi Headquarters (RF Company Groups) to battalion headquarters and activate Sector Tactical Command Posts (STCPs) in each of the provinces. The underlying consideration was the need for larger, more mobile ground combat units to counter the conventional ground threat posed by the NVA.

Combined JGS/MACV meetings resulted in an implementation of the plan in three phases:

- Phase I to consist of 14 STCPs and 74 battalions.
- Phase II to consist of 24 STCPs and 152 battalions.
- Phase III consisting of 21 STCPs and 81 battalions.
- Total of 55 STCPs and 307 battalions (the plan called for large urban areas and certain provinces to have additional STCPs).

Discussion

Phase I was completed in July and combined JGS/MACV Phase I evaluation visits were completed in August. It appears that the major problem is the manner in which the sectors employed the STCPs. In areas where Province Chiefs did not understand the mobile mission concept, the STCPs were serving no useful purposes. JGS is, therefore, in the process of preparing a Missions and Employment Directive which will provide definitive guidelines on the employment of STCPs and attached battalions. Implementation of Phases II and III is to be contingent upon the success of Phase I.

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VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE TRAINING

The US is training over 1700 men in FY 69 in long (37 and 47 week) courses in the Vietnamese language, and over 9100 men in short (2, 4, 6, 8, 12 and 32 week) courses (Table 1). Of the 1700, 235 (14%) will be assigned as advisors and 1479 (86%) will be trained for intelligence and special investigation work (Table 2). We have no data on assignments the 9100 will receive.

The 37 week course is the minimum necessary to allow an American to converse with reasonable ease with a Vietnamese who is speaking normally. It is inadequate to permit good comprehension of an overheard, fast conversation, or to understand nuances of speech intended to be misleading.

The proportion of US military advisors who receive extensive Vietnamese language training is surprisingly low. Tables 2 and 3 show that only 132 officers of an estimated 1450 (9%) and 97 enlisted men of an estimated 2300 (4%) advisors on MACV field advisory teams will receive the 37-47 week long courses. We do not know how many will receive the short courses. One recent study by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) found that only 18 out of 40 (45%) district senior advisors interviewed (out of 222 DSA's assigned) had even some Vietnamese language training; our figures suggest that most of the 18 probably had one of the short language courses.

The small percentages of our advisors able to converse in Vietnamese are partly offset by the ability of many Vietnamese to speak some English. Nevertheless, it must be difficult for US advisors in the pacification program to assess the status of hamlets when they cannot understand Vietnamese. The ACTIV study found a relationship between an advisor's knowledge of Vietnamese and the reliability of his overall ratings for the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES).

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TABLE 1

VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE TRAINING
By Length of Course

Course Length	FY 69				FY 70			
	Army	Navy-Marines	Air Force	Total	Army	Navy-Marines	Air Force	Total
47 wks	933	185	16	1134	1026	228	18	1272
37	0	68	512	580	8	92	582	682
32	265	163	18	446	288	260	22	570
12	1351	1059	29	2439	1075	1614	26	2715
8	1352a/	527	0	1879	1450a/	527	0	1977
2-6	0	4365	0	4365	0	4365	0	4365
Total	3901	6367	575	10843	3847	7086	648	11581

a/ Students programmed for this course must be graduates of corresponding MATA courses where they receive 4 weeks of language training.

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TABLE 2

FY 69/70 VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE TRAINING
37 AND 47-WEEK COURSES

	<u>FY 69</u>											
	Army			Navy/USMC			Air Force			TOTAL		
	VN	Other	Total	VN	Other	Total	VN	Other	Total	VN	Other	Total
Intelligence	604	21	625	108 ^{a/}	102	210	512	1224	123	1347		
Advisor	229 ^{b/}	5	234	1	-	1	-	230	5	235		
Interpreter	70	4	74	39	-	39	-	109	4	113		
Other	-	-	-	-	3	3	16	16	3	19		
Total	903	30	933	148	105	253	528	1579	135	1714		
<u>FY 70</u>												
Intelligence	618	21	639	139 ^{a/}	122	261	581	1338	143	1481		
Advisor	306	5	311	1	-	1	-	307	5	312		
Interpreter	82	2	84	58	-	58	-	140	2	142		
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	19	-	19		
Total	1006	28	1034	198	122	320	600	1804	150	1954		

a/ Interrogator/translator.b/ 132 officers, 97 enlisted men.

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TABLE 3

**ESTIMATED NUMBER OF MACV FIELD ADVISORS
(CORPS LEVEL AND BELOW)**
As of April 30, 1968

	Assigned Strength a/			Adv as % of Total Pers b/	Estimated Number of Advisors		
	Off	EM	Total		Off	EM	Total
Military Unit Advisory Teams	909	1513	2422	66%	600	999	1599
Civil-Military Advisory Teams	856	1366	2222	51%	437	697	1134
RF/PP Advisory Teams	304	440	744	100%	304	440	744
Other Advisory Teams b/	224	294	518	50%	112	147	259
Total	2293	3613	5906	63%	1453	2283	3736

a/ Source: MACV-J1 Strength Report.

b/ Estimated from sampling of June 30, 1967 TO&E data on advisors and overhead personnel authorized for advisory teams. See SEA Analysis Report, July 1968, p. 16.

c/ Includes training center advisors, psyops, logistics.

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HOW THE KOREAN ARMY IMPROVED

The following interview with General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, Retired, was conducted as a part of Regional Programs research in ways to improve RVNAF effectiveness, but is a departure from the usual style of our analyses. We believe that his views are especially timely today in Vietnam where a major effort is being made to train the Vietnamese Army.

General Ridgway makes the point several times that there are more differences than similarities between the two wars. He also makes it perfectly clear that he would "not for one minute presume to judge" the Vietnamese military situation without ever having visited South Vietnam.

We agree with General Ridgway that many differences exist between the two wars. Many of the Korean Army training programs might not work in Vietnam. On the other hand, we believe the principles which he stressed in training the Korean Army are applicable and that there is much to learn from our successful experience in bringing the Korean Army to the high level of proficiency it has shown in Vietnam.

One basic difference from the Vietnam War is that General Ridgway commanded the South Korean Army. Therefore, he had a great deal of leverage in the choice of Korean commanders and in relieving incompetents, and this greatly affected the quality of the Korean Army.

General Ridgway believes that a military unit's effectiveness depends on the quality of its officers and noncommissioned officers. This principle guided all of his efforts to increase the effectiveness of the Korean Army. He considers time to train and improved weaponry as essential, but the focus must always be on the leadership. In his own words "with one (an officer corps) any problem can be overcome; without one, all other efforts are in vain." His answer to leadership problems and the basis of success in improving Korean Army combat effectiveness was selection of good potential leaders and training.

The final section of the interview does not concern either Vietnam or Korea. We include it, hoping that our readers will find it as interesting as we did.

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HOW THE KOREAN ARMY IMPROVEDInterview with Gen. Matthew Ridgway, USA, Ret.LEADERSHIP

General Ridgway: The building of any military establishment into an effective combat force rests on several basic principles which are the same the world over. In general, a military establishment's effectiveness is dependent on primarily its officer corps and secondarily its noncommissioned officer corps. Of course, weaponry is an essential, time to train is essential, but the focus must always be on the officer corps. It takes time to produce an effective combat force and there are a multiplicity of functions which have to be carried out before an armed force is effective. No amount of equipment or numbers of personnel can substitute for the basic ingredient of leadership.

You know, we (as a nation) have had extraordinary experiences with respect to building our own military establishment in times of emergency. When I came into the service the Army had a total of 5,000 officers. I think the entire Army had only about 125,000 personnel. We were plunged into World War I in the same year (1917). Within the space of a little over a year, we raised about four million men in the Army alone and had two million men in France.

Now how is it possible for a little officer corps of 5,000 to expand so enormously--quite apart from the production effort--and to train an Army of that size? After World War I, we let our military establishment go down again, not quite as low as in 1917, but comparably so, considering the increase in responsibilities we acquired as a Nation. And yet, in World War II we raised, trained and effectively led 11 million men.

The answer is training and in particular, our officer school system. Our system begins with basic schools, then intermediate schools, then our staff colleges and finally at the apex is the War College. In the period between the wars, all of us hoped we would be able to alternate periods of schooling with troop duty. That was very difficult because we had so few troops. I was in the Second Division in Texas in 1926 and 1927. It was the only division the Army had intact. All of its units were carried on paper but were cadre. It was brutally skeletonized. I was a company commander, and if I could get nine men out for training in the morning I was lucky. We were down to bare bones. But, our system produced a nucleus of officers that were able to expand almost overnight into a very effective fighting force.

What I want to stress above everything else is the foundation of an Army--its officer corps. With one, any problem can be overcome, without one, all other efforts are in vain. That is the one principle I never stopped stressing

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when we were building the Korean Army. I told their president that I would not give them equipment or increase their strength until they got rid of their incompetents and demonstrated to me that they had an officer corps. They did. In a few years, the Koreans began to replace US units. I understand that today they are doing well in Vietnam.

COMMAND

Major Caulfield: General, what authority did you have over the Korean Army?

General Ridgway: Complete. President Rhee had placed the entire ROK military establishment, which consisted only of the Army (ROKA), under General MacArthur's direct command, and MacArthur in return had delegated that authority to the 8th Army Commander. When I took over from General Walker, I found that I had complete command over the ROK Army. Chung Il Kwon, the present Prime Minister, was the ROK Army Chief of Staff at that time and performed splendidly. He complied heartily with all the demands I placed on him. I never had trouble with him, though I certainly had plenty of troubles with the ROK Army, and for good reason, as you are aware.

No Army in modern times was ever subjected to the battle stresses, strains, and losses to which the ROKs were subjected in the beginning of the war. We had a language problem, but I had a KMAG (Korean Military Advisory Group) headed by Brigadier General Frank Farrel. He was always along side General Kwon. Any orders I had for the ROKs I would give direct to Kwon, and also gave them to Farrel. This was to make sure that there was the supervision of execution, which is the soul of performance.

I guess that answers your first question. The answer is that I had direct command and control over the ROK Army and then when General MacArthur came home and I took over the Far East command, I also delegated authority over the ROKs to the 8th Army Commander, General Van Fleet.

Major Caulfield: Did this relationship change as the ROKs improved?

General Ridgway: No, it didn't change.

Major Caulfield: Was this command authority delegated below 8th Army level?

General Ridgway: Oh, yes. A ROK division assigned to a US Corps was under the direct command and authority of a US Corps commander.

Major Caulfield: Were the ROK divisions always deployed intact?

General Ridgway: Yes.

Major Caulfield: Then ROK regiments were not placed under US Army Division Commanders.

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General Ridgway: Not to my recollection. The reason being that we didn't want to break up the ROK divisions.

Major Caulfield: What action did you take when it was brought to your attention that a ROK Commander was poor? Exactly what would happen?

General Ridgway: I would go to the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army or possibly to the officer's commander and have them relieve him. An Army commander's primary responsibility is the closest possible continuous contact with his Corps commander and to a lesser degree (in my concept of leadership) with the division commander. I'd be down in every division commander's CP and in his command every day, well not every day--that was impossible--but, it would be rare that I didn't meet two or three of them a day. To get back to your question, I'd have him relieved.

Major Caulfield: Suppose the ROK authorities didn't relieve him for political or other reasons?

General Ridgway: That didn't happen. I had very close contact with President Rhee and his Minister of Defense. I told President Rhee in the presence of his Minister of Defense, "we aren't going to get anywhere with your Army until you get some leadership. You haven't got it from the Minister of Defense on down and until you get it, it's just hopeless. Don't you ask me to arm any more of your people. You've lost enough equipment now to equip six of our divisions."

This wasn't just carping criticism. These fellows had a division commander with the experience level of a US Army Captain and young one at that. They just hadn't had the training and the experience. Regardless, President Rhee was tough on them. He even fired his Minister of Defense. I never knew why there was a dual command in South Vietnam.

Major Caulfield: COMUSMACV does not command the RVNAF. He advises and assists.

General Ridgway: Of course, we had a different situation in South Vietnam than existed in Korea. I never could understand why they have a dual command in South Vietnam. Why in hell didn't they put the ARVN under Westmoreland? I understand he didn't want it, but I don't know why and never talked to him about it.

We had a strong man at the head of the Korean government who backed me completely. He was death on communism, although he was a hair shirt to us many times later on with his "On to the Yalu Thing." Perfectly ridiculous for them to go it alone. Nevertheless, I was in Korea only 24 hours when I met him and paid my respects. I knew we couldn't hold in our positions. We had two weak divisions at the front and one weak division in a blocking position to their rear. The whole half of the peninsula (eastern) was wide open. I wanted to prepare some defensive positions to the rear, so we could delay in successive positions if we had to. I asked President Rhee

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for 30,000 men. He said, "you'll have them tomorrow morning, General." I said, "well, I don't think I can provide the tools--but turn them out anyway." The next morning 30,000 men began digging defensive positions. Can you imagine anything like that in Vietnam?

Major Caulfield: No, sir.

Did the KMAG function in other than an advisory capacity? In other words, did they command ROK units, especially in the beginning?

General Ridgway: I don't know. I would think that would depend very much on the personality of the advisor and the ROK commander. If you had a very strong American advisor and a weak, inexperienced ROK commander, or even a good man as ROK commander who saw the handwriting on the wall, he might let the advisor run his unit. The ROK commander would issue the order but he would be receiving them from the advisor. I think that quite frequently US advisors took command of ROK units, but they tried to play the role assigned, which was advisory, not command. They were in no sense responsible. I think that ROK 6th division, in the initial operations was actually commanded by the advisor, LTC McPhail (LTC Thomas D. McPhail, USA). He was a very strong leader who really shook them down and trained them.

LTC Elton: What were some of the methods he used to assert his aggressive leadership in training them?

General Ridgway: Its been 20 years and the details are a little hazy. You would do better asking General Ryan or Champeny. Well, I don't know. If it had been my job, the first urgent requirement would be to get to every one of my subordinate commanders in battle. For example, if I were a regimental advisor I would get to the battalion commanders and so forth. After you have had considerable combat experience, you can very quickly sense the situation when you walk into an area. You can see it, and smell it, and just feel it.

It doesn't take very long to size up the capability of a unit. I would have the commander brief me right on the spot. Standing on the ground with a commander, you very quickly sense his grasp of the situation, and his confidence or lack of it. I would think a good advisor would do the same thing. It doesn't take you very long to size up the training level of a unit and the leadership capacity of a commander.

Major Caulfield: What action was taken when an advisor reported that a ROK commander was incompetent or failed to perform satisfactorily?

General Ridgway: I don't want to evade your question but I just don't know. You will have to ask General Ryan or Champeny. Both of them had a great deal of experience in training and that is why they were chosen. I encouraged Van Fleet's choice because I knew of the records they established in the training business.

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Major Caulfield: What form of discipline did President Rhee or the ROK Army take in regards to an incompetent officer? Rhee, as I know, was a rather undemocratic type. Would he really put it to them or consider politics and that sort of thing?

General Ridgway: Well, I don't know. I would only be interested in seeing to it that the poor one was relieved and replaced by an officer of good potential. I didn't pay attention to what happened to him.

I remember one time, right after one of the ROK divisions folded, asking President Rhee to come with me to talk to them. He did. We had those light planes covered with canvas. We damn near froze to death. The temperature on the ground was five or ten below zero, God only knows what it was in the air. Anyway, he came with me and never complained.

The old man was courageous and forceful. Anything you asked him to do, which was taking a crack at the communists, he was all for. His talks to his men were quite impressive. To cite you another example, he handled opposition in the National Assembly simply by jailing members of the opposition. Just as though President Nixon took several members of the House of Representatives and put them in jail. That's the way Rhee handled opposition. Soon he didn't have any.

Major Caulfield: Did you have equal influence in ensuring that outstanding ROK officers were promoted as you did in firing them?

General Ridgway: Oh, yes. There were several fine ones Paik (General Paik Sun Yup) was strong, so was Song (General Song Yo Chan). Paik commanded the first ROK division. He later became Chief of Staff. He was great. He really controlled that division. Another, was Tiger Song. Song had the capital division way over on the east coast of the Sea of Japan. He had strong control over his division, too. He was charged with murder by one of the presidents later on. Apparently, he shot some of his men for cowardice.

LTC Elton: Yes sir, I remember reading that. I believe he was cleared.

General Ridgway: That's good. I wouldn't presume for a minute to interfere and tell a ROK Division Commander how to run his division. I would go through his Corps commander.

I had one good ROK Corps Commander and one so poor we broke up his corps and relieved him. As an Army commander, you don't have many opportunities to spot officers in the battalions, although I spent much of my time in the battalions. Going back to my World War II experience as a US Corps Commander, I spent a part of each day up front where the going was the hottest. As a division commander, I knew each of my battalion commanders intimately. We went into Normandy with 12 battalion commanders; in a few days, I lost 14.

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I spoke at Leavenworth and got a big laugh out of them by saying that I never had any objection from a Regimental Commander in the appointment of a Battalion Commander. They thought I intimidated the Regimental Commanders. Not at all--what I meant to say is that I knew his officers as well as he did.

To answer your question, I would make sure the US advisors saw to it that these fellows were recognized, but I used the chain of command.

TRAINING

Major Caulfield: What happened to the division that almost ran over you when you tried to stop its retreat? Did you put them in the rear, rehabilitate them, and then place them with American units at first?

General Ridgway: We did a whole series of things. You know, it's quite an interesting experience seeing a disorganized Army in retreat and standing alone trying to stop them. As I was standing in the road, I recalled so clearly being at the Infantry School. I believe it was in Company Commanders Course (1924-1925) when a World War I officer had told me about the British 5th Army. As you know, it was routed in March 1918, when the German's big push came. He told me it is hopeless to try and stop a disorganized body like that near the front. Instead, establish military police check points in the rear. Once out of the immediate fire zone, you have some hope of stopping the panic and getting them together again. Then, you can feed them, rearm them and little by little reconstitute the unit to get them back under control.

Well, that's what I did in Korea. I couldn't stop them on the road. The trucks came barreling down the road. They didn't try to run me down and some stopped. But I couldn't do anything with them. They had thrown away their hand arms and everything. Not only the troop weapons but everything. They just had their bare hands. Well, it was up to the US 24th and 25th Divisions to do the best they could while we reconstituted the ROK division.

Once we got it in reasonable shape, it was assigned to one of my two Corps (I and II). The 10th Corps was still at sea or coming ashore down south. I told the corps commander and our division commanders to watch them. We did the best we could in supporting them with artillery fires and everything else. We didn't give them any more responsibility than they could handle. I told the ROKs the rest was up to them.

You know, throughout the entire period of my 8th Army Command (26 Dec 1950--11 April 1951), it was never possible to take a division out of the line to train. We didn't have the people. We had to keep everybody we had, even though sometimes you'd roll into your sleeping bag at night with a whole ROK division there, and it would be gone by morning. They would pull out during the night and be 10-20 kilometers to the rear by daylight. It is something hard for a well trained US officer to understand unless he sees it.

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It was not until after the 5th Phase enemy offensive (May 1951), when we inflicted enormous casualties on the enemy, that we were able to pull a division out and send them to a training area. That was the last enemy offensive and we began to train them in earnest. It started with the soldier, and progressed to include the squad, company, battalion, and regiment right up to the division. Concurrently, they organized a military academy and other schools. Of course, the results of the schools would be felt far in the future, but if you do not start sometime, you never will. So, this whole tremendously complex, time-consuming process to produce a reliable, well trained force began in May, and the results speak for themselves since then.

Major Caulfield: Yes, they have. As I mentioned in my letter, their performance in Vietnam is excellent.

LTC Elton: General Peers who commanded the I Field Force in II CTZ in Vietnam believes the Vietnamese at this point are in better condition than the ROK's at a comparable point during the Korean War.

General Ridgway: Well, I've never visited Vietnam. But when I received your letter, I immediately thought of our most effective division training. We started with the soldier and ended with a division exercise. We used live ammunition and it was as effective as any training exercise I ever saw. We had other ROK commanders come and watch. Of course, you rarely have a division fighting as a division in Vietnam.

LTC Elton: No sir, never.

General Ridgway: I don't know the conditions in Vietnam, but I would judge that the training should be designed for the battalion or smaller units than a division. Then, later train larger units if necessary. I don't know the character of the Vietnamese people. But, it seems the enemy, North Vietnamese and VC, are well trained. The South Vietnamese are the same people, aren't they? It's hard for me to believe that a difference exists between the two.

A friend of mine, who teaches in the French University in Vietnam, visited me not long ago. He lived in both North and South Vietnam for years. He said the North and South Vietnamese are totally different people. The southerners are easy going people and the iron isn't in their soul. Even so, it's hard for me to believe, because I think human beings are pretty much the same if you have the same caliber of leaders. Of course, the tight control of the people that the communists have in the North does not exist in the South.

Major Caulfield: That may be the problem. The same caliber of leaders. The communists have systematically purged non-communists with leadership potential for the past 10 years. It's the nature of the war. In the past six months alone, some 4,000 Vietnamese have been assassinated or abducted.

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There have been reports that our best officers in Vietnam are not found in advisory positions but in US divisions. Did you have the same problem in Korea?

General Ridgway: Yes, I recognized this very early. I have great admiration for advisors, particularly those in the infantry battalions. In Korea, many of them rolled up in their sleeping bags at night, and by God, found themselves alone in the morning. It wasn't a very comfortable feeling. In fact, it wasn't comfortable for me either.

I asked General MacArthur before taking over the 8th Army if, in his judgment, there was disaffection in the ROK Army. He said not at present, but it was a possibility. I served in China as a young Captain and knew the Orientals. Some would turnover for "silver bullets," as they called them, or for any other reason--just quit. So it's a very uncomfortable thing, and I did everything I could to ensure that these officers in an advisory capacity, unit advisors, were given full credit if they performed well--extra credit--because they really had a much tougher job than fellows in the regular units, a much tougher job.

I think that bore fruit. I got it to Frank Farrel who was the head of the KMAG, and got it across back in Washington through General MacArthur. I forgot the details but we rewarded these fellows, by getting it on their efficiency reports, and giving them extra awards when they performed well.

KATUSA'S

Major Caulfield: What one factor had the highest payoff in improving the ROK officer corps?

General Ridgway: There is no one factor. There are so many factors that go into producing a high grade officer. It is highly complex--you've got the spiritual against the physical, the esprit, leadership to which he is subjected, his emoluments. I could not sift out one factor.

Major Caulfield: Did you assign Korean officers to your staff or other American staffs as a training vehicle?

General Ridgway: There were none on the Army staff until the Armistice negotiations. Then, I chose General Paik Sunyup to represent the Koreans on the UN delegation. I chose him over all the Korean General officers. They did have Koreans on lower staffs, however.

Major Caulfield: Did the Korean Army use battlefield commissions as a normal promotion means?

General Ridgway: I'm not sure. My impression is that they did, but I'm not sure. I do remember that I had the pleasure of pinning second lieutenant bars on a good many of our US noncommissioned officers in Korea.

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LTC Elton: At what point in the Korean war did we begin to combine the KATUSA's into our units.

General Ridgway: Very early. I was over there on the 8th of August 1950, when the President sent me over with Mr. Harriman. They had KATUSA's then. At first, we needed them because of our tremendous losses. Our replacement system could not maintain units above 60%. While it was a desperate measure, it worked even though we had a terrific language problem. The KATUSA performed in a wide variety of ways. They were very valuable on patrols because they knew the country and the language. The overall result was very good.

LTC Elton: Well, then as I understand it the KATUSAs were spread out through the rifle company.

General Ridgway: Oh no, they were right in the rifle squads.

LTC Elton: I had a company in Korea in 1964 and had KATUSA's. They were spread throughout the company. I definitely felt the KATUSA's proficiency improved and that expertise rubbed off from the GI next to them.

General Ridgway: You bet, I don't think there is any question of that.

LTC Elton: We have not done it in Vietnam.

General Ridgway: Well, we probably didn't have the need of it as far as our forces were concerned, but looking at it from the other point of view the benefit which might accrue to the Vietnamese is substantial. It should have great advantages.

LTC Elton: Well, you know we have about five separate wars in Vietnam. It's terribly complex. The key question now is--as we withdraw what will the RVNAF do?

General Ridgway: I know it's complex. From this distance, I wouldn't presume for a minute to judge the Vietnam situation. I have never been there. There are far more dissimilarities between Korea and Vietnam than similarities. As I said, I had direct command over the ROK Army. It was never questioned. I also kept tight control over every intelligence source to ferret out any sign of ROK disintegration.

Major Caulfield: When it was not possible to relieve units on line and send them to training areas, was training accomplished at the front?

General Ridgway: Oh yes, training is a continuing function. It should go on at all times even during combat. In some ways, it is the finest training you can get because that is your ultimate reason for existence--to be effective in combat. Every chance we had in World War II and Korea, we trained. Started at the bottom and worked up. We took advantage of every opportunity to leave the lines and train. Some of those combat exercises in Korea were great. We put the officers of ROK divisions up on a hillside there

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to observe the exercise taking place in the valley. This had a tremendous effect.

Major Caulfield: How did you measure the effectiveness of ROK units? Did you have any yardstick or quantitative means to assess their effectiveness?

General Ridgway: You can't quantify combat effectiveness. I relied solely and absolutely on my judgments in observing them. It's a feeling that comes with experience. I continuously visited unit commanders and had the opinion of my corps commanders. I don't think it is feasible to quantify anything in combat. It's your estimate based on your own personal observations on the ground.

LTC Elton. Do you feel that integration of Vietnamese in unit levels would be even more effective than the KATUSA's?

General Ridgway: It's truly a matter of opinion. We did have parallel integration of foreign units on the battalion level, e.g., the Greeks, French and British. The French battalion was in Paul Freeman's Regimental Combat Team (23rd Infantry) and performed magnificently in combat. They were a hair shirt to him many times. He said, after a real tough fight at Twin Tunnels. "The Frenchmen simply built fires and outlined their positions to the enemy." Even though they were surrounded by three of four divisions, the Frenchmen didn't give a damn. So, Paul had to chew out their commander.

There's a magnificent soldier, that Monclar (General Ralph Monclar, French Army). A very dear friend. He asked to be demoted from Lt General to Lt Colonel so he could command the French battalion in Korea. He had about 17 wound stripes on him, and he had been in about every fight the Foreign Legion had. He was a wonder, that fellow. And then the Greek battalion was assigned under the direct command of our divisions.

LTC Elton: This is the important thing, were they under our command?

General Ridgway: Absolutely, under the direct command of US commanders.

Major Caulfield: Korea was also an unpopular war and the Koreans had their detractors back home. Did you always have faith in the outcome?

General Ridgway: Well, I wouldn't want to put that on imperishable record. There was fine soldier material there. I think I had the feeling that there wasn't any reason, given the proper leadership and time to train that they wouldn't produce. That was my feeling with a very high degree of confidence.

Major Caulfield: Most people who worked with the Vietnamese have the same confidence in their soldiers. But their opinion of Vietnamese leadership is not high. On occasion, when properly led, the Vietnamese have given a good account of themselves.

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General Ridgway: My acquaintance with orientals goes back to the mid 1920's, when I served in China. They haven't had a lot of advantages that our people have had, but they are tough. They are used to all manner of deprivations which would be extreme hardship to our men. Generally speaking, they're docile. They have been conditioned from time immemorial by famine, flood, squeeze and extortion, and they don't expect much. If the Vietnamese are given a fair break and good leadership, and if we reward the good ones and sack the bad ones, we'll get fine results again, given time.

General Ridgway: Major Caulfield, what is your feeling of the caliber of your opponents over there?

Major Caulfield: Their individual soldiers are excellent, especially the North Vietnamese. Their leaders, in a tactical sense, are fools. So often they threw their men away in senseless engagements. I guess we will have to await the verdict of history to assess their leaders' strategic sense.

General Ridgway: That's interesting. We found that the North Koreans were much more fanatical than the Chinese. Their tactical commanders threw them into operations which no American commander would consider. The North Koreans would attack--attack against overwhelming firepower and suffer terrible losses. I was so interested I had the Army Surgeon investigate whether the North Koreans were using dope. He made a thorough investigation and found no evidence of this at all. I never saw the South Koreans operate that way. I couldn't help asking why. Why such a difference between the two when they were the same otherwise? Colonel Elton, do you share Major Caulfield's evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the enemy?

LTC Elton: Yes sir, very much so. My experience was mostly with the Viet Cong guerrillas but they are about the same. This hurling their men at the wire does on.

Major Caulfield: I believe that if the North Koreans cross the DMZ again they would find a far more effective South Korean Army today than in 1950.

General Ridgway: I guess you can take men from any nation on earth, give them leadership, time to train, and produce an effective combat force.

Major Caulfield: Sir, we had the pleasure of having General S.L.A. Marshall spend a day with us a few months ago. He is of the opinion that if we withdraw precipitously from Vietnam it could have a disastrous effect in SEATO, NATO, and the Mid-east. In his words, "If we get out with our tails between our legs, we as a nation will slip to second place and never move to the front seat again." I shuddered when he said that, thinking that historically, when nations do adjust, a friction results that could lead to a world war. Do you agree with General Marshall's assessment?

General Ridgway: Well, not quite. I have the highest respect for Slam Marshall. He sends me every one of his books and I love reading them. But, I feel that is an oversimplification. I believe our leaders and the

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leaders of the Soviet Union are well aware of the results of a confrontation. It's just too horrible to contemplate. I do not believe the Russians would move in the Mid-East or otherwise try to confront us. It seems to me we went from bad to worse in Vietnam, but there would be no gain to the nation in making a public debate out of this question of how to extricate ourselves under acceptable conditions.

Major Caulfield: Your generation experienced victory in the first and second World Wars--my generation has had to settle for less than total victory. Considering the effect Indo-China and Algeria had on the French Officer Corps, what do you think the effect of limited victory in Korea and especially Vietnam will have on our officer corps?

General Ridgway: The French Army had very serious mutinies in WWI. There was exceedingly bad leadership from the top on down in the NIVELLE offensive. I don't know why the British didn't have the same thing in the Fall of 1917. Can you imagine, to cross a thousand meters of mud costing 100,000 casualties. I don't know how long any human being could put up with this today. Maybe the Russian Army or possibly the Chinese could do it. But 100,000 casualties! No Western Army could put up with that.

Getting back to your question--our officer corps is so highly imbued with (a) their high ideals, and (b) the basic tenet that civil authority is supreme, that the individual tries his best to carry out his orders from duly constitutional authority, whatever they may be. Of course, this starts from the top so any officer down below is simply carrying out the orders of his superior. I would never have even thought that this war would adversely affect the morale of our officer corps--there is an unshakable belief in the constitution of the United States and everything we did in Vietnam was done within the constitution. That resolution Mr. Johnson got through the Senate was overwhelmingly passed. If they had any reservations, they should have expressed them at that time. Some have had afterthoughts but it's too late now. As you may know, I've always opposed intervention in Vietnam, even back in 1956.

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NON KOREAN MATTERS

Major Caulfield: Yes sir, the words in you book "Soldier" proved prophetic. I have a few general questions I would like to ask you.

General Ridgway: Go right ahead.

Major Caulfield: When you were the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander in World War II, you commanded the finest American and British troops in some of the greatest battles of history. Where would you place those troops in history--do you think the Army is better today?

General Ridgway: Well, I've always said you can't say that Napoleon's Old Guard was better or worse than Scipio Africanus' Numidian cavalry. Seriously, you just can't reconstruct the problems each faced. So it's hard to compare a Civil War commander with a WWI or WWII commander because we don't know the crucial decisions each made.

It's the same human being each commander deals with; if you have leadership they will rise to any height. If you don't have it, they won't, and that's the key to the whole thing--leadership. How do you produce it? That's an eternally fascinating question. It's not a science; it's an art. You can develop it greatly, but it's not subject to scientific development. It's a question of numerous inter-related factors that affect the nature of man.

Another thing that you should all bear in mind, and I don't think that we have stressed it enough in our Army: It should be brought to the minds of the officer corps--the best of troops will fail if the strain is big enough. I have seen in our airborne, and I have commanded in World War II, the finest troops the US had. Our Rangers, our British Commandos, our US First Infantry, Second Division, Third Armored Division, Ninth Armored Division--all have been under my command. I have seen individuals break in battle, and I have seen units perform miserably. The latter was always because of poor leadership. But sometimes, failure of the individual was not due to leadership. It just gets to the point where a man can't take it any more--that's all. He hasn't got that strength of character in him. I saw men in Normandy in a few cases, where the strain was too damn much for them. Casualties were very, very heavy, men were falling all around them, and they just walked off crying. Always be easy on a man like that. Help him get back to the rear. Nine times out of ten he will come out of it all right. Sometimes he can be ruined for life, though.

Major Caulfield: General, history probably will record you as one of the greatest American commanders from a point of view of influencing action by your personal presence on the battlefield. In your own words, "The Commander belongs where the action is the hottest." I know that applies to company and battalion commanders. But when you commanded a Corps, consisting of six divisions and nineteen battalions of corps artillery in addition to the

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divisions' organic artillery and other supporting arms--how was it possible for you to be with the unit engaged most heavily and still maintain control?

General Ridgway: You brought up a fascinating question. I was never in my CP during daylight hours but had control every minute.

My Chief of Staff knew me as intimately as I knew him. Therefore, he always had authority to issue orders--on any matter--on my behalf. I always picked my Chief of Staff very carefully. A commander and his Chief of Staff should be a dual personality. There must be no secrets between them at all. Each one has to know the soul of the other and has to have confidence in the other. He knew my policies and everything else. He was completely authorized to act in my name. I also had a radio with me at all times and of course, I could stop at someone's CP and get through to my CP. Also, in big units (divisions and above), things don't occur as fast as in smaller units. So, I had complete control.

Now, to cover the other point. A commander at any level ought to have the same physical capacity as his infantry battalion commanders because he's got to be up there with them when the going is rough. Sure, he may get bumped off, but that's all right. You don't even consider that. The commander's job is to be with the fellow that you charge with the execution of an order, particularly the one who has the toughest part of the order to carry out. Now, the purpose is not to criticize or over-supervise but to help him. You can see the situation evolving as quickly as he can and you command things that he doesn't control. So, you can start these things up for him before he gets around to asking you for them.

Now, the presence of the commander up front involves a very fine balance in judgment as you go down the echelon of command. The balance is between what you can accomplish up there, and what you lose by being up there. For instance, an infantry company commander shouldn't be with his lead scout. That's ridiculous. And he can't be with his most heavily engaged squad or he'll lose control of the company. But neither can he be back in the CP all the time. It has to be balanced.

One little thing that might interest you both. I remember I used this to good advantage in 1927 during maneuvers in Panama. An officer in WWI, one whom I admire greatly, told me of an experience he had. He was in the 35th Division which had anything but an enviable record. His battalion was given a tough mission to take an objective. They failed twice. He assembled all of his officers and noncommissioned officers. He put the corporals in front rows and the sergeants next and the officers in the rear. Then he said, "I've arranged the formation this way because the success of this operation is going to rest primarily on you here in the front two rows, you corporals." They went out and took the objective.

So, I tried that in my battalion during maneuvers in Panama. We really cleaned up down there. I'll never forget that.

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LTC Elton: The nature of operations in Vietnam were such that as a battalion commander in the 101st, I was unable to visit my companies each day, or I would give their position away. I would always go in on resupply missions, however. It's amazing how well you can get to know your people during those visits.

General Ridgway: Absolutely, and it means more to them than the commander will ever know.

LTC Elton: The talk you gave to our class at West Point when you were Chief of Staff was one of the most effective I've ever heard. As I recall, you stood in the aisle and refused to use the podium.

General Ridgway: Yes, I always disliked standing above people--I'm no better than they are--in rank yes; in experience yes; but not as a man. Similarly, when reviewing troops I would never permit them to raise a reviewing stand. I always stood out there on the field, 6 to 8 feet from the right flank of the unit going by. Then, I could look into the eyes of the men going by--looking into their eyes tells you something--and it tells them something, too.

LTC Elton: Yes, sir.

General Ridgway: We only had one airborne operation in Korea when I had command of the 8th Army. We hoped to break a deadlock in front of us by dropping the 187 RCT. I toyed with the idea of jumping in with them for a long time.

But then I thought that it was a small echelon for the Army commander to lead. I was in my mid-fifties and if I'd break an ankle or crack a knee I would be forced to turn over command of the 8th Army. So, I decided against it. Instead, I took a light plane with old Mike Lynch, who is a magnificent pilot. We flew just above the parachute echelon going in and watched the whole show from the air. I wanted to land on a dirt road up there, but I couldn't get the paratroopers off the road. We buzzed them and almost knocked their helmets off. They just waved back. Finally, we landed on the road right there with them. They didn't make ground contact for 12 hours or so, so we took off. Anyway, it was great going in there with them. They love to see you at times like that.

Major Caulfield: General, you have had a career that all of us envy. In fact, most of us would settle by culminating our career with any one year of yours from 1941 on. What is the single event you remember most?

General Ridgway: Well, that's a very difficult question. I have been asked that many times. The answer I give probably depends on how I feel at the moment. But of course, nothing can compare with Normandy. Nothing in the annals of military operations can compare with the complexity, the timing of the airborne, and the sea forces. I look back at it now as a dream. It seems unreal, getting into those planes.

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We were on double daylight time in the midlands of England. It takes a long time to form up those formations as you well know. I had 54 planes in my serial. It was still broad daylight at 2230. We didn't jump until 0230 but were airborne at about 2230. Going across the Channel you could see the gun flashes. It seems so unreal. I didn't see a single air explosion anywhere and just before we crossed the coast, we went down to jumping altitude of 600 feet.

There was a nice half moon and it was kind of chilly in your cotton uniform in the open plane. Then all of a sudden, we got into a cloud formation that wasn't predicted at all. The pilots, of course, were given orders that they must not use evasive action under any conditions because of close proximity of other planes. We were afraid of air collisions. I was number two in the stick, and one minute I could look out and see all the planes--the sky was full of planes--then all of a sudden I couldn't see any in the clouds. But my serial, 2nd Bn of the 505th, was put down exactly where we were supposed to go. It was one of the few units that landed where they were supposed to.

But even that wasn't quite the challenge that taking over the 65 mile front in the critical stage of the Ardennes was. Then the visibility was such that, at 75 yards you couldn't see a spoke of a 2½ ton truck. It was right down on the ground. And these black pine woods on both sides of the road--it was just like night. No one knew where anyone else was. Just sheer luck that I wasn't picked up by the Germans. As a matter of fact, when I left Middleton's VIII Corps CP to take over, I was going on one road and somebody said, "I don't know about that road. The Germans might have crossed it already." I took the other road. If I had not, I would have ended up in a German POW Cage. They were all over. I went running around that area in an open jeep all the time and you literally didn't know what you were going to run into.

On Christmas eve, I had my whole corps advanced CP in one little farm house, and we had the Fire Direction Center (FDC) in an adjoining barn. Somebody came in and said, "German tanks are coming down the road." I said fine, let's get all the bazookas out. That's what we're here for. They can't do anything in the dark." One fellow grabbed his bed roll and was half out the door. He was going to get the hell out of there. I said put that thing back where you got it. Here's a bazooka; get yourself a tank.

You know I initially had only one infantry battalion up on that 65 mile front. That's all. Then, the Army Commander told me he was attaching the 3rd armored division to me. That was one of our two big armored divisions (the 2nd and the 3rd). He also told me that the commander of the CCB would report to me as soon as he could. I decided to look for him. So, I went into this Belgium town around midnight. I just had my own radio jeep and a three man body guard in another jeep. The town was completely blacked out. The streets were deserted. We didn't know where to go and just happened to see a little light shining under a door along a row of houses. I stopped the jeep and sent somebody in, and there was the commander of the CCB. He had just gotten in. Just sheer luck finding him in the dark in a pretty big town. That was really something.

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It was piecemeal action for awhile until we could get the divisions up there. The first up was the 82nd Airborne. Then, we got the 3rd Armor and the other divisions up.

Of course, there was also the challenge of Korea. Being commander of the 8th Army was tremendous, too. When I first arrived, the consensus from private to general was, "Let's get the hell out of here. We have no business being here anyway, let's get the hell out." That was the prevalent spirit throughout the 8th Army which was up front at that time. These troops were roughly handled tactically and logistically. To take over something like that was a tremendous challenge. The only way to go was up--it couldn't get worse.

The X Corps, with your magnificent 1st Marine Division, was still at sea. There was a magnificent leader, that O. P. Smith. What is he doing now?

Major Caulfield: I don't know sir. He's retired and I believe he lives in California.

General Ridgway: If it wasn't for his tremendous leadership, we would have lost the bulk of that division up north. His leadership was the principal reason it came out the way it did. He was a great Division Commander.

Major Caulfield: He had some pretty good Regimental Commanders, too.

General Ridgway: Yes, I've known Louis Puller since my days in Nicaragua. What's he doing now?

Major Caulfield: He is also retired and lives in Saluda, Virginia.

General Ridgway: I last saw Puller, Vandergrift and Lem Shepherd, another dear friend, down in Richmond a few years ago.

Incidentally, in my own career, I was fortunate to serve under magnificent leaders. Quite early in my career (1926-27) I served in the 2nd Division which was in Texas. We had the cream of our World War I leaders in that division at that time because there were so few command slots available in the Army. The Department commander, division commander and the two infantry brigade and artillery brigade commanders all had outstanding records of success in World War I. I first served under Frank McCoy, one of the greatest generals we have ever had. Much more than just a soldier, he was a great American. He had numerous diplomatic assignments later and never received the credit he so richly deserved. Well, he had the third brigade. McCoy had the ability to draw out of every junior officer in that brigade more than the kid thought he could put out. Never a whip hand. Always courtesy. He was always dropping in on his officers. I would be working in a little dusty tent way out in the woods during maneuvers and look up and there would be General McCoy. He would just drop in for a chat.

After a year under McCoy, (he left for a bigger job), Harold B. Fiske (Major General) took over the brigade. He was a slave driver if ever there

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ever was one--but the finest instructor of officers I've ever seen. I believe he was the number one training man in the AEF in World War I. There was no excuse ever accepted for anything you failed to do, no explanations could explain. If you were supposed to do something and didn't do it--that was that. He would observe a tactical exercise and then assemble the officers and go over the maneuver in detail. He missed nothing. I thought he was magnificent. Of course, a lot of them hated his guts. But to have two different types of leaders, back to back. Both were eminently successful as a leader but used totally different methods. It was great.

Then, I was fortunate to serve under General George Marshall who was the Lt. Col. of the 15th Infantry when I served with him in North China. It was just sheer luck, that's all. Even when I was an instructor at West Point in the early 20's Charley Daley was the football coach. He had been an All American at Harvard and at West Point. He was a great football coach and he was a great leader. The way he handled that squad was something to observe. We have had only two really great football coaches in all of the West Point history in my opinion. One was Charley Daley; the other was Red Blake. They were both great leaders.

But one's life is so short and the opportunity to serve under great leaders is so limited, that the next great source is by reading and talking to others. The records of all the great ones have been written. It's simply a matter of reading. We don't emphasize this enough in our service schools, even the War College. My advice to any young officers is Read--Read--Read. And learn from the successes of the great ones and their failures. And how they avoided pitfalls. Then, take these experiences and apply them to yourself. Each one of us has to apply these lessons in his own way, because each one of us is different.

LTC Elton: You know, as a Battalion Commander it was an experience meeting the young troopers. They are quite different from even my generation. Since childhood they have been subject to the media, social pressures and other ideas that place self first and country second. It's a great challenge today to lead them. But a different American is entering the Army today.

General Ridgway: You're quite right. They sure are different. And the challenge today is greater than it's ever been. You know, somebody said to me the other day, "Aren't you glad you're not in the Army anymore. You couldn't take it today." Maybe they have something there. I would have to be re-educated.

Major Caulfield: For the first time in history, our country fielded an Army in Vietnam that was successful from the beginning. Yet, because of the Anti-military feeling in the country it looks as though after this war, the hue and cry is going to be "do away with the military in peacetime." Do you think this is just history repeating itself or is the feeling in the country more deep than that--in other words, I have heard the philosophy expressed something like this: "We got into Vietnam because our military had the capability of going there. We don't want any more Vietnams--don't give the military the capability."

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General Ridgway: I think there are enough people in high authority in our government on the civil side who are well acquainted with what we did after WWI and WWII. I think we have a strong Secretary of Defense now. They know the tragedy of not being prepared for WWII and Korea. There will be some reduction after this war, but I don't think we will ever get to where we were in between WWI, WWII and Korea. I hope not. It's so unrealistic to reduce our forces as our potential enemies are increasing theirs. I believe that rational men, who saw us learn the "hard way" will win out.

CONFIDENTIALILLUSTRATIVE RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE TO IMPLEMENT THE AREA SECURITY CONCEPT
IN SOUTH VIETNAMBackground

The Area Security Concept (ASC) is now an integral part of the 1970 Combined Campaign Plan and the 1970 GVN Plan for Pacification and Development. This strategy develops no radically new methods of operations, but focuses already tested concepts on the goal of population security. Allied operations are designed to separate the main force war from the populated areas, and to consolidate existing security through the use of intensive police-type operations in zones surrounding the secure areas. Since each segment of the RVNAF has a distinct mission and area of operation, the Area Security strategy provides a framework within which to examine RVNAF missions and force structure. This study is an attempt to develop the RVNAF force structure required to implement the ASC. However, it does not attempt to integrate the many qualitative factors which influence force effectiveness.

Brief Explanation of the ASC

The ASC divides the countryside of South Vietnam into four zones according to the relative security offered to the population (see Enclosure 1). The Secure Area and the Consolidated Zone encompass the population in all hamlets whose security ratings are A, B, or C, according to the MACV Hamlet Evaluation System. Regional Forces, Popular Forces, Peoples' Self Defense Force, and National Police all operate in these two areas under the control of the Province Chief. When requested by the Province Chief, regular ARVN units might also operate in these areas under his control. The concept emphasizes pacification and population and resources control operations. The Clearing Zone and Border Surveillance Zone encompass all the countryside outside of the Consolidation Zone. These zones are sparsely populated and contain VC-controlled areas. They are broken into areas of operation under the control of the ARVN division commanders. Operations therein are conducted by highly mobile regular combat forces to destroy or break up enemy forces and isolate them from the population in the Consolidation Zone.

Table 1 summarizes the ASC showing the four types of areas and their related command structures, forces, missions and operations..

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TABLE 1

AREA SECURITY CONCEPT SUMMARY

Type of Area

	<u>Secure Area</u>	<u>Consolidation Zone</u>	<u>Clearing Zone</u>	<u>Border Surveillance Zone</u>
<u>HES Rating</u>	A,B (some C)	C (some D,E,VC)	VC (some D,E) and unpopulated areas	Unpopulated
<u>Command</u>	Province Chief	Province Chief	ARVN DTZ/SZ Commander	ARVN DTA/SZ Commander
<u>CVN Forces Responsible</u>	National Police (NP) Popular Forces (PF) People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF)	NP Field Forces (NPFF) PF RF Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) PSDF (ARVN, US, FW as required)	ARVN US FW	CIDG/RF
<u>Mission</u>	Maintain & improve existing security without attempting expansion of area	Provide outer belt of protection for secure area, and raise level of security within zone	Keep VC/NVA away from consolidation zones	Detect, engage, and deter enemy attempting to infiltrate into RVN
<u>Methods of Operation</u>	NP-maintain law & order, neutralize VC; PF, PSDF-reside and operate in secure areas only.	Continuous patrols & ambushes with mobile reaction forces. Police type operations to raise level of security.	Regular forces engage or drive enemy out, and isolate/neutralize enemy base areas.	CIDG operations

Source: MACV/JGS Combined Campaign Plan 1970 (AB 115).

ASC-type operations have been employed in certain areas for some time even before the concept's official endorsement. To see what kind of forces are required to make it work we selected "model" areas where the RVNAF successfully applied the principles of the ASC and we examined, in detail, the friendly forces in those areas. We chose the 11th Division Tactical Area (DTA) in I Corps, the 24th Special Tactical Zone (STZ) in II Corps and the 41st DTA in IV Corps because: (1) the units operating in these areas

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during the observation period were committed to combat operations as opposed to pacification duties, thus conforming to the ASC, (2) the units received high performance ratings in accomplishing their assigned tasks, and (3) a great deal of information about operations in these areas was readily available.

Measuring Area Security - To describe our model areas in the terms of the concept, we devised a method of using HES scores and hamlet locations to approximate the geographic areas for each ASC zone and plotted these on maps of the three model areas. To show the Secure Areas, we blacked out every 1-kilometer square which contained one or more A-B hamlets. To show the Consolidation Zones, we shaded all the 1-kilometer squares containing C hamlets, plus those squares immediately adjacent to squares containing A, B and C hamlets. Finally, we printed a "D", "E", or "V", at the location of the remaining hamlets. The results shown in Enclosures 2-4 (Sep 68) and in Enclosures 5-7 (Oct 69) give dramatic evidence of the relative increase in security in these model areas. Note that some of the D-E-VC hamlets fall within the boundaries of a Consolidation Zone; this is consistent with the Area Security Concept.

Table 2 summarizes pertinent findings from the maps. It reflects that from September 1968 to October 1969 the Secure Areas of the three model areas nearly tripled in size and the overall Secure plus Consolidation Zone areas increased about 75%. At the same time, the total population under A-B security increased dramatically. By September 1968, 85% or more of the population in the model areas were rated A-B-C. More importantly, pacification scores continued to improve even during the second quarter of 1969 when enemy attacks increased compared to the preceding three quarters.

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TABLE 2
SECURITY STATISTICS
MODEL AREAS

	Population (000)		Percent of Total a/		SQ KM	
	Sep 68	Oct 69	Sep 68	Oct 69	Sep 68	Oct 69
<u>11th DTA, I CORPS</u>						
Secure Area (A, B)	327.0	684.2	35	70	116	297
Consolidation Zone (Secure Area, C)	585.7	929.2	62	96	871	1,556
Clearing Zone:						
Populated (D, E, VC)	352.5	42.0	38	4	868	52
Unpopulated	na	na	na	na	8,248	8,379
<u>24th STZ, II CORPS</u>						
Secure Area (A, B)	48.9	185.4	19	61	49	125
Consolidation Zone (Secure Area, C)	153.9	274.8	60	90	909	1,403
Clearing Zone:						
Populated (D, E, VC)	101.0	31.0	40	10	1,453	486
Unpopulated	na	na	na	na	16,629	17,102
<u>41st DTA, IV CORPS</u>						
Secure Area (A, B)	1,19.8	1,197.4	43	68	297	545
Consolidation Zone (Secure Area, C)	1,158.5	1,573.2	69	89	2,582	3,701
Clearing Zone:						
Populated (D, E, VC)	522.8	197.0	31	11	2,133	815
Unpopulated	na	na	na	na	1,946	2,145

a/ Total Population, 11th Division Tactical Area 971,200; 24th Special Tactical Zone 305,800; 41st Division Tactical Area 1,770,200.

We concluded that friendly operations in the model areas had a significant impact on population security, particularly in creating a shield for the population against enemy attacks.

Clearing Zone Forces - The forces in the 11th DTA, 24th STZ, and 41st DTA were the 1st ARVN Division, 42nd ARVN Regiment and 9th ARVN division, respectively, with U.S. combat and service support. Since these forces successfully executed Clearing Zone type functions in their areas of responsibility, we used them as models on which to base our total ARVN structure.

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The size of the force required to successfully implement the ASC in each Division Tactical Area and Special Tactical Zone would depend upon many factors, some of which are purely qualitative. However, three quantitative factors seem most important: (1) the number and strength of VC/NVA units, (2) the intensity of enemy ground assaults and engagements, and (3) the size of the Clearing Zone in which the force must operate.

As a base period for our study we chose the 2nd Qtr, 1969, since during that period the combined forces successfully countered relatively intense enemy activity without degradation of population security. We collected data for the three factors above in all three model areas during that period and used that data in the denominators (models) for computing a relative threat index in each Corps area. The relative threat index equation has the form:

$$RTI = 1/3 \left[\frac{EMBE}{EMBE \text{ Corps Model}} + \frac{\#EASLT}{\#EASLT \text{ Corps Model}} + \frac{ACZ}{ACZ \text{ Corps Model}} \right]$$

Where: RTI = relative threat index.

EMBE = enemy maneuver battalion strength equivalents (relative to a US battalion).

EASLT = enemy ground assaults/engagements.

ACZ = area of clearing zone.

We then collected data on each of the three factors for both a high and a low threat in each Corps Zone and computed the indices. The indices were multiplied by the number of maneuver battalions in the model force to yield a range of required maneuver battalions in each Corps Zone.^{1/} Table 3 summarizes these requirements for each Corps Zone and countryside.

No qualitative refinements were made for differences in mobility, firepower or leadership; and each term in the threat index equation was weighted uniformly even though it was recognized that further study might show one term to be more important than another in assessing a threat. For instance, enemy assaults might be more significant than the size of a Clearing Zone.

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TABLE 3

ARVN/VNMC MANEUVER BATTALION REQUIREMENTS

	Present Bns ^{a/}			RVN Bns ^{b/}		RVN Bns High Threat
	US/FWMAF	RVN	Total	Low Threat		
I Corps	43	40	83	58	69 ^{c/}	
II Corps	35	34	69	68	80 ^{d/}	
III Corps	51	63	114	68	85 ^{c/}	
IV Corps	-	49	49	46	62 ^{e/}	
SVN	129	186	315	240	296	

^{a/} January 15 1970.^{b/} October 1969 activity levels.^{c/} 2nd Qtr 69 type activity levels in 11th DTA.^{d/} 2nd Qtr 69 type activity levels in 24th STZ.^{e/} 2nd Qtr 69 type activity levels in 41st DTA.

On a countrywide basis, 54 ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalions more than the present authorization appear necessary to counter the low (Oct 69 level) threat after US/FWMAF withdraw, while 110 battalions might be needed to counter a simultaneous increase of the threat in each Corps to sustained levels at or above the 2nd quarter 1969 enemy activity. In terms of US/FWMAF battalion strengths to make up the shortfall, this would equate to a range of 42-86 maneuver battalions.^{1/} Realistically, a simultaneous threat increase in all Corps is not likely and the ability to shift battalions to the threatened Corps would decrease the countrywide total required. Moreover, variations in combat effectiveness among US, FWMAF, ARVN and VC/NVA battalions compared to each other (and over time) might also change the range of battalions required.

We then combined the maneuver battalion calculations with model Clearing Zone forces to generate ARVN strength requirements by Corps and countrywide.

I Corps Model Force

We examined the structure of the ARVN 1st Division and supporting units during their successful combat operations in the 11th Division Tactical Area (11th DTA) between September 1968 and September 1969; and we sought to describe the force in detail and to identify the Corps and U.S. support it received during that period. To describe the force we applied the assigned

^{1/} An ARVN battalion is .78 X U.S. battalion in strength.

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strengths from the accelerated Phase II unit authorization list (UAL) to the 1st Division's organization chart. Enclosure 8 shows the type units which made up the 1st Division in the period examined and the authorized strength for each.

We then applied UAL strengths to the I Corps organization chart and allocated one-half of I Corps ARVN support assets to our 11th DTA model, since the ARVN 1st Division had one-half the maneuver battalions assigned to I Corps.^{1/} In one exception to this allocation we assigned a total of two armored cavalry squadrons because we knew that two squadrons had been operating full time with the ARVN 1st Division. The Corps force and the portion allocated to the model are also shown in Enclosure 8.

We then studied the Systems for the Evaluation of the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER) and other data to isolate the support provided the ARVN 1st Division by U.S. units. While our data was probably quite exact for artillery and helicopter support to I Corps and the 1st Division, we could only estimate other support provided, based on such things as after-action reports, communications improvement program targets, total logistics tonnages handled for ARVN, etc. We also tried to take into account the support, such as helicopter lift and resupply, provided ARVN in the normal course of combined mobile operations. (Such support does not show in the SEER data.) Next we attempted to translate this support into individual U.S. units capable of providing that level of support and we converted those U.S. units into equivalent ARVN or VNAF units. Finally, based primarily on the I Corps battalion split, we allocated a portion of ARVN equivalent units to the model Clearing Zone force, and we used the VNAF equivalents in determining total VNAF requirements. These RVNAF equivalents of U.S. support are shown in Enclosure 8.

Then, we combined the ARVN 1st Division and its Corps support and U.S. non-aviation support to form a model ARVN/VNMC Clearing Zone force for the 11th DTA. The total force and the size of a battalion "slice" of the force are shown in Table 4. Because of the similarity of terrain, enemy, and intensity of operations in I Corps and III Corps, we decided to use the same model battalion slice in both I and III Corps.

^{1/} Twenty of 40, included armored cavalry squadrons.

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TABLE 4

AREA SECURITY CONCEPT 11th DTA FORCE MODEL

ARVN Division Force	17,591
ARVN Corps Support	
Combat	3,372
Service	<u>1,708</u>
	5,080
U.S. Support Equivalent	
Combat	1,381
Service	<u>509</u>
	1,890
Total Division Slice (through Corps)	24,561
Battalion Slice ^{a/}	1,198

^{a/} 20½ battalions in model force including Armd Cav Sqdns and Ranger Bn allocations.

In a manner similar to that employed in structuring the I Corps model we constructed models for II Corps and IV Corps Clearing Zone operations.

II Corps Model Force

ARVN Task Force Lien, which was composed principally of the ARVN 42d and 47th Regiments and the ARVN 2d Ranger Group, conducted the Ben Het-Dak To campaign in the 24th STZ of II Corps. We chose Task Force Lien as our model ARVN force for Clearing Zone operations in II Corps because this task force with U.S. combat support operated successfully against strong enemy main force units in II Corps over an extended period without direct involvement of U.S. combat units. Further, because of a very complete "Lessons Learned" study prepared after the campaign we have a great deal of information about the size and structure of both the ARVN force and its U.S. combat support. Enclosure 8 details the ARVN force and the U.S. combat support it utilized. It also shows an allocation of ARVN II Corps forces and U.S. service support. The total force and the size of a battalion "slice" of the force are shown in Table 5.

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CONFIDENTIALTABLE 524th STZ FORCE MODEL

ARVN Regimental Forces	6,796
ARVN Corps Support	
Combat Service	2,889
	<u>1,172</u>
	4,061
U.S. Support Equivalent	
Combat Service	1,662
	<u>365</u>
	2,027
Total Model Slice (through Corps)	12,884
Battalion Slice (11-2/3 Bn)	1,104

IV Corps Model Force

In IV Corps we chose the ARVN 9th Division because during the period of the study it started to conduct mobile, Clearing Zone type operations throughout the Delta. ARVN 9th was also relatively successful, compared with the other IV Corps ARVN divisions, in executing these Clearing Zone functions. The breakdown in Enclosure 8 shows the ARVN 9th Division and its Corps and U.S. support. The total force and the size of a battalion "slice" of the force are shown in Table 6.

TABLE 641st DTA FORCE MODEL

ARVN Division Force	13,801
ARVN Corps Support	
Combat Service	2,128
	<u>1,096</u>
	3,224
U.S. Support Equivalent	
Combat Service	-
	<u>376</u>
	376
Total Model Slice (through Corps)	17,401
Battalion Slice (15 Bn)	1,160

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Other Support

We also examined all other ARVN support assets assigned neither to specific ARVN maneuver divisions nor to the CTZ's but which would indirectly or directly support division forces. While we did not allocate these assets to our model forces we identified and counted them and computed a support "slice" which can be added to each model division force generated in our study. We computed the support "slice" by apportioning 1/15 of the unallocated portion of these units to each of the 15 division force equivalents in the RVNAF.^{1/} Table 7 lays out these division level combat and service support "slices."

TABLE 7

Type Unit	Total Strength
Special Zones Staffs	677
Artillery Command	49
Separate Infantry Units	12,877
Ranger Command	73
Special Forces	3,598
Military Police	8,094
Military Security	2,816
Military Intelligence	2,981
Political War and Civil Affairs	2,950
Signal	10,216
Engineer	17,862
Medical	10,449
Ordnance	12,515
Quartermaster	3,875
Transportation	12,979
Training Base	15,138
Pipeline	50,103
	167,252
Unallocated Division Combat and Service Support Slice (15 DFE's)	11,150

Finally, we lumped the GVN military offices, the RVNAF headquarters and General Staff, the special staffs, the Central Logistics Command and various other headquarters and administrative units which would not vary greatly with the size of the total force into a Headquarters and Administration figure shown below.

^{1/} The 15 DFE's include 10 ARVN divisions, 1 ABN division, 3 separate regiments, and all Ranger and Marine units.

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TABLE 8
RVNAF HQ AND ADMIN

<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>
GVN Military Officers	1,481
RVNAF Hq/JGS	1,321
Special Staffs	1,575
Central Logistics Command	4,118
POLWAR Central Dept	2,116
Hq Units RVNAF	1,562
Admin Units	7,152
Total	19,325

Collectively, the model battalion slices, the unallocated DFE support "slice" and the Headquarters and Administration figure developed above provide the necessary building blocks for estimating the overall size and the disposition by CTZ of ARVN forces required to execute the Area Security strategy. Table 9 summarizes these figures.

TABLE 9
MODEL ARVN FORCES

<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Battalion Slice thru Corps	
I & III Corps	1,198
II Corps	1,104
IV Corps	1,160
Other Support, DFE "slice"	11,150
Headquarters and Admin	19,325

ARVN Force Requirements

In the Clearing Zone Forces section above we developed a range of ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalions required to execute Clearing Zone type operations in each Corps (See Table 3). Applying our model battalion "slices" to each CTZ requirement, we generated the following ARVN/VNMC Corps force requirements.

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TABLE 10
ARVN/VNMC CORPS REQUIREMENTS

Area	Maneuver Bns		Strength	
	Low Threat	High Threat	Low Threat	High Threat
I Corps	58	69	69,489	82,662
II Corps	68	80	74,256	87,370
III Corps	68	85	81,464	101,830
IV Corps	46	62	53,360	71,920
Total	240	296	278,569	343,782

Considering the end FY 70 ARVN/VNMC force of 186 battalions as 15 division force equivalents (DFE) and assuming that each 12 maneuver battalions or major fractions thereof added to the ARVN force will constitute an additional DFE we have a total of 20 divisions for the low threat and 24 for the high threat. Applying our unallocated support slices to these DFE's we have:

	Low Threat	High Threat
Unallocated Combat and Service Spt	223,000	267,600

Finally, we added the Headquarters and Administration figure and subtracted Phase II authorized VNMC forces to derive the total ARVN force requirement.

TABLE 11
ARVN FORCE

Type Forces	Low Threat	High Threat
Maneuver (Corps) Forces	278,569	343,782
Other Support Forces	233,000	267,600
Headquarters & Admin Forces	19,325	19,325
Less: VNMC (present authorization)	(13,070)	(13,070)
Total	517,824	617,637

The ARVN force figures developed here are those required to maintain present security after all U.S. and FWMAF forces withdraw. Assuming that the enemy threat range envisioned in this study (1969 levels) remains constant, the ARVN force required to maintain present security levels

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along with the present U.S. and FWNF forces (109 maneuver battalions by April 15) is only 244,675 for low threat and 343,675 for high threat. If we assume that the U.S. and FWNF force drops to about 50 maneuver battalions, the ARVN would need about 398,975 for low threat and 497,975 for high threat.

Consolidation and Secure Zone Forces - We used the 11th DTA model for all four Corps areas in determining Regional and Popular Force requirements because the RF and PF in the 11th DTA operated successfully in general agreement with the principles of the ASC. We also chose 2nd Qtr 1969 as the base time period for RF and PF forces since by that time at least 90% of the rural population in the 11th DTA model area was considered relatively secure. Use of the 11th DTA territorial force as a countrywide model is valid because the index we developed accounts for differences in population distribution and area size, the two most important determinants of RF/PF requirements. The relative requirement index for the Consolidation Zone is similar to the relative threat index for the Clearing Zone but includes the factors of (1) guerrilla and separate VC company and platoon strength, (2) size of the rural "C" population, and (3) size of the computed Consolidation Zone less Secure Areas.

$$RRI_{RF} = 1/3 \left[\frac{ESTR \text{ Corps}}{ESTR \text{ Model}} + \frac{RUR "C" \text{ Pop Corps}}{RUR "C" \text{ Pop Model}} + \frac{ACNZ \text{ Corps}}{ACNZ \text{ Model}} \right]$$

Where

RRI = Relative Requirement Index

ESTR = Enemy guerrilla and separate unit strength

RUR "C" Pop = Rural population with "C" HES rating

ACNZ = Area of consolidation zone less secure zone

We then multiplied the number of RF units which maintained security in the model area 1/ by this index to calculate the number of RF units needed in each Corps. We calculated the numbers required both to maintain present security conditions (security levels of Oct 69) and to expand security (bringing all D, E, and VC hamlets up to "C" rating).

Similarly, we computed the number of PF platoons needed in each Corps Zone both to maintain present security and to expand security. The PF relative requirement index is based on two factors: (1) rural population with C or better HES rating and (2) size of the entire Consolidation Zone, including the Secure Zone.

$$RRI_{PF} = 1/2 \left[\frac{RUR ABC \text{ Pop Corps}}{RUR ABC \text{ Pop Model}} + \frac{TACNZ \text{ Corps}}{TACNZ \text{ Model}} \right]$$

Where TACNZ = total area of Consolidation Zone including Secure Zone.

1/ Units assigned to security missions according to the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES).

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Table 12 below shows the number of RF companies and PF platoons needed by Corps Zone and countrywide. It appears that presently there are more than enough companies countrywide to meet expanded security requirements. Since Territorial Forces cannot be shifted from one Corps area to another, however, special attention should be given to the RF now assigned to security missions in I Corps and IV Corps. In these two Corps, present levels appear to be too low (IV Corps) or marginally adequate (I Corps) to maintain present security. Similarly, present levels of PF in IV Corps are just above the minimum required to maintain present security, and for expanded security, 62 more platoons would be needed. We note that IV Corps traditionally keeps a larger percentage of RF companies on offensive operations than the other three Corps.

TABLE 12REGIONAL FORCE COMPANY/POPULAR FORCE PLATOON REQUIREMENTS

	Present No. ^{a/} of Units			No. On Security Mission		No to Retain ^{b/} Security Levels		No. to Achieve ^{c/} Expanded Security	
	RF	PF	RF	PF	RF	PF	RF	PF	
I Corps	212	920	171	863	169	743	183	863	
II Corps	359	1311	291	1266	237	1121	261	1268	
III Corps	372	1028	310	965	148	803	153	835	
IV Corps	530	2413	307	2154	380	2004	465	2475	
SVN	1473	5672	1079	5248	934	4671	1062	5441	

^{a/} December 1969 for PF platoons, November 1969 for RF rifle companies.

^{b/} October 1969 HES ratings.

^{c/} All D, E, VC hamlets are brought to a "C" rating.

While the number of RF companies available countrywide is some 400 more than required for expanded security, some of these companies would be engaged in training and rehabilitation, while other units would act as a "swing force" to assist regular forces during periods of high enemy threat (such as the IV Corps situation); still others are required for border surveillance missions on a more or less permanent basis.

Recent CVN directives and comments by President Thieu indicate an apparent modification to the Area Security Concept as presently written, specifically in the formation of an elite PSDF force to replace PF platoons in A, B, and C hamlets during 1970. This program envisions formation of 35-man inter-teams (platoons) from the 500,000 arms-bearing PSDF and training four men per team (60,000 in all) in one week courses. If this program is successful the end result could provide substantial

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assistance for the regular forces from RF units released by the "up-graded" PF platoons. We have not included the effect of this plan in our RF/PF calculations..

Total RVNAF

Our force structure development has concentrated on ARVN, RF and PF. In determining a total RVNAF Force Structure, we assume that a VNN and VNMC of about 37,900 and 13,400 respectively, by end FY 73^{1/} is appropriate. To determine the strength for the VNAF we took the Phase II authorized strength of 35,800 and added the Corps wide projection of the strengths of the Army helicopter and fixed-wing units which supported the model ARVN forces (see Enclosure 8). This resulted in a VNAF of about 52,300 to support the maneuver battalions in a low intensity threat and 57,100 to support them for a high threat. This large VNAF would be able to provide the expanded ARVN/VNMC combat forces with the same level of helicopter and fixed-wing support that the model forces received from the U.S. SVN manpower and U.S. fiscal constraints, however, would probably obviate building a VNAF of this size. The requirement for ARVN forces generated in Table 11 would of course vary with changes in enemy threat and activity and would decrease if the RF began to assume some of the Clearing Zone type missions which are envisioned as ARVN responsibilities in the Area Security Concept. Ignoring these possible variations for the moment, the total Regular Force requirement would be as shown below.

TABLE 13

VIETNAMESE REGULAR FORCE REQUIREMENTS
(Personnel - 000)

	<u>Authorized Phase II</u>	<u>Low Threat</u>	<u>High Threat</u>
ARVN	395.8	507.8	617.6
VNN	33.1	37.9	37.9
VNMC	13.1	13.4	14.4
VNAF	<u>35.8</u>	<u>52.3</u>	<u>57.1</u>
Total	477.8	611.4	727.0

^{1/} These force levels have been requested both by MACV and JGS in recent documents.

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In the section on territorial forces we determined the number of RF companies and PF platoons needed by Corps Zone to maintain present levels of security and to achieve expanded levels of security. Using an RF company strength of 123 personnel and a PF platoon strength of 35 personnel and using existing RF and PF overhead strength percentages of 38% and 11%, respectively, we computed total RF/PF requirements countrywide.^{1/}

TABLE 14RF/PF REQUIREMENTS
(Personnel-000)

	<u>Authorized Phase II</u>	<u>Present Security</u>	<u>Expanded Security</u>
Regional Force	275.7	253.7	288.6
Popular Force	<u>239.4</u>	<u>199.7</u>	<u>232.6</u>
Total	515.1	453.4	521.2

In order to determine a total RVNAF, we added the regular forces required under period of low threat to the RF/PF needed for expanded security, since hopefully security will continue to expand during periods of low enemy activity. This yields an RVNAF of 1,132,600 personnel. On the other hand, during periods of high enemy threat, RF/PF would more than likely be attempting to maintain present security. This yields an RVNAF of 1,180,400. The present end FY 73 authorization for the total RVNAF (Phase II) is 992,900. Subsequent force structure requests have indicated a desire for up to 1,100,000 personnel.

TABLE 15TOTAL RVNAF
(Personnel 000)

	<u>Phase II</u>	<u>Low Threat</u>	<u>High Threat</u>
Regular Forces	477.8	611.4	727.0
Territorial Forces	<u>515.1</u>	<u>521.2</u>	<u>453.4</u>
Total	992.9	1132.6	1180.4

1/ In addition we added 27% of the RF total and 7% of the PF total to account for units not on security missions.

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Conclusions

1. Our study has generated a requirement for a 1.13 to 1.18 million RVNAF to implement the Area Security Concept successfully under threat levels existing throughout 1969 and with no U.S. or FWMAF combat forces in-country. This compares to an approved end FY 73 RVNAF of 0.99 million (Phase II) and subsequent requests for up to 1.10 million from the JCS. Current manpower surveys indicate that the 1.10 million level is attainable.

2. The requirement for from 240 to 296 ARVN/VNMC battalions to operate in the Clearing Zone considers that (1) the threat remains at 1969 levels, (2) all U.S. and FWMAF units are redeployed and (3) that no provisional RF battalions operate in the Clearing Zone. The present RF contains about 400 companies that are not used on security missions. Some of these can be employed to assist the ARVN in the Clearing Zone. By utilizing 40 RF battalions (160 companies) the total ARVN required (without US/FWMAF) would be 200 to 256 battalions. This would in turn reduce the total ARVN required from 517.8-617.6 thousand down to 427.8-547.9 thousand. These strengths compare with authorized and requested strengths as shown below.

ARVN STRENGTH
(Personnel-000)

	Authorized Phase II	QASD(SA) Projected	QASD(SA) Modified	MACV Requests ^{b/}
Low Intensity Threat	395.8	517.8	427.8	517.3
High Intensity Threat	395.8	617.6	547.9	517.3

^{a/} Forty RF battalions utilized in the Clearing Zone to assist ARVN.

^{b/} This strength has not been approved.

3. Additional RVNAF forces will be needed in each Corps Clearing Zone after U.S. units withdraw unless the threat diminishes. The precise number of maneuver battalions required, however, should incorporate qualitative adjustments based on differences in effectiveness and mobility between US/FWMAF, ARVN, and VC/NVA battalions. Further, since the size of the ARVN is a function of the three criteria in the Relative Threat Index any modifications of the index (for instance, to reflect differences in relative importance (weighting) of the factors) will change the requirement.

4. Our required RF/PF forces, from 453.4 to 521.2 thousand compare favorably with the 515.1 thousand (approved for end FY 73 Phase II) and subsequent requests for up to 544.2 thousand from the JCS. If Territorial Forces (RF/PF) operate as the ASC requires, there are sufficient RF rifle companies countrywide to bring all D, E, and VC hamlets to a C rating (expanded security) when the main force security situation permits access to these hamlets. At least 62 more PF platoons, however, will be needed

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in IV Corps under conditions of expanded security. It would be reasonable to employ any excess RF units in portions of the Clearing Zone near their homes rather than to create more regular units.

5. We made no attempt to evaluate the Peoples' Self Defense Force (PSDF) as an effective force in the Secure Area primarily because we have very sketchy information about them. However, it is expected that the effect of at least the armed PSDF would release some PF platoons now on security or other type missions. This in turn would generate additional PF units for security expansion or consolidation; these were not included in our calculations. The apparent GVN change in strategy with regard to PSDF in 1970 will also impact on the regular forces, since more RF units will be made available for employment in the Clearing Zone. This in turn will reduce the requirements for ARVN units.


6. Re-calculation of threat and requirement indices should be made at least every 4-6 months, particularly where PSDF employment changes the ASC strategy.

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TERMINOLOGY FOR AREA SECURITY


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Enclosure 1

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LEGEND

██	SECURE ZONE (A+B)
██████████	CONSOLIDATION ZONE (C+ADJACENT 1 KM)
_____	CLEARING ZONE

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Enclosure 2


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SOUTH VIETNAM

11th DTA


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LEGEND

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██████████	CONSOLIDATION ZONE (C+ADJACENT 1 KM)
████	CLEARING ZONE

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Enclosure 3

SOUTH VIETNAM

11th DTA

OCTOBER 1969




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24th STZ

SEPTEMBER 1968



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Enclosure 4


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
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	CONSOLIDATION ZONE (C+ADJACENT 1 KM)
	CLEARING ZONE

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
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
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LEGEND

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	CLEARING ZONE


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MODEL CLEARING ZONE FORCES, ARVN

Type Unit	Number			Unit Strength			Strength Allocation ^{a/}		
	I CTZ	II CTZ	IV CTZ	I CTZ	II CTZ	IV CTZ	I CTZ	II CTZ	IV CTZ
<u>Division Forces</u>									
Infantry Bn	17	7	12	665	665	665	11,305	4,655	7,980
Arm'd Cav Sqdn	1	1	1	693	693	693	693	693	693
Div Recon Co.	1	-	1	111	-	111	111	-	111
Hq Inf Div	1	-	1	208	-	208	208	-	208
Hq Co.	1	-	1	124	-	124	124	-	124
Hq Inf Rgmt	4	2	3	200	-	200	800	400	600
STZ HHC	-	1	-	-	187	-	-	187	-
Rgmt Recon Co.	4	1	3	111	-	111	444	111	333
Div Arty	1	-	1	1,577	-	1,577	1,577	-	1,577
Arty Bty (2 plts)	-	1	-	-	123	-	-	123	-
Scout Co.	-	3	-	-	142	-	-	426	-
Eng Bn	1	-	1	437	-	437	437	-	437
Eng Co.	-	1	-	-	103	-	-	103	-
DS Bn	1	-	1	666	-	666	666	-	666
Sig Bn	1	-	1	378	-	378	378	-	378
Med Bn	1	-	1	488	-	488	488	-	488
Med Co	-	1	-	-	98	-	-	98	-
Light Trk Co.	1	-	1	152	-	152	152	-	152
Mil Band	1	-	1	29	-	29	29	-	29
Scout Dog Plt	1	-	1	25	-	25	25	-	25
Div Augment ^{b/}	1	-	-	154	-	-	154	-	-
Division Forces Total							17,591	6,796	13,801
<u>Corps Forces</u>									
Arm'd Cav Sqdn	2	2	1	729	729	729	729 ^{c/}	452 ^{d/}	233
Corps Hq	1	1	1	573	573	573	287	196	182
Arty 155 Bn	3	1	3	540	540	540	810	142 ^{e/}	517
Arty 105 Bn	2	-	2	501	-	501	501	-	320
Ranger Bn	3	3	4	655	655	655	983	1,965 ^{f/}	636
Ranger Gp Hq	1	1	1	124	124	124	62	124	40
Corps Combat Support Total							3,372	2,889	2,128
Area Log Cmd	1	1	1	280	280	300	140	96	96
Engr Gp (Combat)	1	1	1	2,517	2,517	2,517	1,258	863	803
Corps Sig Bn	1	1	1	440	440	440	220	151	140
Med Gp	1	-	-	180	180	180	90	62	57
Corps Service Support Total							1,708	1,172	1,096

^{a/} Except where noted otherwise Corps and U.S. support forces allocated to model forces on basis of model force battalions/total Corps battalions split. I CTZ-20/40; II CTZ-12/35; III CTZ-15/47.

^{b/} Includes Radar Section (16), Direct Support (98) and Signal (40) augmentations.

^{c/} Two ACS's operated with ARVN 1st, we assume one was organic and the other assigned full time from I Corps.

^{d/} 3rd ACS and 14th ACS (-) operated with TF Lien; 1 squadron organic, 2/3 squadron allocated here.

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Type Unit	Number			ARVN Equiv. Strength			Strength Allocation		
	I CTZ	II CTZ	IV CTZ	I CTZ	II CTZ	IV CTZ	I CTZ	II CTZ	IV CTZ
<u>U.S. Support</u>									
Arty 175 Bn	2	-	-	540	-	-	540	-	-
Arty 8" Bn	1	-	-	540	5/	-	270	-	-
Arty 155 Bn	-	2	-	-	138	-	-	276	h/
Arty 105 Bn	1	4+	-	501	123	-	226	532	h/
Air Def Bn	1	-	-	690	-	-	345	-	-
Arty Cmd Post	-	1	-	-	126	-	-	126	h/
Combat Engr Bn	-	1	-	-	540	-	-	540	h/
Equiv. U.S. Combat Support Total (ARVN)						1,381	1,474	-	-
Sig Spt Co. ^{1/}	1	1	1	122	122	122	61	42	39
Sig Co. ^{2/}	1	2-1/	1	226	226	226	113	280	85
Truck Co. ^{3/}	1	1	1	168	163	168	84	58	54
Port Term/Boat Corp ^{4/}	1	1	1	200	200	200	100	69	64
Dir. Spt Co.	1	1	1	302	302	302	151	104	96
Med Det.	-	-	4	-	-	30	-	-	38
Equiv. U.S. Service Support Total						509	553	376	
GRAND TOTAL Model ARVN Force						24,561	12,684	17,401	
Model ARVN Battalion Slice ^{1/}						1,198	1,104	1,160	
<u>Support</u>									
Cav Sqdn	1	1-	1	850	177	850	425	177	h/ 271
Asslt Helo Co.	4	1+	6	288	300	288	576	300	h/ 551
Asslt Spt Co.	2	1-	1	268	100	268	268	100	h/ 85
Aerial Wpn Co.	-	-	1	-	-	250	-	-	80
Recon Co.	2	1	2	123	123	123	123	46	79
Avn Bn HHC	1	-	3	100	-	100	50	-	96
Surv. Co.	2	1-	1	331	150	331	331	51	105
VNAF Equivalent of U.S. Helo Support						1,773	674	1,267	
VNAF Helo Support per Battalion						86	58	84	

e/ One 155 bty plus 2 platoons of another.
 f/ All 3 Ranger Battalions in II Corps operated with TF Lien.
 g/ Since ARVN will have no 8" howitzers, 155 Bn substituted here.
 h/ U.S. combat support for II CTZ model derived from actual units in support of TF Lien, therefore entire strength allocated to model.
 i/ U.S. now providing about 2 Co. equivalents of signal support to each Corps during helo assaults, otherwise most divisions self sufficient.
 j/ Includes 3 signal detachments with TF Lien.
 k/ U.S. now providing some surface transport, primarily port service and truck; strength estimates based on number of U.S. units required to handle 20% of RVNAF tonnage (current figure in I CTZ).
 l/ Model force contained 20-1/2 battalions in I CTZ, 11-2/3 battalions in II CTZ, and 15 battalions in IV CTZ.

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A GVN PEOPLE'S ARMY

Summary:

A recent RAND study explored a people's army concept for South Vietnam as a way to reduce the burden of their large military structure. Noting that the Vietnamese have historically used this concept to cope with protracted war, the study concludes that:

- As US support declines, reorganization of the GVN force structure is inevitable. A systematic demobilization concept now may prevent disruption later, after manpower and economic stresses have mounted to intolerable levels.
- The Territorial Forces (RF/PP/PSDF) could be used as a nucleus for phasing into a people's army over the next five or six years, with large regular force reductions only in the later stages.

Our examination of the pertinent data shows:

- RVNAF can find the manpower to sustain the current force, but must dip into their manpower reserves and incur large costs to the economy.

- GVN force increases since 1968 have trended toward a people's army in fact, if not in name; the proposed nucleus now accounts for over 70% of all ground forces in RVN and has gradually assumed the bulk of the defensive burden since mid-1969.

- Less than 20% of the total RVNAF budget goes to the RF/PP, even though this force has been a major factor in providing population security, contains 50% of the military manpower, sustains half of all GVN combat deaths and contributes nearly 40% of the enemy KIA. Moreover, only \$1.5 billion (about 10%) of the total war cost is allocated to territorial security.

The most compelling argument for the people's army is that the Vietnamese are already moving in that direction. President Thieu reportedly has announced to his Cabinet a new four year plan which he will send to the National Assembly shortly after his inauguration. His plan strongly resembles the phased approach to a people's army noted above.

Gradual movement toward a streamlined regular force which can deploy its units to any threatened area, coupled with development of the RF/PP/PSDF into a defense force should be acceptable to the US and GVN:

- It offers the US a chance to reduce the apparent \$2-3 billion dollar floor on war costs with a lesser risk to US interests in SVN.

- If offers the GVN an opportunity to revitalise its economy and become less dependent on outside support without grave risks to their security.

The military situation, combined with economic and manpower realities, favors a shift in priorities. The shift need not be abrupt—the three phase plan seems to provide a reasonable transition in the time frame envisaged by President Thieu. We believe Vietnamese initiative in this direction should be encouraged and supported. But the initiative should remain with them.

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A GVN PEOPLE'S ARMY

Details

Among the serious problems which inhibit improvement in RVNAF quality is their continued high desertion rates. The average RVNAF soldier now faces endless military service with little hope of resuming an active and productive role in Vietnamese society--a state of mind conducive to desertion but which a term of service might alleviate.

The RAND Corporation has explored in detail the concept of a people's army for South Vietnam.^{1/} The concept not only includes a term of service but also discusses the political, economic, and social costs of the GVN's large military structure. We felt it would be useful to summarize the RAND work and then explore the problem further.

The People's Army

Research into Vietnam's cultural and military history shows much historical precedent for their current problem of maintaining an adequate military force without stifling the country's economy. Historically, Vietnamese wars have:

- Been prolonged conflicts involving the general populace, with no clearly defined end.
- Ebed and flowed in the military, political, and economic arenas.

The structure of the present RVNAF regular forces is better suited to fight a conventional western style war than to cope with a protracted struggle.: When US aid is inevitably reduced or withdrawn, the GVN will have to adjust its force structure. Their reorganization alternatives seem bounded by the following grim choices:

-- Demobilization to a force size their manpower and economy can support. This alternative risks a reduction below the level needed to meet the threat, and the influx of unemployed veterans on an already burdened economy could create additional social unrest leading to renewed insurgency.

-- Retention of the present force structure. This alternative carries the danger that the country will crack under the weight of its own military investment rather than from enemy pressure. At best it may survive only as an economically and socially stunted garrison state.

Within these bounds, there is an alternative which draws on Vietnamese traditions--an elite and mobile regular force backed up by a people's army--an army which bears most of the defensive burden and also functions as a productive social unit.

^{1/} A People's Army for South Vietnam: A Vietnamese Solution. R-897-ARPA, November 1971 (Preliminary draft), Brian Jenkins.

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The study contends that the GVN cannot postpone demobilization, economic stabilization and growth, and political stability to some post-war era that probably won't come, or if it did, wouldn't be recognized.

The problem then, is how to move toward a people's army without destroying RVNAF, the GVN's most cohesive and efficient national institution. The study concedes that... "The argument that a people's army is less burdensome on the economy has little merit if it cannot also defend the country." Three phases of development are suggested over the next six years, with large reductions in the regular ground units only in the later stages:

-- Initial Phase (1972-73). During this period the program for a people's army would be established. Using the territorial forces (RF/FF/PSDF) as a nucleus, the command structure and tactical doctrine would be developed, but only minor reduction of the regular ground forces (about 10,000) would be involved. Additionally, a rotational reserve system (term of service) and military farming colonies²⁷ are instituted.

-- Second Phase (1973-75). Additional measures can be taken to expand and increase the effectiveness of the people's army based on evaluations of the initial phase. Limited demobilization (20-25%) of the regular ground forces begins, and regular units not involved in combat undertake some reconstruction and development tasks.

-- Third Phase (beyond 1975). The people's army gradually assumes a greater defensive role as the regular army is reduced to around 200,000. This force would be organized as mobile brigades, capable of deploying to any part of the country.

The gist of the argument is that:

-- Reorganization of the GVN force structure is inevitable. A systematic demobilization concept now may prevent a highly disruptive process later, after manpower and economic stresses have mounted to intolerable levels.

-- The organizational impact of moving toward a people's army could be minimized by using the Territorial Forces (RF/FF/PSDF) as a nucleus.

Based on data available in Washington, we have examined these points. Our major findings follow.

²⁷ Military farming colonies (Don Dien) are created by giving demobilized soldiers land in less secure areas which they would farm, defend, and eventually own. These colonies would provide a buffer between populated areas and enemy units which have been forced into uninhabited regions.

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Manpower and Economic Implications

Considering estimates from several sources, we conclude that 115-150,000 physically fit 18 year olds are probably available for military service each year in South Vietnam. These sources also indicate:

-- A residual of about 200,000 men who are physically fit but have not been drafted for various reasons.

-- About one million men aged 31-45 not up to RVNAF fitness standards, but who could serve in noncombat tasks.

During FY 71, a year of relatively high losses from crossborder operations, RVNAF assigned strength increased by nearly 42,000. The total potential losses (combat deaths, seriously wounded, missing, and net desertions) suffered by RVNAF during this period was about 227,000, while personnel gains (recruiting and conscription) amounted to more than 225,000. This indicates that RVNAF was able to replace its net losses and increase assigned strength during FY 71 by some combination of the following:^{3/}

-- Extracting up to 100,000 from the residual manpower pools mentioned above. (Assuming they obtained about 125,000 incoming 18 year olds.)

-- Recovering an unknown, but probably substantial, number of regular force deserters who later join territorial forces near their homes. Net desertions account for 137,000 of the 227,000 potential losses.

-- Returning some of the seriously wounded and missing (about 68,000 during FY 71) to duty, or alternatively, not dropping them from the assigned strength figures.

-- Recruiting some of the Hoi Chanh (there were 27,000 Hoi Chanh during FY 71, and a yearly average of 20,000 since 1963).

Although the data seems to show that RVNAF will be increasingly hard pressed to find replacements, experience of the past four years warns against making a firm conclusion that a manpower shortage exists.

-- RVNAF has expanded over 70% since 1967 in the face of such pessimistic assessments.

-- The GVN can regulate manpower flows by manipulating policy (lowering standards, cracking down on draft dodgers and deserters, refusing deferments, etc.).

^{3/} RVNAF gains from CIDG conversion and losses to the National Police were about equal during FY 71.

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Still, the data does suggest that RVNAF expansion and replacement of losses has absorbed virtually all of the physically fit 18 year olds and substantial numbers of skilled civilians already in the production base.^{4/5/}

We therefore conclude that there is no demonstrable manpower shortage per se, but that the GVN has to resort to deficit manpower spending to maintain RVNAF--thereby adversely affecting social and economic productivity, an effect more likely to mount than to decline.

In economic terms, the GVN shoulders a monumental defense burden. A 1968 international study of 26 countries revealed that South Vietnam's relative defense expenditures (percent of GNP) were exceeded only by Israel. The US, USSR, and China ranked well below South Vietnam, and 19 of the 26 countries had percentages less than half that for RVN. In the last five years:

-- The GVN has devoted 15-17% of its GNP and over 60% of its total budget to defense.

-- Revenues and foreign aid have more than doubled, but have not kept pace with inflation and expenditures.

Yet the GVN has borne only 3-7% of the total war cost in the past three years. In FY 71 the US picked up \$14 billion (93%) of the \$15.1 billion total cost, spending:^{6/}

-- \$11.3 billion on US forces, of which air and general support forces accounted for two-thirds (\$7.5 billion).

-- \$2.7 billion on RVNAF, including US advisors and their support, MASF, and \$115 million joint support funding through the GVN budget.

- 4/ Particularly since we have not allowed for any VC recruitment from the manpower pool.
- 5/ Although no estimates are currently available concerning the maximum size of RVNAF which could be sustained and still assure economic growth, DA Pamphlet 550-40, Area Handbook for Vietnam-1962, estimated that manpower in RVNAF should not exceed 550,000 if mid-1962 economic levels were to be maintained. A linear extrapolation based on current population would impose a comparable limit for RVNAF of about 700,000.
- 6/ Vietnam Program Budget data, which records the amount actually spent in FY 71, even though the item might have been budgeted in FY 69 or 70. This is particularly applicable for equipment deliveries to RVNAF, some of which have long lead times. These are total costs, not incremental costs.

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In the short run (through FY 73) it appears that the GVN's economic health depends on the US spending some \$2.0-2.5 billion yearly on RVNAF plus another \$0.5 billion in economic aid--a total Vietnam cost floor of \$2.5-3.0 billion.

-- The GVN funds only about \$1.1 billion (30%) of the current RVNAF cost. They would have to allocate nearly 65% of their GNP to absorb the entire load.

-- The total cost to the US will depend on the level of air and general support forces required for continued military security.

Beyond FY 73 the US cost floor should decrease, since relatively few equipment deliveries to RVNAF are scheduled for that period. This cost floor is also dependent on the level of conflict and GVN's ability to maintain their current contribution.

It appears that without a US spending floor of some \$3 billion in South Vietnam, their economic outlook is indeed dismal. Yet even this level may not be enough to provide adequate military security. Moreover, their GNP growth rate from 1967-1969 was about equal to the annual rate of inflation. This failure to achieve a real increase in economic well being may be traceable to the manpower situation discussed earlier.

The Nucleus - Present Size and Capability

We examined the point that the RF/PP and PSDF already embody many characteristics of a people's army and could be the nucleus for such an organization.

Although it could be argued that strength distributions in the GVN Military Regions primarily reflect the nature of the threat and population density for that region, overall GVN force increases since early 1968 have nonetheless trended toward a people's army in fact, if not in name:

-- RF/PP increases have been twice as large as those for ARVN/VNMC (both entered 1968 with about 300,000), while paramilitary strength is about the same.

-- The PSDF, non-existent prior to Tet 1968, now number 4.4 million, including some 490,000 Key Interteam (KIT) personnel who are nearly equivalent to the PP in organizational cohesiveness. Our subsequent discussion therefore includes only the KIT PSDF.

Except in MR I, RF/PP strength is clearly dominant among the ground forces and they comprise more than half the total RVNAF strength in the country. Moreover, the combined RF/PP/KIT PSDF nucleus accounts for over 70% of all ground forces. At the Military Region level their proportion of total ground forces varies as follows:

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-- MR I: 66%
-- MR II: 75%
-- MR III: 73%
-- MR IV: 83%
-- Saigon Area: 35%

Thus, the proposed nucleus already has the most ground force strength in all areas except Saigon. We next examined operational data to assess its capability.

Our investigation supports the contention that the nature of the war has changed considerably since 1968. Characteristics of this change are:

-- A decline in intensity. First half 71 data shows both friendly and enemy combat deaths in South Vietnam have decreased 50-60% from comparable 1968 data.

-- Enemy Activity Patterns. The net effect of the enemy strategy change in mid-1969 (COSVN 9) was a greater enemy emphasis on selective targeting and economy of force tactics.

-- A greater defensive burden on the RF/FF. Comparing the same periods for 1969, 1970, and 1971, friendly KIA from enemy ground attacks and total incidents shows:

- Increasing RF/FF KIA and either unchanged or declining paramilitary/civilian deaths.

- Declining US/FW KIA and either unchanged or declining GVN regular KIA.

Since the people's army would eventually take over much of the country's defense we looked at the RF/FF during the period they were gradually assuming greater defensive responsibilities (since mid-1969). We found no evidence of deterioration in their overall performance.

-- Nearly 40% of the total enemy KIA in South Vietnam were attributed to the RF/FF in 1971, up from 20% in 1970 and 10% in 1969 (comparable periods).

-- The enemy to friendly KIA ratio showed an initial sag in GVN effectiveness against enemy ground attacks in 1970, followed by a partial recovery in 1971.

-- The country's HES A-B security rating rose more than 35 percentage points (from 50% in mid-1969 to 85% in mid 1971), together with a 15% reduction in paramilitary/civilian deaths since 1970.

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The extent to which continued good performance is dependent on the regular force shield behind which RF/FF and PSDF operate is not easy to determine. Events of the past two years in MRs III and IV, however, indicate that this shield does not have to be nearby in order to be effective. Nowhere else has the war changed more dramatically; main force conflict by battalion size units has virtually disappeared in MR's III and IV except near remote base areas or in Cambodia. Yet in the two MRs combined:

-- RF/FF and paramilitary units accounted for about 60% of the enemy KIA and 70% of the friendly KIA during 1971.

-- HES A-B security ratings have continued to progress and are now the highest in the country.

On the other hand, RF/FF in southern MR I and northern MR II have demonstrated some sensitivity to the presence or absence of regular forces. The turbulence caused by the departure of US Marines and later shifts of US Army units appears to have contributed to declines in RF/FF performance this year, while, in MR II, the RF/FF have not yet attained performance levels which would allow regular forces to free themselves from the populated areas.

Overall Evaluation and Observations

We find the major thrust of the People's Army concept to be persuasive. The data suggest that it warrants serious consideration by both the Vietnamese and the US as a means to reduce defense costs without excessive security risks.

-- Without such a change, the US may be faced with an expenditure floor of about \$3 billion for years.

-- The Vietnamese are at present hard pressed to accommodate the war cost even with such a US support level and have had to borrow against their future manpower productivity.

It would appear that current spending is out of balance with the changed nature of the war. Less than 20% of the total RVNAF budget goes to the RF/FF -- a force which has been a major factor in providing population security, contains 50% of the military manpower, sustains 40-50% of all GVN combat deaths (including civilians) and is contributing nearly 40% of enemy KIA in the country. Moreover, only \$1.5 billion (about 10%) of the total war cost is allocated to territorial security.

The suggested movement toward a people's army does not call for large regular force reductions in the initial stages. Our own analysis recognizes two factors which support a measured and selective reduction of regular forces.

-- Events of the past year show that there are limitations on where ARVN troops can be deployed which render it less a national army than a federation of four semi-autonomous corps. Regular units operating out of their normal MRs for long periods begin to suffer severe morale problems leading to increased desertion rates.

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-- The change in the nature of the war has differed among the GVN MRs and until the regular force becomes truly national, it is the MR, not the country-wide, threat which should dictate the appropriate force distribution between regulars and non-regulars.

The most compelling argument for the people's army is that the Vietnamese are already moving in that direction. President Thieu reportedly has announced a new four year plan recently to his Cabinet, which he will send to the National Assembly shortly after his inauguration. The key elements of the plan, which strongly resemble the three phased approach to a people's army, are:

-- The intensity of the war will continue to decline and the policy of the GVN is to develop and reconstruct the nation while the fighting is diminishing.

-- Defense policy must be based on the people's self defense. The country cannot continue with over one million men in the armed forces. Even after peace, the GVN must have the concept of the people with a gun in one hand and a plow in the other.

-- The armed forces cannot be reduced suddenly because of economic disruptions, but the regular forces will be reduced to 300,000 beginning in 1974. The Popular Force strength will be reduced by about 50,000 per year over a three year period beginning in 1972, while the Regional Force and National Police will remain at their current strength.

Some Vietnamese apparently feel that the likelihood of US resistance to the people's army will be a strong impediment to its implementation. We would agree that in the field and in Washington there is an understandable reluctance to undertake major organizational changes, which can breed inactivity at the operational level while the power elite jockey for positions in the new hierarchy. One GVN minister has reportedly suggested that some aspects could begin now in MR III and IV. We think the suggestion has merit:

-- Enemy main forces in both MRs have fragmented into company and platoon size since 1970.

-- By the end of the forthcoming 71-72 dry season we should be better able to evaluate the residual capability of enemy units in the MR IV base areas and those adjacent to MR III in Cambodia.

We conclude that the military situation, combined with economic and manpower realities, favors a shift in priorities. The shift need not be abrupt -- the three phase plan seems to provide a reasonable transition in the time frame envisaged by President Thieu. We believe Vietnamese initiative in this direction should be encouraged and supported. But the initiative should remain with them.

A gradual movement toward a streamlined regular force which can effectively deploy its units to any threatened area, coupled with an expansion of the RF/PP/PSDF into a cohesive force for defense should be acceptable to the US and the GVN:

-- It offers the US a chance to reduce the apparent \$2-3 billion dollar floor on war costs with a lesser risk to US interests in the area.

-- It offers the GVN an opportunity to revitalize its economy and become less dependent on outside support without sacrificing their security.

-- It will likely provide a force tailored specifically to cope with the needs of the protracted struggle ahead.